Using PHINMS and Web-Services for Interoperability The findings and conclusions in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent.

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Presentation transcript:

Using PHINMS and Web-Services for Interoperability The findings and conclusions in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Raja Kailar, Ph.D. CTO, Business Networks International Inc. Tim Morris – PHINMS Project Sponsor CDC/NCPHI Director, DISS

2 Overview PHINMS Web Services extension phases Interoperability considerations –Scalable Messaging Architectures –Non-PHIN Networks

3 PHINMS Web-Services Adapter

4 PHINMS Web-Services Reliable Messaging

Current Message Transport Modes Route-not-Read Direct-Send

Maintainability/Scalability: Current Challenges Route-not-Read has single point of failure, performance bottleneck Direct-Send difficult to install (Firewall, DMZ etc) Lifecycle management of client certificates used for Sender authentication by Receivers proxy web-server

7 Transport - Long Term Goals Scalability –Support for thousands of messaging nodes Maintainability –Adding new nodes, or renewing certificates at a node should not require manual updates at all other nodes

Transport Architectures Under Consideration Option 1: –Identity provider based Centralized/Federated authentication Option 2: –Regional gateways with routing capability

Option 1: Identity Provider based Centralized/Federated Authentication

10 What is an Identity Provider? User identity proofing –e.g., Is this John Doe living at 123 Main St, TN? Identity binding to digital credentials –e.g., John Doe = Certificate with Serial No Periodic renewal of credentials, re-binding of identities Online authentication Service –e.g., Client-Certificates, Login and Password Standard based authentication and/or authorization (session) tokens –e.g., SAML assertions

What is SAML? Security Assertion Markup Language Open standard for communicating information: –Authentication –Authorization –Attribute Platform and Language independent (XML based) Can be used to support single sign-on and identity federation

12 Identity Provider and SAML Based Authentication Approach

Identity Providers – Advantages and Challenges Advantages Centralized control over authentication and/or authorization User identity management burden shifted from services that use identity Challenges Establishing trusted identity providers –More than technology –Service requestor and responder need to agree on same authentication/authorization mechanisms Centralizing trust can create single point of failure, target for hack attacks Standards (e.g., SAML, WSS) are evolving Where is authorization performed?

Option 2: Regional Gateways with Routing Capability

15 Regional Gateways Messaging/routing –Nodes authenticate to gateway –Send/Poll model at each regional gateway –Gateways perform message routing

Regional Gateways – Advantages and Challenges Advantages –No single point of failure –Local control of identities and processes –De-couples intra-regional interfaces from inter-regional ones Challenges –Authentication/authorization not necessarily end-to-end Gateways may act as trusted intermediaries (transitive trust) Need policies, binding agreements between regional gateways –End-to-End routing, encryption –Acknowledgements in multi-hop mode

Interoperation with Non-PHIN Networks

18 Approach 1: Multiple Protocol Support

Multiple Protocol Support: Challenges Addition of each new protocol requires upgrade of messaging node software Complexity of messaging nodes go up (multiple security credentials, protocols etc)

20 Approach 2: Inter-Network Gateways

21 Example – Non-PHIN to PHIN Message Flow

22 Inter-Network Gateway Architecture

Inter-Network Gateways – Advantages and Challenges Advantages –Facilitates re-use of existing messaging systems to support new data routes and business use cases Challenges –Agreements (policy, business, service-level) between different networks on gateway protocols, routing, security –Trust on gateways End-to-end messaging security properties –Authentication –Confidentiality

24 Summary Current models are secure but may not scale to large number of nodes New models are scalable/maintainable, but there are security challenges: Centralizing authentication / authorization Regional gateways (transitive trust) Security - Technology is a small part of the problem. Bigger challenges are: Establishing trust in identity proofing, authentication and authorization Policy, Governance, Agreements on inter- organizational or inter-regional entities