REFEDS Assurance Suite

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Appropriate Access InCommon Identity Assurance Profiles David L. Wasley Campus Architecture and Middleware Planning workshop February 2008.
Advertisements

Functional component terminology - thoughts C. Tilton.
David Groep Nikhef Amsterdam PDP & Grid Evolving Assurance – IGTF LoA generalisation David Groep Interoperable Global Trust Federation IGTF Documents at.
Innovation through participation eduGAIN federation operator training eduGAIN policy eduGAIN training in Vienna Oct 2011
Identity Management What is it? Why? Responsibilities? Bill Weems Academic Computing University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston.
Credential Provider Operational Practices Statement CAMP Shibboleth June 29, 2004 David Wasley.
Policy, Trust and Technology Mitigating Risk in the Digital World David L. Wasley Camp 2006 © David L. Wasley, 2006.
Sirtfi David Kelsey (STFC-RAL) REFEDS at TNC15 14 June 2015.
Federated Identity Management for HEP David Kelsey WLCG GDB 9 May 2012.
AAI-enabled VO Platform “VO without Tears” Christoph Witzig EGI TF, Amsterdam, Sept 15, 2010.
Federated or Not: Secure Identity Management Janemarie Duh Identity Management Systems Architect Chair, Security Working Group ITS, Lafayette College.
Levels of Assurance in Authentication Tim Polk April 24, 2007.
INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST TRY InCommon eduGAIN Policy and Community Working Group.
Innovation through participation eduGAIN interfederation service for research and education Cern FedID workshop in RAL, UK 2-3 Nov 2011 Mikael Linden,
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration Licia Florio REFEDS Meeting The AARC Project I2 Technology Exchange.
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration Licia Florio AARC Workshop The AARC Project Brussels, 26 October.
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration Mikael Linden AARC all hands Milan Authentication and Authorisation.
Federated Identity Management for HEP David Kelsey HEPiX, IHEP Beijing 18 Oct 2012.
Click to edit Master title style © by Nat Sakimura. Coping with Information Asymmetry SESSION G: Managing Risk & Reducing Online Fraud Using New.
Networks ∙ Services ∙ People Daniela Pöhn REFEDS EWTI, Vienna IdPs and Federations Service Aspects of Assurance SA5T1.
Innovation through participation EduGAIN policy (working draft) Status update REFEDs 30th May 2010
Networks ∙ Services ∙ People Thomas Bärecke Journée Fédération, Paris Collaboration européenne GÉANT SA5 03/07/2015 SA5 T5 team
Networks ∙ Services ∙ People Nicole Harris UK federation meeting eduGAIN, REFEDS and the UK 23 June 2015 Project Development Officer GÉANT.
Networks ∙ Services ∙ People Licia Florio TNC, Lisbon Consuming identities across e- Infrastructures 16 June 2015 PDO GÈANT.
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration Taipei - Taiwan Mechanisms of Interfederation 13th March 2016 Alessandra.
PRACE user authentication and vetting Vincent RIBAILLIER, 29 th EUGridPMA meeting, Bucharest, September 9 th, 2013.
IGTF Generalised Assurance comments by federation operators with a SAML background September 19-21, 2016 CERN, Geneva, CH.
Building Trust for Research and Collaboration
The EGI AAI “CheckIn” Service
J Jensen, STFC Chief Soapbox Officer 23 May 2017
Cross-sector and user-centric AAI
The Policy Puzzle Many groups and (proposed) policies, but leaving many open issues AARC “NA3” is tackling a sub-set of these “Levels of Assurance” –
EGI Updates Check-in Matthew Viljoen – EGI Foundation
AARC Update What’s been happening in AARC which matters for GÉANT
Federation made simple
User Community Driven Development in Trust and Identity
eduTEAMS platform for collaboration Niels Van Dijk
CheckIn: the AAI platform for EGI
AAI Alignment Nicolas Liampotis (based on the work of Mikael Linden)
GakuNin: Federated Identity Management Activities in Japan
Introduction How to combine and use services in different security domains? How to take into account privacy aspects? How to enable single sign on (SSO)
Towards hamonized policies and best practices
The AARC Project Licia Florio (GÉANT) Christos Kanellopoulos (GRNET)
AARC2 JRA1 Nicolas Liampotis
The AARC Project Licia Florio AARC Coordinator GÉANT
Minimal Level of Assurance (LoA)
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
Frameworks for harmonized policies and practices
Policy in harmony: our best practice
REFEDS Assurance Framework
Policy and Best Practice Harmonisation (‘NA3’)
Towards hamonized policies and best practices
Federal Requirements for Credential Assessments
AAI For Researchers Licia Florio AARC Project Coordinator GÉANT DI4R
AARC Blueprint Architecture and Pilots
Supporting communities with harmonized policy
EUGridPMA Status and Current Trends and some IGTF topics March 2018 APGridPMA ISGC Meeting David Groep, Nikhef & EUGridPMA.
OIDC Federation for Infrastructures
David Groep for the entire AARC Policy Team I2TechEX18 meeting
Protecting Your Credit Identity
David Groep for the entire AARC Policy Team AARC2 AHM4 meeting
Appropriate Access InCommon Identity Assurance Profiles
WEQ-012 PKI Overview March 19, 2019
Provisioning of Services Authentication Requirements
JRA1: Integrated AAI Developments
REFEDS Assurance WG REFEDS meeting 16 June 2019
Baseline Expectations for Trust in Federation
Combined Assurance Model
GEANT Data protection Code of Conduct 2.0 REFEDS meeting 16 June 2019
Check-in Identity and Access Management solution that makes it easy to secure access to services and resources.
Presentation transcript:

