Lecture 7 UN Professor O’Malley Collective Security Lecture 7 UN Professor O’Malley

Concept of Collective Security Directed outwardly toward potential external aggressor who may threaten a group of states Intends to keep the peace among internal members Attack on one state in group is attack on all Assumption: no state in group would attack another member due to overwhelming response of others Subsumes traditional self-help techniques of states (alliance creation, declarations of war, individual and collective defense) * States are now ‘citizens’ of a rule-based institution!

Concept of Collective Security Presumption that the common interests of states are in harmony or supersede national interest Assumption that members of a community of nations will have reasonable trust with other members and all will use rules to solve disputes It is a ‘mental construction’ that changes as threats change (therefore, it evolves)

Evolution of Collective Security Idea Traditionally was the idea of stopping an aggressor at its border or punishing an aggressor Now: Preventative Diplomacy Defense of community values (human rights, economic well-being) Peacekeeping and State building NATO and UN w/AIDS examples of evolution

Aggression League of Nations Legal Basis for Collective Security (p.163) No definition of ‘aggression’ Either in League or UN This along with consensus decisions made the League unable to name an aggressor and take collective action UN Security Council has only twice named an aggressor (for UN action): Korea and Iraq (1990) Argentina an aggressor in 1982 but only a UK response

UN Collective Security Less robust than League of Nations ‘Universal’ collective security institution All matters are ‘internal’ – no external aggressor Legal Basis for UN Collective Security (p.169) Security Council (and UN) is ‘legitimizer’ or ‘delegitimizer’ for use of force internationally This leads states to behave differently

UN Charter and Collective Security Article 2, paragraph 4: refrain from threat or use of force Article 51: inherent right of individual or collective self-defense until Security Council acts to restore peace Article 35: any state can bring ‘any dispute or any situation’ to the attention of the Security Council if it endangers peace Chapter VI: means of pacific settlement of disputes Chapter VII: allows enforcement measures through military force (for international peace – must respect state’s sovereignty in internal affairs)

Chapter VI: Steps to Peace Council must establish a threat exists, then: Measures of Art. 33, para. 1: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial decisions and regional institutions to try and resolve threat Art. 36, para. 1 and Art. 37, para. 2: Sec. Council can make recommendations about procedure or method to settle dispute Art. 38: Council can make additional recommendations if requested by states Goal: Not to establish good relations between states; just to prevent war!

Chapter VI 1/2 Does not exist on paper Stands for the ‘reinterpretation of Chapter VI to solve particular conflicts’ Peacekeeping and Observer missions come from this Avoids the use of ‘overwhelming force’ by all members of the UN (which is Chapter VII) Term originally coined by Dag Hammarskjold to describe this new ‘gray area’ of operation for UN

Uniting for Peace and Emergency Sessions *Despite the Charter, UN efforts to secure peace depend on circuitous methods, enhanced roles of the GA and Secretariat, and broad interpretations of Chapter VI. Uniting for Peace Resolution Begun during Cold War deadlock on Korea Informal amendment giving GA legal authority to recommend ‘the use of armed force’ when necessary Circumvented anticipated use of veto Doesn’t work if the offending state is a superpower

Uniting for Peace and Emergency Sessions Uniting for Peace Resolution allows for Emergency Special Sessions of the GA: Can be convened at request of any 7 members of the Sec. Council Can be convened by a majority of GA members Held within 24 hours of being called Became accepted practice at UN Two problems: Superpowers do what they want UN members unwilling to pay for resolutions they don’t deem ‘Charter supported’

Post-Cold War Collective Security Subcontracting – the new collective security Authorize a state or group of states to act on behalf of the world community Case Study: Iraq 1991 (first of Chapter VII since Korea) Built law case first: Resolution 660 (condemnation of invasion) Resolution 661 (mandatory economic sanctions) Resolution 662 (annexation of Kuwait is null and void) Resolution 678 (Iraq gets 48 hours to withdraw or face military retaliation)

Post-Cold War Collective Security 1992 – Sec. Council asks Sec.Gen. Boutros Butrous-Ghali to recommend ways to strengthen UN peacemaking Report: Agenda for Peace (1992) Preventative Diplomacy (resolve intra- and interstate conflicts before violence erupts) Peacemaking (bring hostile parties to negotiated settlement before or after the intervention of UN forces) Peacebuilding (construct an environment that sustains peace) Those three added to already used peacekeeping *Beyond UN financial and political abilities? Reminiscent of old League mandate system and neo-colonialism?

Smart Sanctions Art. 41 allows for mandatory sanctions (all state’s obligated to follow) Most sanctions hurt common people and worsen humanitarian situation Case: South Africa a success (but many less than success) Smart sanctions – sanctions tailored to have ‘a high probability of directly hurting those responsible for the targeted policies while sparing the general population’ Allow for humanitarian assistance and limited trade Cases: Sierra Leone (conflict diamonds), North Korea (luxury goods), Iraq (oil for food program)