Command Indoctrination Operations Security DD MMM YY

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Presentation transcript:

Command Indoctrination Operations Security DD MMM YY

Operations Security Operations Security (OPSEC) is a process that identifies unclassified critical information and indicators (CII), outlines potential threats and the risks associated and develops countermeasures to safeguard critical information. Success of operations depends on protection of CII. Operations Security: 1. A systematic, proven process by which a government, organization, or individual can identify, control, and protect generally unclassified information about an operation/activity and, thus, deny or mitigate an adversary's/competitor's ability to compromise or interrupt said operation/activity (NSC 1988). 2. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to (a) identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems, (b) determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation (DOD JP 1994; JCS 1997). Operations Security process: An analytical process that involves five components: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, and application of appropriate countermeasures (NSC 1988).

OPSEC Process A 5 step process that … Identifies, controls and protects sensitive, critical unclassified information and indicators about a mission, operation or activity Assesses potential threats, vulnerabilities, and risk Utilizes countermeasures to mitigate an adversary's effectiveness against a friendly operation

Discuss your organization’s most realistic threat or adversary Capabilities and intentions of an adversary to undertake any action detrimental to the success of friendly activities or operations. Conventional Threats Military opponents Unconventional Threats Terrorism (foreign and domestic) Hackers Insiders (Spies) Thieves, stalkers, pedophiles Discuss your organization’s most realistic threat or adversary

What are they looking for? Names, photographs of important people Present/future operations Information about military facilities: Location Number of personnel Ammo depot locations Dates and times of operations Family details Spouse, children Location of work, school

Insert or discuss your command specific critical information Information we must protect to ensure success Information the adversary needs to prevent our success Capabilities Operations Personnel Security procedures Insert or discuss your command specific critical information

Personal Critical Information Some examples of critical information that apply to your family life: Names and photos of you and your children Usernames and passwords Length and location of spouse’s deployment Social Security Numbers Credit card/banking information Significant dates (birthdays, anniversaries) Addresses and phone numbers Everyday schedules Travel itineraries

Indicators Friendly, detectable actions that reveal critical information and vulnerabilities Longer working hours Rehearsals Sudden changes in procedures Onloads Large troop movements Emblems/logos Routine predictable procedures Not all indicators are bad

Avoid Indicators

Data Aggregation Information collected from multiple sources Open source collection provides enemy most of their intelligence Manchester Document: 80% of information collected is done so legally Internet Trash Media Small details put together give big picture

Vulnerabilities Weakness the adversary can exploit to get CI Some common vulnerabilities are: Lack of awareness Social media Social engineering Data aggregation Technology Trash Poor policy enforcement Unsecure communications Predictable actions/patterns

Risk The probability an adversary will gain knowledge of your CI and the impact if they are successful Impact: How much will it cost if your CI is lost? Lives Mission Money Time How much are you willing to risk by displaying this indicator or not correcting that vulnerability?

Countermeasures Anything that effectively negates or reduces an adversary's ability to exploit vulnerabilities or collect & process critical information Hide/control indicators Vary routes Modify everyday schedules Influence or manipulate an adversary’s perception Take no action React too late Take the wrong action

Your Command OPSEC Program Manager information here. Contact Information Your Logo here Your Command OPSEC Program Manager information here. OPSEC@Navy.mil 757-203-3656 opsec@navy.mil NAVAL INFORMATION FORCES ATTN: NAVAL OPSEC SUPPORT TEAM 115 LAKE VIEW PARKWAY SUFFOLK, VIRGINIA 23435