Continuous Evaluation Program What is CEP? Why care? What’s the process? This section covers The Continuous Evaluation Program. Reference Chapter 10 of the SECNAV M-5510.30.

Continuous Evaluation Program What it is Ensures those granted eligibility remain eligible through continuous assessment and evaluation We must report any information that falls under the 13 adjudicative guidelines What it’s not Burning bridges Betraying a confidence CEP is the means to ensure everyone who has access to classified information remains eligible. The program relies on all personnel within command to report questionable or unfavorable information which may be relevant to a security clearance determination. The CEP is not optional—it must be effectively implemented at every level within every command and includes contractor, military, and civilian personnel.

Continuous Evaluation Program Who’s it for? It applies to all contractor, military, and civilian personnel. Who’s responsible? Everyone. CEP is the means to ensure everyone who has access to classified information remains eligible. The program relies on all personnel within command to report questionable or unfavorable information which may be relevant to a security clearance determination. The CEP is not optional—it must be effectively implemented at every level within every command and includes contractor, military, and civilian personnel.

Adjudicative Guidelines Allegiance to the US Foreign influence Foreign preference Sexual behavior Personal conduct Financial considerations Alcohol consumption Drug involvement Emotional, mental, personality disorders Criminal conduct Security violations Outside activities Misuse of IT systems ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES: An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States. FOREIGN INFLUENCE: A security risk may exist when an individual‘s immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. FOREIGN PREFERENCE: When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. * Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or as a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance. PERSONAL CONDUCT: Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION: An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION: Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness. DRUG INVOLVEMENT: Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Drugs are defined as mood and behavior-altering substances, and include: Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens); or Inhalants and other similar substances. Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction. EMOTIONAL, MENTAL, AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g. clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider. CRIMINAL CONDUCT: A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. SECURITY VIOLATIONS: Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES: Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. MISUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS: Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.

Continuous Evaluation Program Why Care? Ft. Hood Shooting Anthrax Attack Wiki Leaks Attack on fellow soldiers Kuwait Chapter 10 of the SECNAV M-5510.30. The requirement to do continuous evaluation has been around for years but has been especially highlighted over the last 10 years or so. This slide contains pictures of the accused where the CEP most definitely applies. Events such as Ft Hood, Wiki leaks, Bruce Ivans, and Hasan Akbar cause us to analyze “how did that person have a clearance or be in a sensitive position? Did anyone report incidents and adverse information? If not, why? If so, what was the outcome? Did anyone know what was really going on with the individual? What leadership actions were being done? What can we do to make the program better to prevent harm to national security, our personnel, and our resources?” If an act of violence occurred, if someone was leaking classified information, if someone harmed himself, if an insider committed terrorism--could your command answer those questions? There’s a reason CEP is an inspectable item via the IG inspection. It’s not a “nice to have”. It’s not a program that should be under the radar or barely met. It matters for the safety of our personnel and protection of national security information. You should care. Your command should care. The reality is that events like the Fort Hood shooting raised concern at the DoD level. The DoD expects all services to step up. The Ft Hood Study highlights the need for us to emphasize insider threat, violent indicators, and continuous evaluation. The issues can no longer be viewed as separate. The CEP is one vital tool to protect our Marines, our information, our commands. Nidal Hasan has not been convicted, but the USG alleges that he is responsible for the murder of 13 people. Does this just happen or do people display indicators that they have a problem? The facts and details have yet to be made public, but it is almost certain that when they are they will show that many people observed troubling things about this man that they failed to report which resulted in this tragedy and indicate a complete failure of the continuous evaluation process. Note to Jill: I’ve not found any videos of the Ft Hood shooting that are available open source and stand alone. In other words you can’t download it and plug it into a PP. There are videos that can be hyperlinked to, but my sense is that you do not favor that because you have no control over the source (link may break) or control over the capability to get to the internet in a particular classroom. I settled on what you see here because it makes the connection implicitly that CEP failed and Hasan should have been reported under it, while not directly saying Hasan is a radicalized Islamic terrorist who was known to have allegiance and foreign preference discrepancies. If you decide on some Ft Hood attention gainer/WIFFM technique, it might be prudent to have a lawyer analyze it for the impact on Nidal’s prosecution or other potential liability. You could use the “what’s reportable” video, but would it have the impact you want/need to have the student be able to answer, “why am I listening to this”?

Facts entered as “incident” The process Security manager determines if reportable & whether to submit initial or final report Info reported Facts entered as “incident” JPAS Makes determination CAF The basic process

The process Determine if the information is reportable Consult the CEP check sheet, Exhibit 10A Featured guidelines Security violations Allegiance to the U.S., foreign preference, and foreign influence Financial Drugs Alcohol Emotional, mental, & personality disorders PTSD alone is not reportable Featured guidelines extracted from Appendix G of the SECNAV M-5510.30. Note that all items that fall under the 13 Adjudicative Guidelines are reportable under the CEP. These featured are the most common.

The process Security manager makes the report in JPAS The CAF Reports can be made in 3 stages Initial or final Use command discretion and common sense Consider severity of incident Consider what works better for tracking and receiving follow up information The CAF Looks at the total picture: reviews the report, previous case file, and previous incident reports Reporting something doesn’t automatically equal revocation

The process Average 3-6 months for the CAF to make a determination Individuals may PCA or PCS but consider… No transfer during due process Coordination MOS/future billet requirements may prevent transfer Coordinate with the monitor, IPAC, S-1/G-1, and SJA Pending legal actions may affect transfer Coordinate with future security manager

The process Withdrawal What about access? Suspension

The process What is access? Eligibility is the determination made by the CAF Access to classified information is granted by the command locally based on eligibility, investigation, and need-to-know The command may do the following during a pending incident report at the CAF: Allow continued access Do a routine withdrawal Do a full suspension Access must be removed if incident report results in revoked eligibility by the CAF

The process Summary All those with clearance eligibility are subject to the CEP Know what’s reportable Items under the 13 adjudicative guidelines Report information immediately to the security manager Understand the process Facts are reported to the CAF CAF makes the determination whether to maintain eligibility Command has authority to authorize, withdraw, or suspend individual’s access