REFEDS Assurance Suite FIM4R, 11 Feb 2019 Mikael Linden, REFEDS assurance wg chair mikael.linden@csc.fi

Challenge How was the registration/Identity Proofing done? Is that even a shared account (libraryuser1@university.org)? Can this user ID be later reassigned to some other person? How fresh is that affiliation information? How was the user authentication done? Home University/Institution Research service eduGAIN interfederation Local federation Identity Provider Service Provider ePPN=”bob@university.org”, ePAffiliation=”faculty”

Short history of REFEDS Assurance Suite 11/2015 AARC publishes minimum requirements on assurance 6/2016 REFEDS establishes Assurance working group 4-6/2017 First public consultation on RAF 2-5/2018 Pilot on RAF, SFA and MFA 4-6/2018 Second public consultation on RAF and SFA 10/2018 RAF and SFA ver 1.0 published

REFEDS Assurance Suite REFEDS Assurance Framework (RAF) ver 1.0 Approved and published https://refeds.org/assurance REFEDS Single-factor authentiation profile (SFA) ver 1.0 https://refeds.org/profile/sfa REFEDS Multi-factor authentication profile (MFA) ver 1.0 approved in June 2017 You can use them together or separately

The big picture of assurance in REFEDS Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

Split of responsibility between REFEDS specs REFEDS Assurance framework (RAF) AuthN profiles Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication Separate specification: REFEDS Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication Separate specification: REFEDS Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

Test your IdP’s conformance: https://attribute-viewer. aai. switch RAF values released by your IdP You can ask the test SP to request particular authentication context and display IdP’s response

Outreach to federations Presentations REFEDS 38th in Trondheim Presentations REFEDS 39th meeting in Orlando TechEx 2018 session in Orlando Webinar December 2018 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCussxbcR_OxG1e_kRp0pjpA

Otherwise the IdPs are not going to deploy it. Start supporting it! Start requiring it! Otherwise the IdPs are not going to deploy it.

Questions? The work has been funded by AARC, AARC2 and GN4 projects

Backup slides

Assurance Framework assertions and profiles To be expressed by the CSP in the eduPersonAssurance attribute $PREFIX$=https://refeds.org/assurance

RAF values for properties of identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/ID/unique The user identifier represents a single natural person The CSP can contact the person to whom the identifier is issued The user identifier is never re-assigned The user identifier is eduPersonUniqueID, SAML 2.0 persistent nameId, subject-id or pairwise-id or OIDC sub (public or pairwise) ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/ID/no-eppn-reassign - eduPersonPrincipalName value has properties 1-3 (see above). eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/ID/eppn-reassign-1y - eduPersonPrincipalName value has properties 1-2 (see above) but may be re-assigned after a hiatus period of 1 year or longer. ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

RAF values for identity proofing Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication Identity proofing and credential issuance, renewal, and replacement qualify to any of… ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/IAP/low sections 5.1.2-5.1.2.9 & 5.1.3 of Kantara AL1 IGTF level DOGWOOD or ASPEN Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/IAP/medium sections 5.2.2-5.2.2.9, 5.2.2.12&5.2.3 of Kantara AL2 IGTF level BIRCH or CEDAR section 2.1.2, 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 of eIDAS low ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F) eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/IAP/high section 5.3.2-5.3.2.9, 5.3.2.12&5.3.3 of Kantara AL3 section 2.1.2, 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 of eIDAS substantial

RAF values for attribute freshness Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/ATP/ePA-1m eduPersonAffiliation, eduPersonScopedAffiliation and eduPersonPrimaryAffiliation attributes (if populated and released to the RP) reflect user’s departure within 31 days time ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication eduPersonAssurance=$PREFIX$/ATP/ePA-1d eduPersonAffiliation, eduPersonScopedAffiliation and eduPersonPrimaryAffiliation attributes (if populated and released to the RP) reflect user’s departure within one days time ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

RAF conformance criteria REFEDS Assurance framework (RAF) AuthN profiles Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication In all cases the CSP MUST (baseline expectations for Identity Providers): The Identity Provider is operated with organizational-level authority The Identity Provider is trusted enough that it is (or it could be) used to access the organization’s own systems Generally-accepted security practices are applied to the Identity Provider Federation metadata is accurate, complete, and includes at least one of the following: support, technical, admin, or security contacts A CSP indicates its conformance to this profile by asserting $PREFIX$. ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

“Cappuccino” for low-risk research use cases REFEDS Assurance framework (RAF) AuthN profiles Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication ”Goes with” ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

“Espresso” for more demanding use cases REFEDS Assurance framework (RAF) AuthN profiles Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication ”Goes with” High (e.g. F2F)

Single-factor authentication profile https://refeds.org/profile/sfa

SFA profile requirements Authenticator type Secret basis Min length Memorized Secret ≥52 characters (e.g. 52 letters) 12 characters ≥72 characters (e.g. 52 letters + 10 digits + 10 special characters) 8 characters Time based OTP-Device Out-of-Band Device 10-51 characters (e.g. 10 digits) 6 characters 4 characters Look-Up Secret Sequence based OTP-Device 10 characters Cryptographic Software/Device RSA/DSA 2048 bit ECDSA 256 bit Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)

Further SFA requirements Protection against online guessing (e.g. rate limiting). Secrets cryptographically protected online and in transit Way of delivery Maximum life time Time based OTP Device 5 minutes Telephone network (e.g. SMS, phone) 10 minutes E-mail (e.g. recovery link) 24 hours Postal mail 1 month

SFA requirements: Replacement for a lost authentication factor An existing secret must not be sent to the user (e.g. a stored password). The replacement procedure does not solely rely on knowledge-based authentication (e.g. answer a secret question). Human based procedures (e.g. service desk) ensure a comparable level of assurance of the requesting user identity as the initial identity vetting. In order to restore a lost authentication factor, an OTP may be sent to the users address of record. For authenticators which are provided to the user as a backup, all requirements of the corresponding authentication factor apply.

Multi-factor authentication profile https://refeds.org/profile/mfa

MFA profile requirements Identifiers ID proofing Attributes Authentication ID is unique, personal and traceable Low (self-asserted) Affiliation freshness 1 month Single-factor authentication The authentication of the user’s current session used a combination of at least two of the four distinct types of factors: something you know, something you have, something you are, something you do) The factors are independent (access to one factor does not by itself grant access to other factors) The combination of the factors mitigates single-factor only risks related to non-real-time attacks such as phishing, offline cracking, online guessing and theft of a (single) factor ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Medium (e.g. postal credential delivery) Affiliation freshness 1 day Multi-factor authentication High (e.g. F2F)