SEPTEMBER 12, 2012 | MARKETS COMMITTEE Aleks Mitreski MARKET DEVELOPMENT (413) 535-4367 Hourly Offer and Intraday.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
ASM Phase II Real Time Dispatch and Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors rev2.0 NEPOOL Markets Committee June 28/29, 2005 Jim Milligan ISO-NE Markets Development.
Advertisements

ASM Phase II Real Time Dispatch and Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors rev3.0 NEPOOL Markets Committee July 12-13, 2005 Jim Milligan ISO-NE Markets Development.
1 Minimum Generation Emergency Operating Reserve Proposal Gary Zielanski Markets Committee Meeting September 30, 2004.
1 Review of the Reserves and OpCap Markets: New Englands Experience in the First Four Months Peter Cramton Professor of Economics, University of Maryland.
Chapter 1 The Study of Body Function Image PowerPoint
Electricity and Natural Gas Supply, Reserves, and Resource Adequacy CMTA Energy Conference Energy: Growing Californias Economy William J. Keese California.
MISO Day 2: A Transmission Users (Marketers) Perspective Leon White August 8, 2007.
ISO New England Demand Resource Measurement & Verification Standards Manual Overview April 11, 2007 NAESB Development of DSM/EE Business Practices Washington,
NAESB Coordinate Interchange Version 1 Standard Revision 1, Draft 5 August, 2005.
NAESB Coordinate Interchange
1 Credit for Redispatch Small Group Review of Unconstrained MFs NAESB BPS Meeting December 14-15, 2011.
Definition of Firm Energy and Interruptible Transmission Two Issues Causing Problems for Business in the Western Interconnection.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Long Term Procurement Plan Proceeding Renewable Integration Model Results and Model Demonstration October 22, 2010 Workshop.
Jeopardy Q 1 Q 6 Q 11 Q 16 Q 21 Q 2 Q 7 Q 12 Q 17 Q 22 Q 3 Q 8 Q 13
Jeopardy Q 1 Q 6 Q 11 Q 16 Q 21 Q 2 Q 7 Q 12 Q 17 Q 22 Q 3 Q 8 Q 13
Demand Resource Operable Capacity Analysis – Assumptions for FCA 5.
Water Distribution Systems – Part 1
2000, Independent Electricity Market Operator All Rights Reserved 1.
An Introduction to International Economics
MARCH 13, 2014 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE Jonathan Lowell PRINCIPAL ANALYST | MARKET DEVELOPMENT Updates to Market Rule 1 and Appendix F.3 to Address the.
Ancillary Services Market, Day-Ahead Load Response and Special Case Nodal Pricing Implementation Vamsi Chadalavada FERC Technical Conference March 4, 2005.
Standard Market Design (SMD) in New England Federal Energy Regulation Commission Conference on Standard Market Design January 22, 2002 David LaPlante Vice.
Overview of CAISO Stakeholder Process for FERC Order 764 Compliance Implementation of 15 minute scheduling and settlement Jim Price, CAISO Presentation.
© 2013 Day Pitney LLP Overview and Update on the Ever-Evolving New England Wholesale Capacity Market presentation to Boston Bar Association May 23, 2013.
Organization of Electricity Markets
Summary of Proposed Market Rules For Transition Period Price-Responsive Demand and Active Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Market Henry Yoshimura,
PX Activity Rules Robert Wilson Presentation to PX Team, 2/10/97.
Brookfield Renewable Energy Group. Focusing on Renewable Power Generation and Transmission Conceptual discussion how to integrate renewable resources under.
APRIL 9-10, 2013 MARKETS COMMITTEE Christopher Parent MARKET DEVELOPMENT | Creating a tiered Reserve.
