1 Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Capital Regulation by Arnoud W. A. Boot and Matej Marenč Discussant: Franklin Allen JFI/WB Conference.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Concentration and Competition in the Banking System Rony Hizkiyahu, Supervisor of Banks Bank of Israel June 26, 2007.
Advertisements

1 June 2005 Cross Border Implementation of Basel II Kevin Davis Commonwealth Bank Group Chair of Finance The University of Melbourne Director, Melbourne.
Finance, Control, and Efficiency in Firms SFB TR 15 B3 Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
Bank Competition and Financial Stability: A General Equilibrium Expositi on Gianni De Nicolò International Monetary Fund and CESifo Marcella Lucchetta.
The IPO. Equity financing The majority of firms in the US are sole proprietorships and partnerships But this group accounts only for 15% of total US sales.
FOUNDATIONS OF MICRO- BANKING THEORY CHAPTER 2: Why do financial intermediaries exist? CHAPTER 3: The Industrial Organisation approach to Banking CHAPTER.
Selcuk Saldirak Chief Executive Officer CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE.
Fenghua Song Smeal College of Business, Penn State University Anjan V. Thakor Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, and ECGI Financial.
Lecture 4: Financial instruments and regulation
An Overview of the Financial System chapter 2. Function of Financial Markets Lenders-Savers (+) Households Firms Government Foreigners Financial Markets.
International Business 9e By Charles W.L. Hill McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
DIVIDEND POLICY CHAPTER 18. LEARNING OBJECTIVES  Explain the objectives of dividend policy in practice  Understand the factors that influence a firm’s.
Optimal Debt Financing and the Pricing of Illiquid Assets Antonio Bernardo and Ivo Welch Discussion.
Copyright © 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill /Irwin Chapter One Introduction.
Chapter 2 An Overview of the Financial System © 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
Chapter 11. Economic Analysis of Bank Regulation Asymmetric Information Banking Crisis of 1980s Asymmetric Information Banking Crisis of 1980s.
Why Are Financial Intermediaries Special? Chapter 1 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Copyright © 2000 Addison Wesley Longman Slide #2-1 Chapter Two AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM.
Function of Financial Markets
Commercial Banking Structure, Regulation and Performance Chapter 15 © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning.
Ch 9: General Principles of Bank Management
PENSION FUNDS. PENSION PLANS 1.PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS Created by state, local or federal govt. 2.PRIVATE PENSION PLANS Created by private agencies including.
An Introduction to Money and the Financial System
Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill /Irwin Chapter One Introduction.
HOTEL INDUSTRY RUSSIA 2010 FINANCING REFINANCING A. Bourdin 2/12/10.
Discussion of Allen, Carletti, Goldstein & Leonello „ Government Guarantees and Financial Stability“ Gerhard Illing LMU Munich University/CESifo Norges.
FOUNDATIONS OF MICRO- BANKING THEORY CHAPTER 2: Why do financial intermediaries exist? CHAPTER 3: The Industrial Organisation approach to Banking CHAPTER.
© 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved 2-1 Function of Financial Markets 1. Allows transfers of funds from person or business without investment.
Financial Markets and Institutions. Financial Markets Financial markets provide for financial intermediation-- financial savings (Surplus Units) to investment.
Economics of Bank Regulation Sudipto Bhattacharya Arnoud W. A. Boot Anjan V. Thakor.
Chapter 14 Commercial Banking Structure, Regulation, and Performance ©2000 South-Western College Publishing.
Capital Structure Decisions: The Basics
10/5/20151 A CREATION OF VALUE TO (INVESTORS)SHARE HOLDERS By M.P.NAIDU.
Managing the Multinational Financial System
Chapter 2 An Overview of the Financial System. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 2-2 Function of Financial Markets Perform.
Fourth Edition International Business. CHAPTER 11 The Global Capital Market.
Chapter 2: The Financial System 1. Evil and Brilliant Financiers? Financiers are not innately good or evil but rather, like other people, can be either,
Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and if so, Who should pay for it? Alan Morrison, Merton College & Saïd Business School, Oxford Lucy White, Harvard Business.
The I.O Approach. THE I.O. APPROACH Issues: Understanding the structure of competition among financial intermediaries Understanding the implications of.
1 FIN 408 International Investment Factors affecting Risk and Return Size and Number of International Open-end Funds Global market Correlations Correlation.
Chapter 2 An Overview of the Financial System. © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved 2-2 Function of Financial Markets 1. Allows transfers.
Chapter Two Overview of the Financial System Slide 2–3 Function of Financial Markets Allows transfers of funds from person or business without investment.
Joseph V. Rizzi June 15, 2011 Setting Risk Appetite in the New Regulatory Environment Linking Strategy, Risk and Capital Structure © The views expressed.
Discussion of Jackson, Perraudin, Saporta by A. Boot Basel II - Basel, May “Regulatory and ‘economic’ solvency standards for internationally active.
An Overview of the Financial System chapter 2 1. Function of Financial Markets Lenders-Savers (+) Households Firms Government Foreigners Financial Markets.
An Overview of the Financial System
Status of the Bank’s Rural Finance Loan Portfolio: Summary Statistics and Main Issues Jacob Yaron (RDV) June 2002.
Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 2-1 Function of Financial Markets Perform the essential function of channeling funds from.
Chapter 2 An Overview of the Financial System. © 2013 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.2-2 Function of Financial Markets Perform the essential.
Financial Sector Integrity and Emerging Risks in Banking FDIC Conference 2005 João A.C. Santos Federal Reserve Bank of New York The views expressed here.
Financial Intermediaries and Financial Innovation Chapter 2.
1 On the Choice Between Group-Based and Individual-Based Pensions--The Role of Financial Education Dean M. Maki Vice President and Economist Putnam Investments.
C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School. US MNE US MNE Foreign Sub Foreign Sub Repatriates $80 Owes US tax of ($100 x 35%)=$35, less foreign tax credit.
Need for Regulation. Rationale for Regulation of Banking Sector Social objectives Confidence building need for banking sector Protect existing/probable.
International Business 9e
The future of the capital markets in Guyana
Bank Liability Structure
AK/ECON Money, Banking and Finance A Fall 2016
Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Capital Regulation
An Introduction to Money and the Financial System
Chapter 2 Learning Objectives
Function of Financial Markets
An Overview of the Financial System
Lecture 2 Chapter 2 Outline The Financing Decision
An Overview of the Financial System
An Overview of the Financial System
An Overview of the Financial System
An Overview of the Financial System
Presentation transcript:

