The illicit trade in cigarettes: Can we determine large increases in illicit activity from excise revenue data? A case study of South Africa Corne van.

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The illicit trade in cigarettes: Can we determine large increases in illicit activity from excise revenue data? A case study of South Africa Corne van Walbeek and Elaine Cleophas School of Economics University of Cape Town This research was made possible with funding from the American Cancer Society

The illicit trade problem in South Africa Types of illicit activity: smuggling and counterfeiting The industry claims illicit trade is a very big and increasing problem – Counterfeiting has become more prominent in the popular press in recent years – The legal industry is undermined by illegal operators – Government is losing excise tax revenues – The link with organised crime The industry’s incentive is clear: – Further excise tax increases will make the problem worse – Government should impose measures to stop illicit trade, especially counterfeiting

The scale of the illicit trade problem Year Illicit sales in billion sticks (BAT numbers) Legal sales in billion sticks (BAT numbers) Implied total sales in billion sticks (BAT numbers) Illicit market share (percentage) Legal sales in billion sticks (official numbers) Source: BAT, : TISA “illicit trade has grown from zero ten years ago to 20% of the total South African market : TISA estimates the illicit market share as 20% of the market 2011: TISA estimates the illicit market as 25% of the South African market

Euromonitor also indicates that illicit trade is increasing Euromonitor indicates its source as “industry” It has also had to rescale its estimates a few times

How believable are the numbers cited by the industry? If the Euromonitor figures are correct, it implies that total cigarette consumption in SA would have increased by 12% between 2002 and 2008 Official (tax-paid) sales increased by 4.3% between 2002 and 2008 The environment is not conducive for rapid increases in smoking: Tough legislative environment Rising prices of cigarettes Stagnant (even decreasing) smoking prevalence Cigarette consumption in SA

The problem We cannot easily get believable data on the magnitude of the share of illicit cigarettes, without doing comprehensive and expensive surveys The question addressed in this paper: – Can we determine, from official sources, whether cigarette consumption has decreased to the extent that it becomes a significant problem for government revenue?

If illicit trade in tobacco becomes an increasing problem, one would expect the following: – Large deviations in actual revenue from budgeted revenue – Consistent over-budgeting of revenues (and thus disappointing actual revenues) – Changing budgetary expectations over time

How large are the deviations from budget, on average? Financial years by decade Beer made from malt SpiritsCigarettes and tobacco products 1950/51 to 1959/ /61 to 1969/ /71 to 1979/ /81 to 1989/ /91 to 1999/ /01 to 2011/ Theil’s U-coefficient: zero = no deviation; large U-coefficient = large deviation, on average

There is no evidence that the Treasury officials were consistently over-budgeting tobacco revenue Average deviation from budget (1994/5 to 2011/12): Beer: - 1.7% Spirits: - 4.9% Cigarettes & tobacco: + 0.3% The budgeted revenues for cigarette and tobacco excise taxes were very accurate on average; for beer and especially spirits they were rather optimistic

Do the Treasury officials have a “model” when predicting excise tax revenues? Analysis is based on what they do, not what they say The two major determinants of cigarette consumption are income (GDP growth rate) and cigarette prices (and excise tax) Can one simulate excise tax revenues (and thus consumption) using plausible values of the income and tax elasticity of demand? If the simulated values closely follow the budgeted values, it implies that the demand equation is stable, and that “official” consumption figures (i.e. based on tax paid consumption) are a good approximation of actual consumption figures

Do the Treasury officials have a “model” when predicting excise tax revenues? Comments 1.The simulated values closely follow the budgeted values over the whole period 2.The demand equation (i.e. the price and income elasticities) are stable 3.The Treasury officials have not adjusted the budgeted revenue numbers down in the latter part of the period 4.Other than a blip in 2010/11 there is no evidence that there has been a large-scale decrease in legal sales that is not explained by an increase in the excise tax or changes in GDP growth

Conclusion This type of study is not a silver bullet in refuting the industry’s claims that there has been a large increase in illicit trade However, using official data, there is no evidence to suggest that increases in the excise tax has decreased the legal market by significantly more than one would reasonably expect Government’s hesitance to increase the excise tax on tobacco on the grounds that illicit trade significantly undermines excise tax revenue has no empirical basis Nevertheless, government should always be vigilant in the fight against illicit trading of tobacco products