Simple Models at HQ 1(UK) Div Op TELIC John G Owen Principal Operational Analyst Directorate of Land Warfare 21 st ISMOR 3 September 2004

Background Two UK Operational Analysts deployed to HQ 1(UK) Armd Div in Kuwait 29 Jan 2003 Presence of 2 – 4 analysts maintained at UK-led HQ ever since Roulement every 3 – 4 months Initial team: John Owen and Jarrod Cornforth Overview presentation given at 20 th ISMOR

Subjects OA in support of warfighting planning –Narrower scope but greater depth than last year Interaction with Commanders and Staffs Combat-related questions and tools (Other work – POW numbers, ammo consumption, logistic reach, campaign duration, Helo risk from AD, building staff tools and databases – will not be covered)

HQs and Locations OA Team attached to 1(UK)Armd Div Main throughout Initial location Camp RHINO: DSG, 3 Cdo Bde, 7 Bde, 16 Bde, JHF HQs adjacent Attached to G3(Plans) – but also tasked by other Div HQ cells and other HQs Tasking from other HQs declined after deployment from Camp RHINO – comms difficult

Getting Started J Cornforth had worked with Div staff, especially DSG, in recent past Relationships and trust existed Use of OA seen as normal J Owen substituted for designated Analyst ‘Unknown quantity’ to HQ Unfamiliar with the routines of this particular HQ HQ extremely busy – difficult conditions to introduce self and OA Analysts should exercise with the HQs they might be supporting operationally –this includes ‘reserve’ analysts

Tasking Cycle Question posed to OA by staff officer Often derived from Commander’s tasking of staff Not tasked directly by Commanders Any HQ cell (Div and Bdes) could ask for OA support Timescale: ‘by xx:00 today’, ‘before next Div update’, ‘by this time tomorrow’ 2 – 24 hours (Applies to combat modelling tasks only – some logs and software tool tasks had longer timescales) Working to staff, not Commander Questions fairly specific and limited

Interactions Initial brief from officer posing question Analyst needed general situational awareness to understand context and clarify question Some follow up meetings with other staff To gather information (e.g. Intelligence data) Staff time generally very limited Did not conduct wargaming with military ‘players’ Some Bde HQs conducting their own wargaming – but no OA support, no quantification of combat Generally working ‘for’ rather than ‘with’ Insufficient perceived added value from closer collaboration Analyst time also limited – prioritisation of tasking

Reporting 5-minute verbal brief to staff officer Main results and assumptions Written response also prepared Question, Headline answer, Assumptions, then more detailed method and results Usually accepted – sometimes read and passed on Important for Analysts as a record of work Some briefing to larger groups Including Comd Gp – GOC, Bde Comd, principal staff Always at request of staff officer who had already seen results Verbal brief – HQ very short of projectors for slide shows! Analysts must be able to brief concisely Identify the critical assumptions and limitations that the audience must be told

Combat Questions What is the correlation of forces in this area? What is the OA assessment of this proposed/possible plan? Usually at Bde level Risk? Casualties and equipment losses? Impact of changing ORBAT Update previous assessments given different assumptions/intelligence Very ‘traditional’ military OA Conventional warfare

Scenarios UK force Bde or a part of Except for 7 Bde, a ‘light’ force Iraqi force: Up to nominal Div strength Mostly old equipment – T-55 generation Below TOE strength because of poor maintenance Attrited by air before ground battle (but how much?) Largely infantry force in some sectors How hard, and how coherently, will they fight? Much of the Div and Bde planning – and hence OA – for contingencies in which Iraqi formations did fight as such Worst case for potential (short-term) losses Even if unlikely, has to be considered

Tools Used Balance Analysis Modelling System (BAMS) Static Scoring Wartime Planning Tool (WPT) Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model Simple Model of Infantry Close Combat (SMICC) Duration and outcome distribution of Sect – Coy battle Data from historical analysis For each tool: –Is it a simple model? –Was it used or abused?

BAMS Force Value =  (Number of Equipments) x (Equipment Score) Compare total scores for correlation of forces A quick ‘first cut’ method Very quick and simple to use Equipments not previously scored can be added if there are close equivalents Equipment Scores are for ‘contribution to the all-arms battle’ Based on old NATO Central Front Heavy, mechanised forces, Bde and above On borderline of validity with TELIC scenarios –size and composition of forces

WPT (1) Deterministic heterogeneous Lanchester model 10 weapon categories, depth fire, AH and FW Attrition rate adjustments for terrain, posture, barriers Data set derived from more detailed modelling BG/Bde battles – with sequencing of units MS Excel implementation –Added personnel casualties calculation –Added unit defeat levels and participation levels Risk and variability by sensitivity testing Adjustment to tank attrition rates for T-55

WPT (2) A simple model? Simple to use Simple to add facilities around basic model Re-calibration a big task Represents a complex situation – complexity inherent in the aggregations Use and abuse? Battles generally ‘lighter’ than calibration Size and force composition at low end Was T-55 adjustment correct?

SMICC (1) Section – Company infantry engagements with armour and artillery support Select values for conditions of battle –Terrain, level of support, defence posture Distribution of battle outcomes, durations, losses Based on historical analysis Implemented in Visual Basic Used for some questions relating to 3 Cdo Bde Would have been used if ‘proper’ wargaming with Bde undertaken

SMICC (2) A simple model? Very quick and simple to use Equations and coefficient values complex ‘Black box’ unless substantial additional HA available Use and Abuse? HA based; human factors implicit in equations Used in its intended domain

General (1) Op TELIC was at the borders of validity of the tools –Not a comfortable place Saving grace: –UK casualties heavy and battles lost only if Iraqi determination and cohesion at highest level

General (2) Models for rapid use in operational HQs must be simple to use Not necessarily simple in structure Analyst must understand the tools thoroughly to avoid abuse Still a need for combat modelling Combat models cannot be improvised Data sets are required Need for scoring systems, model calibrations for high-tech vs lower-tech forces and for light, not armoured forces