Ari Juels RSA Laboratories Marty Wattenberg 328 W. 19th Street, NYC A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme.

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Presentation transcript:

Ari Juels RSA Laboratories Marty Wattenberg 328 W. 19th Street, NYC A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme

Biometrics

Biometric authentication: Computer Authentication through Measurement of Biological Characteristics

u Fingerprint scanning u Iris scanning u Voice recognition Types of biometric authentication u Many others... u Face recognition u Body odor Authenticating...

Enrollment / Registration Template t Alice

Enrollment / Registration Alice Server

Authentication Server

Authentication Alice Server

Server verifies against template ?

The Problem...

Template theft

Limited password changes First password Second password

Templates represent intrinsic information about you Alice Theft of template is theft of identity

Towards a solution

password UNIX protection of passwords password h(password) Password

Template protection? h( )

Fingerprint is variable u Differing angles of presentation u Differing amounts of pressure u Chapped skin Don t have exact key!

We need fuzzy commitment ( )

Seems counterintuitive u Cryptographic (hash) function scrambles bits to produce random- looking structure, but uFuzziness or error resistance means high degree of local structure

Error Correcting Codes

Noisy channel Alice Bob Alice, I love… crypto s

Error correcting codes Alice Bob 110

g Function g adds redundancy Bob M 3 bits C 9 bits c Message space Codeword space g

Error correcting codes Alice Bob

f c C Function f corrects errors Alice f

Alice uses g -1 to retrieve message 9 bits C M 3 bits Alice g-1g-1 c Alice gets original, uncorrupted message 110

Constructing C

Idea: Treat template like message W g C(t) = h(g(t))

What do we get? uFuzziness of error-correcting code u Security of hash function-based commitment

Problems Davida, Frankel, and Matt (97) u Results in very large error-correcting code u Do not get good fuzziness u Cannot prove security easily u Dont really have access to message!

Our (counterintuitive) idea: Express template as corrupted codeword u Never use message space!

Express template as corrupted codeword W t w t = w +

t = w + h(w) Idea: hash most significant part for security Idea: leave some local information in clear for fuzziness

How we use fuzzy commitment...

Computing fuzzy hash of template t u Choose w at random u Compute = t - w u Store (h(w), ) as commitment (h(w), )

Verification of fingerprint t u Retrieve C(t) = (h(w), ) u Try to decommit using t: –Compute w = f(t - ) –Is h(w) = h(w)? ?

Characteristics of u Good fuzziness (say, 17%) u Simplicity u Provably strong security –I.e., nothing to steal

Open problems u What do template and error distributions really look like? u What other uses are there for fuzzy commitment? –Graphical passwords

Questions?