1 Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Capital Regulation by Arnoud W. A. Boot and Matej Marenč Discussant: Franklin Allen JFI/WB Conference on Bank Regulation and Corporate Finance

2 The Model Banks financed with equity and deposits Cost of equity > Cost of insured deposits Regulatory capital minimum k binds Banks monitor borrowers – the more monitoring the higher is v, the borrower’s probability of high payout Cost of monitoring = (c/2)(v-v T ) 2 with v G >v B

3 The Model (cont.) t=0t=1t=2t=3 -k set by-Borrower -Borrower-Payoffs regulator matchedsearches forrealized with bankcompeting offer -Banks-Bank type-Prob. q one entergood or bad appears and there discovered is Bertrand comp. -Bank makes-Funds collected first offer -Borrowers do projects

4 Main Results With a fixed number of banks, increasing competition (a higher q) improves the monitoring incentives of good banks and reduces those of bad banks With endogenous entry, increasing capital requirements increases the returns to good banks and reduces the returns to bad banks so there is a “cleansing” effect In weak banking systems capital regulation is less effective than in strong banking systems

5 Comments Model is very interesting and much can be done with it More discussion on the nature of fixed costs helpful Policy analysis is focused on level of monitoring and thus on stability issues A welfare analysis would be helpful –What is the optimal number of banks? –What are the set of efficient allocations? –Is a reduction in risk always desirable? –What is the optimal value of k?

6 Comments (cont.) What is the size distribution of firms in the solution? Symmetric equilibria are considered but asymmetric equilibria may also be important It would be good to prove that the minimum capital constraint k imposed by the regulator is binding

7 Comments (cont.) Given a fixed cost of monitoring, would a two part pricing scheme for loans allow an improvement? What would happen without deposit insurance? Can the results on foreign entry be related to what happened in Eastern Europe?