The Implementation of Top Up Operation at the Australian Synchrotron Light Source Don McGilvery.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Computer-System Structures Er.Harsimran Singh
Advertisements

Configuration management
Software change management
Configuration management
ESLS 04 Daresbury Laboratory
Database System Concepts and Architecture
New Radiation Safety Interlock System for the SPring-8 Accelerator Complex C. Saji, M. Toko, T. Matsushita, R. Furuta, H. Hanaki, S. Hashimoto 1), Y. Hashimoto,
NERC Lessons Learned Summary December NERC lessons learned published in December 2014 Three NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in December.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS-II Shielding Workshop S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27, 2007.
The applications of FA-M3 PLC used in SSRF ZHOU Dayong
CESR as Light Source David L. Rubin for the CESR Operations Group Cornell University Laboratory for Elementary-Particle Physics.
1 Personnel Protection System (PPS) – Definition Interlock system, to protect personnel from Ionising Radiation (and other hazards) –(Note: does not include.
Manufacturing Productivity Solutions Management Metrics for Lean Manufacturing Companies Total Productive Maintenance (T.P.M.) Overall Equipment Effectivity.
Titel des Kapitels: ITC Franklin Gothic LT, Bold, 11 Punkt, weiß MLS (Metrology Light Source) and the Willy-Wien-Laboratory – Status Report Ralph Lange.
UPS Improvements to Beam Availability at the Australian Synchrotron Light Source Don McGilvery.
1 ITC242 – Introduction to Data Communications Week 12 Topic 18 Chapter 19 Network Management.
F.Brinker, DESY, July 17 st 2008 Injection to Doris and Petra Fitting the detector in the IP-region Radiation issues Beam optic, Target cell Polarisation.
Super-B Factory Workshop January 19-22, 2004 Accelerator Backgrounds M. Sullivan 1 Accelerator Generated Backgrounds for e  e  B-Factories M. Sullivan.
Maintaining Windows Server 2008 File Services
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Next Linear Collider Test Accelerator EPICS Support S. Allison, R. Chestnut, M. Clausen, K. Luchini.
Technical review on UPS power distribution of the LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) Anastasia PATSOULI TE-ABT-EC Proposals for LBDS Powering Improvement 1.
EPICS Developments at the Australian Synchrotron Contributors: Richard Farnsworth, Andrew C Starritt (Controls Team) Chris Myers & Mike DeSilva (Versi)
SNS Integrated Control System EPICS Collaboration Meeting SNS Machine Protection System SNS Timing System Coles Sibley xxxx/vlb.
Chapter 8 Implementing Disaster Recovery and High Availability Hands-On Virtual Computing.
Imperial College Tracker Slow Control & Monitoring.
CHAPTER 2: COMPUTER-SYSTEM STRUCTURES Computer system operation Computer system operation I/O structure I/O structure Storage structure Storage structure.
1 Kenneth Osborne, 9/14/07 Inter Group communications at the Advanced Light Source. Overview of the different methods of communication between different.
Simple Solutions to Simple Problems Global Trigger of a Post Mortem Event Don McGilvery Australian Synchrotron.
CE Operating Systems Lecture 3 Overview of OS functions and structure.
BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES 0 Top-Off Safety Yongjun Li ASAC Meeting October 22, 2009.
B. Todd et al. 25 th August 2009 Observations Since v1.
© Janice Regan, CMPT 300, May CMPT 300 Introduction to Operating Systems Memory: Relocation.
SNS Integrated Control System Timing Clients at SNS DH Thompson Epics Spring 2003.
Time Management.  Time management is concerned with OS facilities and services which measure real time, and is essential to the operation of timesharing.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Redundancy Requirements for Critical Devices R. Casey August 8, 2007.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Storage Ring Commissioning Samuel Krinsky-Accelerator Physics Group Leader NSLS-II ASAC Meeting October 14-15, 2010.
Timing Requirements for Spallation Neutron Sources Timing system clock synchronized to the storage ring’s revolution frequency. –LANSCE: MHz.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS-II Overview Satoshi Ozaki Director, Accelerator Systems Division NSLS-II Project March 27, 2007.
A U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science Laboratory Operated by The University of Chicago Argonne National Laboratory Office of Science U.S. Department.
A U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science Laboratory Operated by The University of Chicago Argonne National Laboratory Office of Science U.S. Department.
Unit 17: SDLC. Systems Development Life Cycle Five Major Phases Plus Documentation throughout Plus Evaluation…
Operational experience of high-power RF at Diamond Light Source
CESR as Light Source David Rubin for the CESR Operations Group Cornell University Laboratory for Elementary-Particle Physics.
OPERATOR ROLES AT THE AUSTRALIAN SYNCHROTRON LIGHT SOURCE How We Keep Our Operators Motivated Don McGilvery Greg LeBlanc.
BIS main electronic modules - Oriented Linac4 - Stéphane Gabourin TE/MPE-EP Workshop on Beam Interlock Systems Jan 2015.
MI Shielding Machine Protection Credit D. Capista March 7,2010.
Maximum Credible Beam Loss in the Main Injector D. Capista January 26, 2012.
UITF Laser and Gun High Voltage John Hansknecht UITF Operational Review March 18, 2016.
ESS Timing System Plans Timo Korhonen Chief Engineer, Integrated Control System Division Nov.27, 2014.
Reliability and Performance of the SNS Machine Protection System Doug Curry 2013.
Operation Status of the RF Systems and Taiwan Photon Source
Montse Pont ARW 2013 Operation and Reliability at ALBA Montse Pont.
Operations Machine Simulator.
Maintaining Windows Server 2008 File Services
Accelerator Reliability and Software
SLS Timing Master Timo Korhonen, PSI.
DLS Standard PLC System
ATTRACT TWD Symposium, Barcelona, Spain, 1st July 2016
1v0.
Coupling Correction at the Australian Synchrotron
Hot Checkout System for LERF Resuscitation
Unit 27: Network Operating Systems
UITF Operational Review
Machine Protection Xu Hongliang.
MLS (Metrology Light Source) and the Willy-Wien-Laboratory – Status Report Ralph Lange (BESSY) Titel des Kapitels: ITC Franklin Gothic LT, Bold, 11 Punkt,
Personnel Safety Systems
TS2 PSS Architecture, Concepts of Operations and Interfaces
TS2 PSS; update on concepts of operation and system's architecture
Operation of Target Safety System (TSS)
Hardware integration and interfaces
Presentation transcript:

The Implementation of Top Up Operation at the Australian Synchrotron Light Source Don McGilvery

The Australian Synchrotron Light Source 3 rd Generation Synchrotron Light Source with a full energy injection system. Beam lines tangential to the electron beam collect Synchrotron radiation over the spectral range up to 100KeV X-rays. The Beamline enclosure X-ray shielding is only designed to shield this energy range. The Storage ring is normally filled to 200mA and with the usual ~30hr beam lifetime requires refilling every 12hrs. Each Beamline has Safety Shutters which are closed during injections to protect against possible stray electrons or gamma radiation finding their way down a beam line. User experiments are disrupted during injections The variation in heat loading, both on the storage ring and beam line optics introduces significant variation in beam flux and beam quality delivered to the end station experiments. 2

Top Up Operation (Top Off) Every few minutes a shot of electrons are injected into the storage ring to maintain a near constant photon flux for the beam lines. The Beamline Safety Shutters remain open during injections. It is necessary to ensure that no electrons or gamma radiation can find their way down a beam line under both normal operation or possible fault condition. Modeling the electron orbits during normal operation is relatively easy but predicting all fault conditions to model is rather difficult.

Top Up Operation (Top Off) We modeled the trajectories electrons or gamma would have to follow to navigate the shielding down a beam line. We then modeled a restricted range of conditions around normal operations and checked to ensure there was no overlap with the paths down a beam line. If the storage ring orbits are outside of this range then injections would become interlocked. Phase space of stored beam } Phase space down beamline

Implementing Top Up Interlocks Only if the Safety Master Shutter is Enabled do we need to protect injection. We need to ensure that we have the correct electron Beam Energy – Storage Ring (SR) dipole magnets and dipoles in the Booster to Storage (BTS) ring transfer line. Stored Beam Current > 50mA – if there is stored beam then the orbit is stable Stored Beam lifetime > 20hrs – good lifetime means reasonable orbit Correct Orbit – if all of the storage ring quadrupole and sextupole magnets are set to the correct values for the “model orbit” Injection efficiency > 50% (BTS to SR) Software interlock Injection efficiency > 30% (Booster to SR) PLC interlock

Gun Interlock System The electron gun transmitter is controlled via a hardwired Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) based interlock. Introduced Gun modes which are selected via Software By default the Gun is “Disable” unless the requested Gun mode is allowed based on the input signals to the PLC A truth table in the PLC determines which gun modes can be active dependant on the state of the Safety Master Shutter Enable. Illegal Gun modes cannot enable the Gun. Single shot modes immediately drop back to disable after the shot is fired The Top up Software processes also independently monitor all Top up variables and provide a software gun interlock Gun PLC Enable Triggere-e- Gun Mode Status Safety Shutter Status

PLC based interlock system The Equipment Protection PLCs are utilised to control the Electron Gun enable and are linked to the PSS RF inhibit. There are 7 PLCs connected via a private redundant fibre network. One PLC monitors the other 6 via regular heartbeat signals. It also monitors the link to the Personnel Safety System (PSS). Should any fault occur in these systems the Storage Ring RF is immediately inhibited dumping the stored beam. This is the primary Equipment Protection Network and provides a reliable platform to support Top Up. The PLCs also monitor via regular heartbeat signals, the IOC processes supporting Top up operation and should any fail, the electron gun is inhibited and Top up operation is suspended. The PLCs have voltage inputs monitoring the SR Dipole, the 4 BTS dipoles and all of SR quadrupole and sextupole magnets. There are defined ranges set for each of these magnets in the PLC configuration and these limits are set by the Top up Change Control Board.

