9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq Prof. Theo Farrell Dept of War Studies King’s College London

Content  9/11 and Al Qaeda  Afghanistan War  The Bush Doctrine  2003 Iraq War  The Logic of Prevention

The bad guys

Al Qaeda’s record  bombing of World Trade Center (1993)  attempt to destroy 11 Jumbo’s (1995)  bombing of US facilities in Riyadh (1995) & Dhahran (1996), killing 26 and injuring 540  embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 (1998)  attack on USS Cole (2000)

Impact of 9/11

Blair on 9/11 (March 2004) September 11 was for me a revelation If the 20th century scripted our conventional way of thinking, the 21 st century is unconventional in almost every respect. This is true also of our security.

Terrorism and public fear  involuntary exposure - cars kill more than terrorists - terrorism is beyond our control  unfamiliarity - Malaria (kills 1m each year) v Ebola (killed 891 since 1976) – Sept01 anthrax attack on US closes down DC but only kills 5

The New Terrorists  Smarter  More agile  More lethal

Al Qaeda’s strategy 1. Bleeding wars 2. Building safe havens and franchises (AQI, AQIM, Hamas) 3. Raids on the West Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda

GWOT: the opening campaign  “War on Terrorism”: Bush address to nation on 11 Sept.  Rumsfeld orders JCS to draw up military options on 12 Sept.  CENTCOM plan approved 2 Oct and Op Enduring Freedom begins 7 Oct

CENTCOM uses the CIA plan JCS plans (13-15 Sept) (a) cruise missile attacks (b) longer bombing campaign (c) large-scale invasion CIA plan: US airpower, SOF teams + local Afghan allies

Op Enduring Freedom 1. Coalition air offensive (7-19 Oct) 2. US/UK supported NA offensive in North (late Oct–Nov 2001) 3. US/UK-led land offensive in South (Dec 2001–July 2002)

Bush Doctrine  Terrorists + WMD = increase the risks of inaction  “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.” Nat Security Strategy, 20 Sept 2002

Neocon agenda  Moral certitude  Military primacy  Middle East democracy

Iraq: the road to war  Post 9/11: worse-case analysis gained a new credibility  Bush orders war plans (21 Nov 2001)  Framing the threat: “Axis of Evil” (2002 State of the Union)  Selling the threat: Iraq, Al Qaeda and WMD

Iraq: countdown to war  Aug 2002: Bush authorises war plans  10 Oct 2002: Congress authorises war, &  8 Nov 2002: UNSC passes res  20 March 2003: OIF begins

Twenty days later…

Rumsfeld Doctrine  CONOPS: “Shock and awe” replaces “overwhelming force”  “Army lite” invasion force: 170,000 (v. 540,000 in 1991 GW)  Victory for military transformation

Losing the peace  Lack of phase IV planning  ORHA & CPA: poorly resourced and staffed  US forces: too few and unprepared for COIN  American mistakes

American mistakes 1. De-baathification 2. Disbanding the Iraqi Army 3. Failure to maintain order 4. Pushing too fast on political and economic reform

The logic of prevention  Preventive war thinking in early Cold War America  Clinton administration and North Korea  Israeli raids on nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (Sept 2007)