NetWarden: Mitigating Network Covert Channels without Performance Loss

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Presentation transcript:

NetWarden: Mitigating Network Covert Channels without Performance Loss Jiarong Xing, Adam Morrison, Ang Chen Rice University

Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels Launch code: 1011 Ah! 1011 TCP hdr: 1011 H E L L O President Launch code Code is 1011 1 1 1 H E L L O Attacker Secretary Covert channels: Storage channels: changing the packet header fields. Timing channels: changing the timing of packets.

State of the art: Existing channels Covert storage channels: TCP initial sequence number channel (Rowland, 1997) IP TTL channel (Qu, 2004) Partial ACK channel (Luo, 2009) … Covert timing channels: IP timing channel (Cabuk, 2004) TCP timing channel (Luo, 2008) Physical layer channel (Lee, 2014) … Covert channels can leak data over long distance effectively “Common Criteria” require protection against both channel types!

State of the art: Storage channel defense TCP sender TCP hdr: 1011 H E L L O TCP receiver TCP hdr: 1101 H E L L O replace (+2) Repeat for EVERY packets for Tbps traffic Field X = a replace (+2) Field X = a +2 Field X = b replace (+2) Field X = b +2 Field X = c replace (+2) Field X = c +2 Field X = d replace (+2) Field X = d +2 … State-of-the-art solutions are software-based Detection: Per-packet header inspection Mitigation: Per-packet header modification As a result, they are very inefficient!

State of the art: Timing channel detection Normal traffic: With channel: Two peaks One peak Distribution of packet gaps 1 Detection: Statistics-based tests over packet gaps Looking for signs of statistical deviation  Not always accurate

State of the art: Timing channel mitigation With channel: After mitigating: H E L O 1 extra delay Mitigation: Add random delay to each packet Destroy the original timing of the packets It will increase the latency of TCP connections

Problem: Performance penalty Detection: Per-packet inspection required Software cannot keep up with Tbps traffic Mitigation: Adding random delay to each packet  Increase latency Collateral damage  Affects legitimate traffic (e.g., false positives)

Can we mitigate covert channels while preserving performance? Key question Can we mitigate covert channels while preserving performance?

Approach: NetWarden Launch code: 1011 NetWarden TCP hdr: 1011 H E L L O ???? President 1 1 1 H E L L O Attacker Secretary ToR switch NetWarden: A performance-preserving covert channel defense.

Key challenges and solutions Challenge #1: Efficient detection Solution: Use programmable switches Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation Solution: Performance “boosting” Challenge #3: Hardware limitations Solution: Fastpath/slowpath co-design

Outline Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels State of the art: Performance penalty Approach: NetWarden NetWarden design Challenge #1: Efficient detection Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation Challenge #3: Hardware limitations Initial validation Ongoing work Conclusion

Challenge #1: Efficient detection Memory Switch control plane Problem: Software-based detection cannot handle Tbps traffic. Solution: Detecting covert channels on programmable switches. Programmable switches have two layers: Control plane: General purpose CPU. Data plane: Programmable ASIC.

Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation Problem: Existing mitigations incur performance loss. Solution: Temporarily boosting TCP performance to neutralize the performance penalty. Two boosters: ACK booster: Generate ACK packets in advance. Receive window booster: Enlarge receive window field temporarily. Two boosters: ACK booster: Generate ACK packets in advance. Receive window booster: Enlarge receive window field temporarily.

Boosting performance: ACK booster NetWarden data1 data1 ACK1 ACK1 data2 data2 Performance boosting Creates the illusion of a shorter latency as perceived by the sender.

Challenge #3: Hardware limitations Packet buffers Statistical tests Traffic Fast path (data plane) Slow path (control plane) Storage channel detector Timing channel detector Problem: The data plane has hardware restrictions E.g., does not support packet caching Or complex statistical tests Solution: Fastpath/slowpath co-design

Outline State of the art: Performance penalty Approach: NetWarden Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels State of the art: Performance penalty Approach: NetWarden NetWarden design Challenge #1: Efficient detection Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation Challenge #3: Hardware limitations Initial validation Ongoing work Conclusion

Experimental setup Proof-of-concept prototype: Two covert channels: P4 for fastpath Python for slowpath Runs in software-based simulator. Two covert channels: Channel #1: TCP storage channel Channel #2: IP timing channel Scenario: Client downloads file from NetWarden-protected server Baseline: A naïve defense without performance boosting

Results: Effectiveness Bit decoding error rate (%) Perfect decoding (flip 0/1) 100 75 50 25 50 49 Random guess 4 Perfect decoding No defense Naïve defense NetWarden Naïve defense: renders decoding to a random guess. NetWarden: very close to a random guess. NetWarden can mitigate covert channels effectively.

NetWarden can mitigate covert channels with minimal performance loss. Results: Performance Normalized file downloading time 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.18 1.00 1.03 No defense Naïve defense NetWarden Naïve defense incurs 18% extra downloading time. NetWarden only incurs 3% extra downloading time. NetWarden can mitigate covert channels with minimal performance loss.

Ongoing work How should we divide the labor between fastpath and slowpath? “Optimal” division of labor How much performance boosting should NetWarden perform? Too much  unfair to other connections Too little  cannot neutralize performance loss How can we make NetWarden effective for all TCP variants?

Questions? Conclusion Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels Key limitation of existing approaches: Performance penalty Our approach: NetWarden Using programmable data planes Performance boosting Fastpath/slowpath design The goal of NetWarden: Mitigating covert channels without performance loss! Questions?