Divergent social contracts: Rousseau and The Federalist papers Dr Imogen Peck University of Warwick

Rousseau: life and works 1712 - born in Geneva 1728 - briefly converts to Catholicism, forfeiting Genevan citizenship 1742 - Moves to Paris 1745 - Opera performed, meets Thérèse Levasseur. 1750 - First Discourse 1754 - Second Discourse 1755 - Political Economy 1758 - Lettre à d’Alembert 1761 - Julie ou la Nouvelle Hélöise 1762 - The Social Contract and Emile 1771 - Considerations on the Government of Poland 1778 - Reveries and Dialogues

The state of nature Man is guided by two main passions: Amour de soi – a constant impulse to preserve one’s life. Pity (pitie) – compassion for the suffering of other members of society. ‘Pity is what takes us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering. Pity is what, in the state of nature, takes the place of laws, mores, and virtues, with the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its sweet voice’. (Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men) Differentiates amour de soi from Hobbes’ right of nature, which is more like amour propre (vanity).

the problem Contrary to natural law theorists Rousseau thinks it’s circumstance, and not the application of God given reason, that led man out of the state of nature. In these more communal situations you start to get increasing inequality. Conflict between ‘the right of the strongest and the right of the first occupant’. ‘The first man who, having enclosed. Piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody’. (Second Discourse) ‘Man is born free and everywhere he is is chains’ (The Social Contract, I.1)

(The Social Contract, I.6) the question How to ‘find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before’. (The Social Contract, I.6)

The solution ‘These clauses, rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community. For, in the first place, since each gives himself entirely, the condition is equal for all, and since the condition is equal for all, no one has any interest in making it burdensome to the rest […] each, by giving himself to all, gives himself to no one, and since there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right as one grants him over oneself, one gains the equivalent of all one loses, and more force to preserve what one has’. (The Social Contract, I.6)

Three forms of freedom Natural – ‘unlimited right to do anything everything that tempts him’. Civil – ‘which is limited by the general will’. Moral – ‘which alone makes man truly the master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is freedom’. (The Social Contract, I.8).

particular and general will Particular Will ‘tends to partiality’ (SC II.1) ‘Each individual man, as a man, have a particular will contrary to or different from the general will he has as a citizen’ (SC I. 7) General Will tends to ‘equality’ (SC, II.1) ‘general will alone can direct the forces of the State according to the end of its institutions, which is the common good’ (SC II.1) Sovereignty – ‘nothing but the exercise of the general will’ (SC II.1)

Forcing to be free ‘Each individual man, as a man, have a particular will contrary to or different from the general will he has as a citizen…hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each Citizen to the Fatherland, guarantees him against all personal dependence; the condition which is the device and makes for the operation of the political machines, and alone renders legitimate civil engagements which would otherwise be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most enormous abuses’. (SC, I.7)

Arriving at the general will: the problem of democracy ‘There is often a considerable difference between the will of all and the general will: the latter looks only to the common interest, the former looks to private interest, and is nothing but a sum of particular wills; but if, from these same wills, one takes away the pluses and the minuses which cancel each other out, what is left as the sum of the differences is the general will’ (SC II.3) When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what they are being asked is not precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will that is theirs. Each one expresses his opinion on this by voting, and the declaration of the general will is drawn from the counting of the votes. Therefore when the opinion contrary to mine prevails, that proves nothing except that I was mistaken, and what I thought to be the general will was not. If my private will had prevailed, I would have done something other than what I wanted’. (SC IV. 2) VS

The federalist papers: the context 1775 and 1783 – War of Independence 1777 - Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union 1787 - Constitution of America ratified John Singleton Copley, ‘The Defeat of the Floating Batteries at Gibraltar’ (1782)

Aims of The federalist papers ‘It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgement, their interests can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government’. Introduction, The Federalist Papers  

bibliography Rousseau C. Morris, The Social Contract Theorists (1999) P. Riley, Will and political legitimacy : a critical exposition of social contract theory (1982) M. Cranston, The noble savage : Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754-1762 (1993) On voting/general will M. Schwartzberg, ‘Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules’, Political Theory (2008), 403-423 C. Bertram, ‘Rousseau's Legacy in Two Conceptions of the General Will: Democratic and Transcendent’, The Review of Politics (2012) 403-419 P. Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will’, The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau The Federalist Papers R. Hammersley, Revolutionary moments : reading revolutionary texts (2015)