Validating MANRS of a network

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Presentation transcript:

Validating MANRS of a network Andrei Robachevsky robachevsky@isoc.org

Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security MANRS provides baseline recommendations in the form of Actions Distilled from common behaviors – BCPs, optimized for low cost and low risk of deployment With high potential of becoming norms MANRS builds a visible community of security minded operators Social acceptance and peer pressure

MANRS for Network operators Filtering Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information Ensure the correctness of your own announcements and announcements from your customers to adjacent networks with prefix and AS-path granularity Anti-spoofing Prevent traffic with spoofed source IP addresses Enable source address validation for at least single-homed stub customer networks, their own end-users, and infrastructure Coordination Facilitate global operational communication and coordination between network operators Maintain globally accessible up-to-date contact information in common routing databases Global Validation Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale Publish your data, so others can validate

Commitment, transparency and credibility Inform and improve MANRS participants about their degree of commitment Establish measurable indicators of MANRS readiness Publish through the MANRS Observatory (https://observatory.manrs.org/) MANRS Observatory provides a view from the outside (with its limitations), but how does the network really looks for the inside? Create a local auditing tool. It will automate parsing router configurations to detect a wide range of common configuration issues Help network engineers secure their eBGP speaking routers, implement MANRS actions to prevent spoofed traffic, secure BGP route policy and help validate global routesWhile Potentially use this as a complementary indicator for MANRS readiness when evaluating an application

Project vision A locally run tool for auditing BGP and anti-spoofing configurations on various platforms Tool will take in a configuration file and output a report showing how well the router did against the pre-defined rules MANRS is a first candidate, but there may be other sets Audit configs from different vendors/OSes

What kind of checks? Action 1 – Filtering Action 2 – Anti-spoofing Are inbound routing advertisements from customers and peers secured by applying prefix- level filters? Is the router configured to connect to a RPKI-to-Router interface for ROA validation? Is the router configured to drop RPKI invalids? Action 2 – Anti-spoofing Is uRPF strict mode enabled on interfaces connected to customers? Are there ACLs applied to stub customers to prevent them from sending spoofed traffic?

More difficult kind of checks Action 1 – Filtering Are prefix-level filters dynamically applied from IRR entries? Do prefix filters match the customer cone? Action 2 – Anti-spoofing Are the ACLs correctly match customer’s network blocks?

Prototype Implementation Developed as part of a hackathon at Charter Communications Robot Framework based automatic router configuration analyzer Use of a single, high level, cross-platform tool makes it more accessible to a broad range of users Produces graphical/web based reports to make it easier to understand and act on the results Extensible w/Python for more complex analysis if needed

Sample output Screenshot courtesy Rich Compton and Pratik Lotia

Reports Screenshot courtesy Rich Compton and Pratik Lotia

From a prototype to a tool Beta-test the prototype. Verify that the results that the tool is outputting are results that people can actually use and will help them Verify that people would actually use this tool. If not, then it's not worth putting in time to work on it. I'm not sure how we can verify this. Maybe a survey? Increase the platforms supported by the tool. Populate a “library” of configurations: what is the priority – MikroTik, Cisco IOS, Huawei? Share the tool with others to encourage them to use it.

Would like to contribute? Could this be useful? Would like to contribute? manrs@isoc.org