Safety / Performance Criteria Agreeing on Assumptions 1 BEIJING, CHINA; 30 JUN-11 JUL 2014

ObjectiveObjective2 This module provides an overview of Performance and Safety Criteria as well as Project Assumptions

Why?Why? Why set performance criteria Why set performance criteria ✈ Measurement ✈ Determine success ✈ Evaluate safety Why set performance criteria Why set performance criteria ✈ Measurement ✈ Determine success ✈ Evaluate safety 3

AssessmentAssessment4 QQualitative Assessment  Expert judgement used to assess the design based on ICAO SARPs ( Standards and Recommended Practices ) and Procedures QQuantitative Assessment  Quantified results produced in the form of numerical data e.g. capacity increased by 20% QQualitative Assessment  Expert judgement used to assess the design based on ICAO SARPs ( Standards and Recommended Practices ) and Procedures QQuantitative Assessment  Quantified results produced in the form of numerical data e.g. capacity increased by 20% Both Qualitative and Quantitative assessment are crucial to safety and performance assessment

References: ✈ ICAO Doc 9859, AN/474, Safety Management Manual (SMM) ✈ ICAO Doc 9689, Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima ✈ ICAO Circular 319-AN/181, A Unified Framework for Collision Risk Modelling in Support of the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima (Doc 9689) ✈ ICAO Doc 9613, Performance-Based Navigation Manual ✈ ICAO Doc 8168, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Volume I, Flight Procedures ✈ ICAO Doc 9905, RNP AR Procedure Design Manual ✈ ICAO Doc 4444, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Air Traffic Management. References: ✈ ICAO Doc 9859, AN/474, Safety Management Manual (SMM) ✈ ICAO Doc 9689, Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima ✈ ICAO Circular 319-AN/181, A Unified Framework for Collision Risk Modelling in Support of the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima (Doc 9689) ✈ ICAO Doc 9613, Performance-Based Navigation Manual ✈ ICAO Doc 8168, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Volume I, Flight Procedures ✈ ICAO Doc 9905, RNP AR Procedure Design Manual ✈ ICAO Doc 4444, Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Air Traffic Management. Evaluating Safety 5

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) 6 Ref: ICAO 9859, 2.2

SAFETY THEORY 7 Organizational & Structural Pressure Various defences are built into the aviation system to protect against fluctuations in human performance or decisions at all levels of the system. defensive layers

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) 8 Traditional Approach: Data collection and analysis efforts are limited to data collected through investigation of accidents and serious incidents. New Approach: Adds routine collection and analysis of data using proactive as well as reactive methodologies to monitor known safety risks and detect emerging safety issues. These enhancements formulated the rationale for moving towards a safety management approach. Ref: ICAO 9859, 5.1

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) 9 A SMS is a system to assure the safe operation of aircraft through effective management of safety risk. This system is designed to continuously improve safety by identifying hazards, collecting and analysing data and continuously assessing safety risks. The SMS seeks to proactively contain or mitigate risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. Ref: ICAO 9859, 5.1

10 A SMS is not static but is designed for continuous improvement. a) Develop forms for internal evaluations. b) Define an internal audit process. c) Define an external audit process. d) Define a schedule for evaluation of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures to be completed through audits and surveys. e) Develop documentation relevant to operational safety assurance. Ref: ICAO 9859 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)

11 The four components of a SMS are: a) safety policy and objectives; b) safety risk management; c) safety assurance; and d) safety promotion Ref: ICAO 9859, 5.3

12 Safety Risk Management Ref: ICAO 9859

Safety Management 13 Identify Hazards Evaluate Hazards

Safety Management 14 Mitigate vs Eliminate Hazards

Ref: ICAO 9859 Evaluating Safety 15

Risk Assessment 16 Ref: ICAO 9859

Risk Management 17 Ref: ICAO 9859

ASSUMPTIONSASSUMPTIONS 18

AssumptionsAssumptions 19 Columbus challenged the Spanish courtiers to stand an egg on its end. They tried but failed. He then hard-boiled one and squashed it down. “That’s not fair,” they protested, “you broke the rules.” “Don’t be silly,” he replied, “you just assumed more than you needed to.” What unnecessary assumptions can you eliminate? Columbus challenged the Spanish courtiers to stand an egg on its end. They tried but failed. He then hard-boiled one and squashed it down. “That’s not fair,” they protested, “you broke the rules.” “Don’t be silly,” he replied, “you just assumed more than you needed to.” What unnecessary assumptions can you eliminate?

AssumptionsAssumptions 20

AssumptionsAssumptions 21

AssumptionsAssumptions22 PBN

A few examples …. ✈ Changing a radar ✈ Blocked military airspace – that wasn’t ✈ Changing planned runway orientation ✈ Change to the number of runways available ✈ Changing a radar ✈ Blocked military airspace – that wasn’t ✈ Changing planned runway orientation ✈ Change to the number of runways available 23

Questions???Questions??? 24