Non-Myopic Strategic Bluffing Papers Presented by Nick Wells

Myopic Short-sighted Always truthful Never an incentive to deviate

Why do we care about non-myopic? Repeated games Intelligent players Focus on present round or later rounds?

Games “Non-Myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets” Can’t see other person’s signal But can infer their signal based on action Trading security F based on event E P{E|00}, P{E|01}, P{E|10}, P{E|11} Independent Signals (implies CD)

Games “Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets” Alice-Bob-Alice We can analyze both papers with this game Alice always reveals in first round (PBE) Knowing Bob’s information won’t help her anyway Because of Conditional Independence (i.e. Nature choosing a coin) Therefore, Alice goes first to take biggest slice she can by going first

Relative Entropy Each Player Expects to Gain the Relative Entropy of his Distribution to the Old Distribution Thus always being truthful makes a profit But can we make more profit by being deceitful?

Truth or Lie Yes, we can make more profit by being deceitful if we have independence. No, we cannot if we have conditional independence Intuitively, with conditional independence we don’t really change our actions anyway. With independence, one player can deceive the other and turn the tables on them at the end.

Discounted Market Scoring Rule Aims to prevent forward-looking bluffing strategies by discounting future payoffs, thus making you focus on the present In other words, you act myopically Problems: Arbitrage system by taking advantage of the present System shrinks to a point where there is no incentive to participate How can we fix it? Still not sure…