Humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games by Julia Poncela-Casasnovas, Mario Gutiérrez-Roig, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro,

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Presentation transcript:

Humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games by Julia Poncela-Casasnovas, Mario Gutiérrez-Roig, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro, Julian Vicens, Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Josep Perelló, Yamir Moreno, Jordi Duch, and Angel Sánchez Science Volume 2(8):e1600451 August 5, 2016 Copyright © 2016, The Authors

Fig. 1 Summary of the games used in the experiment and their equilibria. Summary of the games used in the experiment and their equilibria. Schema with labels to help identify each one of the games in the quadrants of the (T, S) plane (left), along with the symmetric Nash equilibria (center) and average empirical cooperation heatmaps from the 8366 game actions of the 541 subjects (right), in each cell of the (T, S) plane. The symmetric Nash equilibria (center) for each game are as follows: PD and HG have one equilibrium, given by the pure strategies D and C, respectively. SG has a stable mixed equilibrium containing both cooperators and defectors, in a proportion that depends on the specific payoffs considered. SH is a coordination game displaying two pure-strategy stable equilibria, whose bases of attraction are separated by an unstable one, again depending on the particular payoffs of the game (5, 6, 43). The fraction of cooperation is color-coded (red, full cooperation; blue, full defection). Julia Poncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci Adv 2016;2:e1600451 Copyright © 2016, The Authors

Fig. 2 Results from the K-means clustering algorithm. Results from the K-means clustering algorithm. For every cluster, a column represents a player belonging to his or her corresponding cluster, whereas the four rows indicate the four average cooperation values associated with his or her (from top to bottom: cooperation in HG, SG, SH, and PD games). We color-coded the average level of cooperation for each player in each game (blue, 0.0; red, 1.0), whereas the lack of value in a particular game for a particular player is coded in white. Cluster sizes: Envious, n = 161 (30%); Pessimist, n = 113 (21%); Undefined, n = 66 (12%); Optimist, n = 110 (20%); Trustful, n = 90 (17%). Julia Poncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci Adv 2016;2:e1600451 Copyright © 2016, The Authors

Fig. 3 Summary results of the different phenotypes (Optimist, Pessimist, Envious, Trustful, and Undefined) determined by the K-means clustering algorithm, plus the aggregation of all phenotypes. Summary results of the different phenotypes (Optimist, Pessimist, Envious, Trustful, and Undefined) determined by the K-means clustering algorithm, plus the aggregation of all phenotypes. For each phenotype (column), we show the word description of the behavioral rule and the corresponding inferred behavior in the whole (T, S) plane (labeled as Numerical). The fraction of cooperation is color-coded (red, full cooperation; blue, full defection). The last row (labeled as Experiment) shows the average cooperation, aggregating all the decisions taken by the subjects classified in each cluster. The fractions for each phenotype are as follows: 20% Optimist, 21% Pessimist, 30% Envious, 17% Trustful, and 12% Undefined. The very last column shows the aggregated heatmaps of cooperation for both the simulations and the experimental results. The simulation results assume that each individual plays using one and only one of the behavioral rules and respects the relative fractions of each phenotype in the population found by the algorithm. Note the agreement between aggregated experimental and aggregated numerical heatmaps (the discrepancy heatmap between them is shown in section S4.11). We report that the average difference across the entire (T, S) plane between the experiment and the phenotype aggregation is of 1.39 SD units, which represents a value inside the standard 95% confidence interval, whereas for any given phenotype, this difference averaged over the entire (T, S) plane is smaller than 2.14 SD units. Julia Poncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci Adv 2016;2:e1600451 Copyright © 2016, The Authors