PLC interlock system cont. A PLC also monitors the SR current and will not enable the Electron Gun if the Master Shutters are enabled unless the SR current exceeds 50mA. SR lifetime and injection efficiency are also provided to the PLCs from the Top up IOC processes and will also inhibit the gun in Top up modes. Previously the electron gun could be fired at any time independent of the state of the Safety Master Shutter enable and relied purely on administrative procedures (Operators) for safe operation. The implementation of the Gun Interlock system has caused some issues with Machine Studies and requires us to consider “protected injection system operation”.

Magnet Interlocking 9 Magnets are interlocked both on Current and Voltage Soft interlocking by Software uses the magnet currents read via the machine network. This was initially implemented to test the Top up before the hardware system was complete. It has been retained and implements tighter limits on magnet settings and provides a level of redundancy. These limits can be varied if required without approval by the Change Control Board Hard interlocks use an independent voltage output of the power converters hardwired directly to PLC inputs. Using voltage rather than current protects against magnet shorts as well as incorrect set points. These limits require approval by the CCB for change. All Storage Ring quadrupole and sextupole magnets are interlocked ensuring that the electron orbit in the storage ring is within predefined limits, and does not rely on purely administrative control

Injection Efficiency Any electrons lost during injection can contribute to higher radiation levels around the facility We do not interlock on “high” radiation We do interlock on poor electron capture Electrons are injected into the storage ring off axis and damp via synchrotron radiation over milliseconds In vacuum insertion devices can be very close to the beam We use apertures and scrapers to restrict the physical beam size Injection system optimisation is very critical Injection system stability is very critical We interlock on efficiency levels approved by the CCB (50%, 30%) We are always striving to improve injection efficiency (ALARA)

Code Protection The Control system is only as reliable as the code which runs it and the level of rigor applied during testing. In order to provide a high level of code protection both the Software code and PLC code are contained within the CCB envelope. The computers hosting any Top up code are contained within a “mini-build” separately managed on our version control system. There are restricted rights to modify the code and any Process Variables (PV) associated directly with Top up control. The control PVs are located on a single concise Graphical User Interface Pane with EPICS restricting ad-hoc changes. The standard Top up configuration files are located in a read-only (restricted write) directory on the server. The PLCs have password protection to only allow code or limit changes after approval of the CCB. Any code changes require revalidation of the Top up interlock system.

Pre Run Top up Testing Before the start of any Top up run a standard test procedure is completed. This is defined by a test template in the eLog system which once signed off cannot be changed. Load configuration Test various interlocks Optimise machine performance

Timing Interlocks To Beamlines We provide both low and high resolution interlock signals to the Beamlines. At present we operate in a current based mode. A target current is set for the machine and whenever the SR beam current is predicted to drop below that target a new injection sequence is initiated. A routine predicts when the next shot will occur and updates each second the expected next injection time. The XFM beamline uses this countdown to pause or discard data collection during the injection. Once this countdown reaches 15 seconds the injection time is locked in and a 10 second event is sent to the IR beamline to gate out their data collection. Each beamline has an event receiver system which they could use to mask injection events but only mid IR uses it.

Top Up Performance Maintaining 200mA +/- 0.5mA over 12hrs

Top Up Shift Summary A shift summary from eLog. There was a injection system problem which caused a 43 minute outage of top up.

Summary 16 Implementation of Top Up has required us to implement a system where we are confident that electron injections into the storage ring can be done safely with the shutters open. Hardware and Software systems monitor and protect against component or configuration failure. Hardware systems monitor software systems and variables Where possible redundant interlocks are implemented. Software, hardware and configurations are under independent review and control. The system works well and has not significantly increased Operator work load. The Beamline Science staff and Users are Very Happy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 17 Greg LeBlanc – Head Accelerator Physics Dean Morris – Head Operations David Zhu – Physicist (modelling) Andrew Starritt – Controls Engineer (Software) Bryce Karnaghan – Controls Engineer (PLC) Sergio Constantin - Radiation Safety Officer Operators – development, testing and operation Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Technicians Vince Kempson – External Review The whole operations Team

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS