Network Security: an Economic Perspective Marc Lelarge (INRIA-ENS) currently visiting STANFORD TRUST seminar, Berkeley 2011.

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Presentation transcript:

Network Security: an Economic Perspective Marc Lelarge (INRIA-ENS) currently visiting STANFORD TRUST seminar, Berkeley 2011.

Threats and Vulnerabilities Attacks are exogenous

Contribution (1) Optimal security investment for a single agent -Gordon and Loeb model, 1/e rule -Monotone comparative statics (2) Optimal security investment for an interconnected agent - Network externalities (3) Equilibrium analysis of the security game - Free-rider problem, Critical mass, PoA

(1) Single agent Two parameters: – Potential monetary loss: – Probability of security breach without additional security: Agent can invest to reduce the probability of loss to: Optimal investment:

(1) Gordon and Loeb Class of security breach probability functions: measure of the productivity of security. Gordon and Loeb (2002)

(1) Gordon and Loeb (cont.) vulnerability Optimal investment (size of potential loss fixed)

(1) Gordon and Loeb (cont.) Probability of loss for a given investment

(1) Gordon and Loeb (cont.) High vulnerability Low vulnerability

(1) Conditions for monotone investment If then is non-decreasing Augmenting return of investment with vulnerability: Extension to submodular functions.

(1) The 1/e rule If the function is log-convex in x then the optimal security investment is bounded by:,i.e of the expected loss

Contribution (1) Optimal security investment for a single agent -Gordon and Loeb model, 1/e rule -Monotone comparative statics (2) Optimal security investment for an interconnected agent - Network externalities (3) Equilibrium analysis of the security game - Free-rider problem, Critical mass, PoA

(2) Effect of the network Agent faces an internal risk and an indirect risk. Information available to the agent: in a poset (partially ordered set). Optimal security investment:

(2) How to estimate the probability of loss? Epidemic risk model Binary choice for protection Limited information on the network of contagion (physical or not): degree distribution. – Best guess: take a graph uniformly at random. Galeotti et al. (2010)

Attacker directly infects an agent N with prob. p. Each neighbor is contaminated with prob. q if in S or if in N. (2) Epidemic Model Attacker N S

(2) Monotone comparative statics If the function is strictly decreasing in for any then the optimal investment is non-decreasing. Equivalent to: Network externalities function is decreasing:

(2) Strong protection An agent investing in S cannot be harmed by the actions of others:. in previous equation. Decreasing network externalities function.

(2) Weak protection If, the network externalities function is:

Contribution (1) Optimal security investment for a single agent -Gordon and Loeb model, 1/e rule -Monotone comparative statics (2) Optimal security investment for an interconnected agent - Network externalities (3) Equilibrium analysis of the security game - Free-rider problem, Critical mass, PoA

(3) Fulfilled expectations equilibrium Concept introduced by Katz & Shapiro (85) Willingness to pay for the agent of type : multiplicative specification of network externalities, Economides & Himmelberg (95). C.d.f of types: % with Willingness to pay for the ‘last’ agent:

(3) Fulfilled expectations equilibrium In equilibrium, expectation are fulfilled: The willingness to pay is: Extension of Interdependent Security 2 players game introduced by Kunreuther & Heal (03).

(3) Critical mass Equilibria given by the fixed point equation

(3) Critical mass (cont.) Equilibria given by the fixed point equation fraction of population investing in security cost

(3) Critical mass (cont.) If only one type: willingness to pay = network externalities function. fraction of population investing in security cost

(3) Price of Anarchy The social welfare function: Because of the public and private externalities, agent under-invest in security (in all cases). Public externalities Private externalities

Conclusion Simple single agent model: 1/e rule – General conditions for monotone investment Interconnected agents: network externalities function – General conditions to align incentives Equilibrium analysis of the security game – Critical mass, PoA Extensions: In this talk, agent is risk-neutral. What happens if risk-adverse? Insurance?

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