FEBRUARY 14, 2013 RELIABILITY COMMITTEE MEETING Steve Weaver SYSTEM OPERATIONS In-Day Reserves & Supplemental Procurement.
Chapter 10 Project Cash Flows and Risk
Capacity Planning For Products and Services
VOORBLAD.
Enhanced Day Ahead Commitment Project: Enhancements to the DACP IESOTP 244-3d.
© 2012 National Heart Foundation of Australia. Slide 2.
03/11/2013 MARKETS COMMITTEE Aleks Mitreski MARKET DEVELOPMENT (413) Overview of Market Rule revisions.
Winter 2013/2014 Reliability Solution Including LNG MWHs N. Jonathan Peress Conservation Law Foundation Greg Lander Skipping Stone NEPOOL Markets & Reliability.
25 seconds left…...
Copyright ©2004 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 Overview of a Financial Plan.
Controlling as a Management Function
IMPACT TO FREQUENCY CONTROL DURING STARTUP AND SHUT DOWN OF UNITS
We will resume in: 25 Minutes.
Principles of Marketing
PSSA Preparation.
Congestion Management Settlement Credits December, 2002.
JANUARY 14-15, 2014 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE Matthew Brewster MARKET DEVELOPMENT | Conceptual design.
Ancillary Services Update NEPOOL Markets Committee October 14, 2003 Jim Milligan ISO-NE Markets Development.
SEPTEMBER 24, 2013 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE ISO NEW ENGLAND - MARKET DEVELOPMENT Summary of NCPC Credit for Postured Generators NCPC Payments – Generator.
Al McBride MANAGER, AREA TRANSMISSION PLANNING Existing Import Interfaces: Transmission Transfer Capabilities and The Calculation of Tie Benefits DECEMBER.
Balance-of-Payments and Exchange-Rate Determination
IJT Transaction Timelines and Scheduling – NISL and CMSC.
OCTOBER 8, 2014 Bob Laurita INTERNAL MARKET MONITORING New Import Capacity Resource FCM Market Power Mitigation Order to Show Cause Compliance Filing.
Ramping and CMSC (Congestion Management Settlement Credit) payments.
G 200 L 200 ISO NEW ENGLAND T H E P E O P L E B E H I N D N E W E N G L A N D ’ S P O W E R. COLD SNAP Overview of Proposed Options for Winter 2004/2005.
Electricity Markets Overview Lo-Cal seminar, 09/21/2010.
Demand Response in MISO Markets NASUCA Panel on DR November 12, 2012.
© 2013 McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC October 17, 2013 Robert A. Weishaar, Jr. ON SITE ENERGY – INTERPLAY WITH PJM DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS Harrisburg, PA.
Ontario Electricity Supply Forum PEO Mississauga Chapter - September 6, 2007 Rhonda Wright-Hilbig, P.Eng Market Analysis - IESO.
Day Ahead Market Working Group April 14, Agenda Discussion of SMD-style DAM review questions posed by the DAM WG and Coral regarding the SMD-
1 Electricity System and Energy Market Basics David J. Lawrence Manager, Auxiliary Market Products Prepared for: RGGI I&L Workshop June 15, 2006.
PJM©2013www.pjm.com Economic DR participation in energy market ERCOT April 14, 2014 Pete Langbein.
Congestion Management and Ramp Rate for Delivering Ancillary Services Resmi Surendran.
PJM©2013www.pjm.com Demand Side Working Group Loads in SCED Angelo Marcino Real-Time Market Operations – PJM April 14, 2014.
Texas Nodal © Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. All rights reserved. 1 Nodal Verifiable Costs Process WMS Meeting May 15, 2007 Ino.
Hourly Offers Schedule Update Examples
Congestion Management and Ramp Rate for Delivering Ancillary Services
30 Minute Reserves EPFSTF January 4,
Presentation transcript:

SEPTEMBER 12, 2012 | MARKETS COMMITTEE Aleks Mitreski MARKET DEVELOPMENT (413) Hourly Offer and Intraday Reoffers Overview of Current Market Components

Presentation Objective This presentation is intended to provide high level overview of the current Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Market offer rules with focus on: – Timing and offer requirements in the DAM – Parameters used to formulate an offer in the DAM – Modification of offers during the Re-Offer Period – Supplemental commitments during the Resource Adequacy Assessment – Commitment and Dispatch of generators in real-time – Parameter re-offer/re-declaration in real-time 2

Energy Markets Overview 3 Real-Time Energy Market balances differences between the Day-Ahead scheduled amounts of electricity and the actual real-time requirements DAM produces financially binding schedules for the production and consumption of electricity (occurs on the day before the operating day) Energy Markets Day-Ahead Energy Markets (DAM) Real-Time Energy Markets

Energy Markets Overview (cont.) 4 Real-Time Energy Market Day-Ahead Energy Market ―00:00 ―16:00 DA Energy Market results published Real-Time Energy Market starts 16:00―18:00― Re- Offer Period ―12:00 DA Energy Market offer and bid period closes OPERATING DAY OPERATING DAY -1 22:00― Initial RAA is performed to finalize operating plan for next day RAA is performed throughout the operating day

DAY-AHEAD ENERGY MARKET Review of offer structure, clearing, obligations

Day-Ahead Energy Market The DAM allows participants to sell/purchase energy on a forward basis Load/Asset Related Demand Virtual Transactions (Increments/Decrements) Dispatchable Asset Related Demand External Transactions (Imports/Exports) Generators The DAM produces financially binding positions that are satisfied through: – Physical performance (i.e. delivery/consumption) in real-time, or – Cash settlement at the Real-Time Price for Day-Ahead quantities not delivered/consumed 6

Price Taker versus Price Sensitive Behavior Participants have the ability to participate in the energy market as price-sensitive or a price taker (i.e.,fixed) A fixed demand in the market effectively represents a bid to consume energy at any cost below $1,000 MWh A fixed supply in the market effectively represents an offer to sell energy at $0 MWh 7

Participation – Load/ARD Load/ARD participate through Demand Bids only in the DAM Demand Bids can be submitted as: – Fixed Demand Bid specifying quantity and location (one per hour) or – An individual priced Demand Bid specifying price, quantity and location Participants can submit up to 10 individual demand bids per location, per hour The price range can be between $0 and $1,000 MWh 8

Participation – External Transactions External Transactions are submitted to capture energy flow into New England (Import) or out to one of the neighboring areas (Export) in the DAM and RTM External Transactions can be submitted as: – Fixed External Transaction specifying quantity and external node ranging in duration from one hour to 24 hours – An individual priced External Transaction specifying price, quantity and external node ranging in duration from one hour to 24 hours The price range can be between $0 and $1,000MWh 9

Participation – Virtual Transactions Virtual Transactions are a virtual supply Increments (INCs) and virtual demand Decrements (DECs) only in the DAM Virtual Transactions can be submitted as; – Up to 50 priced bid blocks per location, per participant The price range can be between $0 and $1,000MWh 10

Participation – Generators Generators participate by submitting Supply Offer with physical and financial parameters in the DAM and RTM 11 Physical Parameters (sample) Time Interval Emergency MinHourly Economic MinHourly Economic MaxHourly Start Up TimeDaily Notification TimeDaily Minimum Down TimeDaily Minimum Run TimeDaily Manual Response RateDaily Financial Parameters (sample) Time Interval Start Up FeeDaily No Load FeeDaily Incremental Energy Offer Daily

Generator’s Financial Parameters Start Up Fee is the cost a generator incurs when started. Separate cost can be designated when coming on-line from the following three states (in $) – Cold – Intermediate – Hot No Load Fee is the cost a generator incurs for each hour it remains on-line (in $/hr) Incremental Offers are the blocks of energy quantities paired with particular prices that reflect what a generator can produce at certain incremental cost (price/quantity pairs) – Quantity must be monotonically increasing – Cost must be between $0 MWh and $1,000 MWh – Identical price/pair blocks are used for the entire day 12

Example: Incremental Energy Offer 13 Price MW Quantity $60300 $50250 $40200 $30150 $20100 $1050

Generator’s Physical Parameters Emergency Minimum is the lowest value at which the generator can be dispatched during Minimum Generation Emergency Economic Minimum (“EcoMin”) is the lowest value at which the generator can be dispatched during normal conditions Economic Maximum (“EcoMax”) is the highest value at which the generator can be dispatched during normal conditions Manual Response Rate is the rate at which the generator can ramp its output 14

Generator’s Physical Parameters (cont.) Notification Time is the time needed for generator to synchronize once informed to come on-line Start Up Time is the time the generator needs to reach its Economic Minimum once synchronized to the system Minimum Run Time is the shortest duration the generator has to remain on-line (after reaching Economic Minimum and available for ISO dispatch) prior to being asked to come off- line, Minimum Down Time is the shortest duration between the time the generator has gone off-line and the time to come on- line, reach Economic Minimum and is available for ISO dispatch 15

Example: Generation Physical Parameters 16

Example: Financial & Physical Parameters 17 Parameter Offered Value Emergency Minimum 25 MW Economic Minimum 50 MW Economic Maximum 300 MW

Generator Self Scheduling Resource can chose to self-schedule (i.e., fixed) their output and become a price taker. A self-schedule “overrides” the resources financial parameters effectively reflecting a desire to operate at zero price, assuming no reliability issues. There are two key aspects of self-scheduling; – Self-Commitment: A request for a resource to come online for a duration (e.g., Minimum Run Time) at its EcoMin and be economically dispatched between its EcoMin and EcoMax – Self-Dispatch: An adjustment of a resource’s EcoMin to a desired minimum output level. Resources will continue to be dispatched between their EcoMin and EcoMax 18

Self Scheduling in DAM Generator can Self-Schedule which will result in clearing the Day Ahead Energy Market as a price taker – Equivalent to an offer to produce at the EcoMin at no cost (zero price offer), and compensated at the Day-Ahead Clearing Price (set by another generator) This is achieved by setting the Must Run flag and the parameters are treated as: – Start Up Fee = $0 – No Load Fee = $0 – Energy price pair blocks below the Economic Minimum offered at $0 Generator will clear the Day Ahead Energy Market with at least the energy below the Economic Minimum (unless there is a reliability issue) 19

Example: Self-Schedule in DAM 20 Parameter Offered Value Emergency Minimum 25 MW Economic Minimum 50 MW 150MW Economic Maximum 300 MW Generator Self-Schedules in the DAM and sets its Economic Minimum at 150MW At a minimum, generator A will clear 150MW for all 24hr of the day at the Day-Ahead clearing price Clearing/dispatch of output above 150MW will be on economic merit

Example: Self-Scheduling & Dispatchable Range A generator that is not constrained by its physical parameter is eligible to set the Real Time Price – When self-scheduled, participants often increase the Economic Minimum from their DAM offer, which naturally decreases the range in which a generator is eligible to set the Real-Time Price 21

RE-OFFER PERIOD AND THE RESOURCE ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT Modification of financial parameters as previously submitted in the DAM, supplemental commitments

Re-Offer Period Between 16:00 and 18:00 prior to the operating day, Participants may modify certain financial Supply Offer parameters that were submitted in the DAM – The Incremental Offer (price/quantity pairs) can be modified for all generators – For generators that have not cleared the DAM, the Start Up and No Load fee can be modified – Generators that did not clear the DAM can also request to self- schedule Physical parameters can be re-declared only through phone call to the Control Room 23

Resource Adequacy Assessment Between 18:00 and 22:00, the ISO performs the initial Resource Adequacy Assessment to ensure that resources committed in the DAM can meet the operational requirements (e.g., forecasted load, operating reserves) During this time, supplemental commitments are considered using offers submitted in the DAM (or modified during the Re- Offer Period) 24

REAL-TIME ENERGY MARKET Dispatching resources, settling Day-Ahead positions

Real-Time Energy Market Redeclaration Participants cannot change the financial parameters of their Supply Offers Participants have the ability to self-schedule (self-commit) in real-time, with 30 minute advance notice – If approved, the generator will be permitted to come on-line – If approved, the generator will at least be operated at its Economic Minimum parameter Participant can also self-scheduled its output by re-declaring their the Economic Minimum (self-dispatch) or to request release to go off-line. Physical parameters in real-time can only be re-declared through phone call to the Control Room 26

Real-Time Energy Market The ISO is evaluating system needs throughout the operating day and will commit additional generators as needed During the operating day, economic dispatch of committed generators is done based on the incremental offer submitted in the DAM (or modified during the Re-Offer period) 27

Settlement Generators that clear in the DAM and produce energy up to their cleared schedule are not impacted by the Real-Time Price for that energy During an hour, if a generator produces less energy than its Day-Ahead cleared schedule then it must procure the shortfall at the Real-Time Price If a generator is dispatched above its Day-Ahead schedule then the additional energy is settled based on the Real-Time Price Generators which were committed/dispatched out of merit for system needs are made whole through NCPC (i.e., indifferent regarding Real-Time Prices) 28

Summary As discussed, participants do not have an opportunity to update financial parameters after the Re-Offer Period The Incremental Offer blocks must be identical for each hour of the day The price of the Incremental Offer blocks can range between $0 and $1,000 During upcoming meetings, the ISO will discuss the observed problems with the current market rules and the proposed enhancements 29

30