Problem Structure: Security and Trade

Outline Midterm question – next Thursday Review of Parsons lecture on EU – What was structure of the problem EU faced, in terms we have been discussing? – What was the solutions proposed, and how were they driven by the problem structure? Security, economics, and problem structure – How do security issues differ from each other? – How do trade issues differ from each other? – How do security and trade issues differ?

Midterm #1 – Next Week Thursday Goal – Demonstrate knowledge of problem structure – Show some ability to compare across two issue areas

Midterm Essay Show how 2 international problems differ (or are similar) with respect to at least 3 aspects of problem structure Make an argument for how the differences you identify influence either the likelihood of international cooperation or the type of international cooperation

Midterm #1 Essay Pick 3 aspects of problem structure Read 4 readings on trade, security, hr, and envt Identify 2 specific problems, 1 from each of TWO issue areas Discuss how these 2 (or more) problems differ with respect to 3 aspects of problem structure you chose. Complete essay with initial argument about how differences : – make it harder/easier to form international institution – make it more/less likely institution includes certain features

How do these security & trade issues differ with respect to our 9 questions? Conflict/Harmony/Cooperation Actors Capacities/Power Incentives/Preferences Information/Knowledge Norms/Values Violation tolerance Inherent transparency Response incentives

Comparing Problem Structure Across Issue Areas Rule #1 of Critical Thinking COMPARING is easiest way to classify real- world problem structures. Easier to say – “Issue area A more transparent than issue area B” than to say – “Issue area A is transparent”

Q1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation Security Conflict but not deadlock Security dilemma: countries develop/deploy weapons to increase security but, if both sides do it, they spend more but don’t increase security Land for peace: deadlock Trade Conflict but not deadlock Trade wars: domestic political incentives to raise tariffs to protect import-competing sector lead to slower economic growth of country’s economy as a whole Failure to address ag can be seen as deadlock

Q2: Actors Security Chem-bio-small arms: many Nuclear: fewer Wargames: neighbors only Almost exclusively governments Trade All countries involved, though some more than others Neighbors matter more than others

Q3: Capacities/power Security Chem-bio-small arms: all capable Nuclear: few capable and “haves” can preclude development by have- nots Wargames: all capable Power varies and matters a lot Trade All states can impose tariffs, subsidies, quotas, NTBs Some countries have significant power through market attractiveness and competitiveness of products Failure to address ag can also be as power issue

Q4: Incentives/preferences Security Usually collaboration game Insecure countries prefer own weaponry But some countries opt for “economic security” Coordination games in alliance weapon deployment Trade Collaboration game Domestic pressure for protection from import- competing sector Opposing pressure from export sector Ag sector succeeds more than mfg

Q5: Information/knowledge Security Most states believe more weapons equal more security but it’s costly (haves attempt to convince have-nots that not having is in their interests but this rarely works) Wargames are “assurance” games Trade Most states believe free trade grows economy – theory supports free trade (but this is a recent idea)

Q6: Norms/values Security Some weapons considered morally wrong but not all Right to defend yourself but not with morally inappropriate weapons Trade No morality of high v. low tariffs But norm against free trade: “Buy American” Norm of reciprocity if have trade

Q7: Violation tolerance Security Chem-bio-small arms: rather tolerant Nuclear: not tolerant at all Wargames: somewhat tolerant Trade Quite violation tolerant because can be “undone”

Q8: Inherent transparency & ability to cheat Security Strong incentives and ability to keep weapons development and deployment secret Harder to keep wargames secret Trade Tariffs, quotas, non- tariff barriers (NTBs) “visible at the border” Subsidies NOT visible at border

Q9: Response incentives Security Strong incentives to make a response but not to reinforce the agreement but to respond to the threat Can’t target response at single country (weapons threaten all) Trade Can target response: ability to target and calibrate response Incentives to calibrate response to maintain broader agreement Reputational concerns