A crash-course on the euro crisis

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A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
Presentation transcript:

A crash-course on the euro crisis Markus K. Brunnermeier & Ricardo Reis A crash-course on the euro crisis

The financial crash and systemic risk Section 4

Strategic complementarities, amplification, multiplicity, and pecuniary externalities Modern financial markets depend critically on how each individual market participant reacts to the behaviour of others The combination of capital misallocation, reliance on wholesale funding and the rise of modern banks has led to a financial system that is prone to instability Adverse feedback loops amplify initial exogenous shocks so seemingly small events can have large changes in credit and asset prices If these amplifying forces are sufficiently strong, multiple equilibria can arise such that the system self-generates systemic risk

A model of strategic interactions All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s Choices of one bank as a function of the choices of others Best response functions for lending Traditional bank decreases lending whenever others increase their average lending: there are fewer good projects needing financing. BR curve is downward sloping Actions are strategic substitutes

Equilibrium All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s O 45o For simplicity, assume all other banks’ lending choice is identical At O, the individual bank’s BR coincides with the market BR, at the 45o line as all identical There is an equilibrium in that every single participant chooses to do what the group is also doing

After a shock shock All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s O 45o Shock: banks become better aware of risks or investors give less funding. Cut lending. Shift the BR curve downwards Others cut lending (45o line)

After a shock But now individual bank wants to lend more. All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s H O attenuation 45o But now individual bank wants to lend more. Get attenuation of initial shock Cobweb: then want to lower, then want to raise it, and so on… Equilibrium moves from O to H Both O and H are stable equilibriums and shocks only lead to moderate changes due to attenuation

Modern banks: upward sloping BR curve Due to rapid growth, modern banks are under-capitalized so their leverage ratio is already at the regulatory limit. Hence, falls in their tradable asset prices causes them to shrink their balance sheets by shedding assets When the entire financial sector is selling assets simultaneously, there is little market liquidity. Fire sales Since each bank anticipates that all other banks will be selling, each will have an incentive to sell first causing fast drops in asset prices All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s O 45o

Modern banks: upward sloping BR curve Low asset prices reduce funding liquidity due to two spirals A losses spiral, where decreases in collateral value lead to cuts in funding and loans A margins spiral, where a fall in collateral value causes lenders to raise margins in anticipation of a fire sale These two spirals mean that when average actions increase, the participant chooses a more aggressive action. Actions are now strategic complements All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s O 45o

Shock with modern banks At equilibrium O the difference between a downward and upward sloping BR curve is not immediately apparently. The initial shock shifts the BR down by the same vertical distance Yet, in a modern system the equilibrium becomes unstable in the presence of a shock All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s shock O H 45o

Amplification and liquidity spirals Now when one bank cuts lending, the others want to cut lending further. Leads to further cuts, and so on Since all the banks’ actions are now strategic complements, it leads to amplification of the initial shock Equilibrium is now lower at L All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s shock O H amplification L 45o

Multiple equilibrium Shifts in beliefs can lead to a new (stable) equilibrium at a much lower point D If banks believe that others will cut lending, then they anticipate fire sales and price drops, and the losses and margins spirals They will cut lending beforehand due to anticipation and thus triggering the depressed-lending equilibrium Hence, there is multiplicity of equilibrium All other banks’ lending choice Individual bank’s shock O H amplification L multiplicity D 45o

Pecuniary externalities and systemic risk When banks sell assets they exert a pecuniary externality by pushing asset prices down and causing losses of other banks While strategic complementarities lead to amplification and multiplicity, externalities lead to systemic risk Losses in some financial institutions can lead to losses across the whole financial system Systemic crises spread to the real economy through a general- equilibrium propagation of the initial shock Pecuniary externalities and systemic risk

Systemic risk in the Irish banking sector Summer of 2007: news of bad loans in the US subprime market triggered losses in American investments of some core European banks This led these banks to cut back on interbank lending as well as their repo purchases of securitized mortgages from the periphery At the same time, US money market funds, which have rolling over repos to European banks for years, withdrew from this market between 2007-2008 due to the growing US financial crisis These two forces combined led to a negative shock to the supply of funds in the wholesale and repo markets for bank funding Irish banks were particularly reliant on this foreign wholesale funding and had also invested in American securities Over the previous decade, they had transitioned from traditional to modern banks supplying abundant credit to real estate The shock to funds triggered fire sales and liquidity spirals that led to large falls in lending and house prices Large losses spilled over to the real economy leading to a systemic banking crisis. The general-equilibrium propagation and the paradox of prudence led to a deep recession in Ireland

Individual risk and systemic risk Value-at-risk (VaR) Measures how individually risky a bank is Calculate the size of the losses in the value of its equity in the worst 5% of the weeks during a two-year period. ∆CoVaR Measures systemic risk of banking sector Calculate by how much the value at risk of the banking sector changes when one particular bank is under distress.

The transition from traditional to modern banking in Ireland increased the VaR in 2 of the major banks. ∆CoVaR increased in all 3 banks. And see how positively associated they are

Irish banks and housing Strategic complementarities amplified the financial shock from abroad causing credit to construction and housing sectors to fall by 48% between 2008-2010 Propagation to the real economy led to a fall in residential property prices in Dublin of 35% By early 2009, the private equity of all 3 banks had been almost wiped out

What can policy do? To attenuate the amplification if the externalities involved are large. Central bank lending to banks. Requires collateral Government bail out banks through loans or recapitalizations that more or less explicitly nationalize the banks. Requires trust that banks remain economically solvent.

More euro-area data Credit boom as all banks lend more House prices rise and fall quickly

The credit boom in Spain Source: Santos, T. (2012) The Spanish Banking Crisis

House prices in Spain Source: Santos, T. (2012) The Spanish Banking Crisis

House prices in periphery Source: Baldwin Giavazzi (2015) “The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Remedies” CEPR Press

Credit boom Source: Meghir, Pissarides, Vayanos, Vettas (201x) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT Press

Run on Greek deposits Source: Meghir, Pissarides, Vayanos, Vettas (201x) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT Press

Bad loans and fire sales Source: Meghir, Pissarides, Vayanos, Vettas (201x) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT Press

Summary The actions of traditional banks are strategic substitutes with a downwards sloping BR curve. Hence, there is attenuation after an initial shock to the financial system Modern banks, on the other hand, have upwards sloping BR curves. Fire sales and liquidity spirals cause their lending choices to be strategic complements Multiplicity can move the economy to a stable depressed-lending equilibrium The Irish banking sector is an example of systemic risk where the crisis spilled over into the real economy through a general- equilibrium propagation of the initial shock This led to large falls in Ireland’s lending and house prices and causing a deep recession