NOVEMBER 18, 2013 | WESTBOROUGH, MA Administrative Pricing Rules for Forward Capacity Auction #8.

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Presentation transcript:

NOVEMBER 18, 2013 | WESTBOROUGH, MA Administrative Pricing Rules for Forward Capacity Auction #8

Topics ISO fix to the gap in the trigger for Insufficient Competition A clarification to New Capacity Required as it applies to the system, and what this means for export- and import-constrained zones A clarification to the treatment of de-list bids when there is administrative pricing 2

ISO fix to the gap in the trigger for Insufficient Competition III Insufficient Competition “…(b) at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price: (i) Less than 300 MW of capacity is offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources (the ISO shall revisit the appropriateness of the 300 MW threshold in the case of an import-constrained Capacity Zone having a Local Sourcing Requirement of less than 5000 MW); (ii)the amount of capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources is more than the amount of New Capacity Required but less than twice the amount of New Capacity Required; or …“ Deleting this phrase eliminates the ‘gap’ created when the amount of New Capacity Required is greater than 300MW If the amount of new capacity offered is less than or equal to 300MW or less than two times the amount of New Capacity Required, then subsection (b) of III is true 3

Clarification of New Capacity Required as it applies to the system New Capacity Required is currently defined in Section III for an import-constrained zone and for the Rest-of- Pool zone, however, Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition at the system level apply to all zones The description of New Capacity Required for Rest-of-Pool does not apply – all zones are part of the system The Rest-of-Pool zone has no zone minimum requirement, so by itself the Rest-of-Pool zone cannot have Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition 4

The clarification to New Capacity Required Clarification: Substitute the definition of Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone New Capacity Required in Section III with the following: “; system-wide, “New Capacity Required” shall mean the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) minus the total amount of capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period), minus capacity otherwise obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period.” And add the underlined phrase to Section III (a) “the amount of capacity offered from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period), minus capacity otherwise obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period) is less than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement, as applicable; and…” 5

What does this mean for an export-constrained zone? Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition at the system level apply to all zones - all zones are part of the system The auction may continue in an export-constrained zone and produce a lower clearing price than the Rest-of-Pool zone Under Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition, cleared new resources are paid the capacity clearing price, cleared existing resources are paid the lower of either the clearing price or the specified administrative rate Thus, if there is system Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition and the auction is run for an export-constrained zone, resources in the export-constrained zone are subject to the Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition pricing provisions 6

Export-constrained zone - example 2 zones in the system, Rest-of-Pool and an export-constrained zone, and there is system Insufficient Competition The auction is run and the clearing price is $8 in Rest-of-Pool and the clearing price in the export-constrained zone is $4 Insufficient Competition pricing for new resources is the capacity clearing price; for existing resources it is the lower of the clearing price or the administrative rate specified in the Tariff. For purposes of this example, we’ll use $5 as the administrative rate Because the system has Insufficient Competition, all resources in the system are subject to the Insufficient Competition pricing provisions In Rest-of-Pool all cleared new resources will get the Rest-of-Pool clearing price, $8; all cleared existing resources will get the administrative rate, $5 In the export-constrained zone all cleared new resources and all cleared existing resources will get the zonal clearing price, $4 7

What happens when there is system Insufficient Competition and the Carry Forward rule is triggered in an import-constrained zone? If there is system Insufficient Competition, and in an import-constrained zone the carry-forward provision is triggered, the carry-forward provisions will be utilized, subject to the constraints in Section III III Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor. “The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.” 8

An example of what this means for the import-constrained zone 2 zones in the system, Rest-of-Pool and an import-constrained zone; and there is system Insufficient Competition and the carry-forward rule is triggered in the import-constrained zone Insufficient Competition pricing for new resources is the capacity clearing price; for existing resources it is the lower of the clearing price or the administrative rate specified in the Tariff For purposes of this example, we’ll use $5 as the administrative rate under Insufficient Competition and $10 as the administrative rate under the carry-forward provisions Case 1: The auction is run and the clearing price is $8 in both Rest-of-Pool and in the import- constrained zone Because the system has Insufficient Competition, all resources in the system are subject to the Insufficient Competition pricing provisions; all cleared new resources will get the clearing price, $8; all cleared existing resources will get the Insufficient Competition administrative rate, $5 Due to the subsequent application of the carry-forward provisions, however, the clearing price in the import-constrained zone is changed to $10. In this case, all resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained zone, both new and existing, are paid $10. NOTE: This outcome is the same as the case wherein the system Insufficient Competition provision was not triggered 9

Another example of what this means for the import-constrained zone 2 zones in the system, Rest-of-Pool and an import-constrained zone; and there is system Insufficient Competition and the carry-forward rule is triggered in the import-constrained zone Insufficient Competition pricing for new resources is the capacity clearing price; for existing resources it is the lower of the clearing price or the administrative rate specified in the Tariff For purposes of this example, we’ll use $5 as the administrative rate under Insufficient Competition and $10 as the administrative rate under the carry-forward provisions Case 2: The auction is run and the clearing price is $12 in both Rest-of-Pool and in the import- constrained zone Because the system has Insufficient Competition, all resources in the system are subject to the Insufficient Competition pricing provisions; all cleared new resources will get the clearing price, $12; all cleared existing resources will get the Insufficient Competition administrative rate, $5 The subsequent application of the carry-forward provisions would lower the price to $10 in the import-constrained zone, however, this is prevented by the requirement that the price in an import-constrained zone cannot be less than the price in the Rest-of-Pool zone. In this case, all resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained zone, both new and existing, are paid the clearing price, $12. 10

The clarification to the treatment of de-list bids when there is administrative pricing Clarification: Add the underlined phrase to Section III III Treatment of De-List and Export Bids When the Capacity Clearing Price is Set Administratively. “Where the Capacity Clearing Price is set pursuant to Section III (Capacity Carry Forward Rule), or where payments are set pursuant to Section III (Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition), and as a result a Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Export Bid clears that would not otherwise have cleared, then the de-listed or exported capacity will not be replaced in the current Forward Capacity Auction (that is, the amount of capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or Local Sourcing Requirement, as appropriate, minus the amount of the de-listed or exported capacity that results from the application of administratively determined prices) and shall be included in subsequent annual reconfiguration auctions (that is, the amount of capacity procured in subsequent annual reconfiguration auctions shall be increased by the amount of the de-listed or exported capacity).” 11

What does this mean for de-list bids? A de-list bid would not get a Capacity Supply Obligation if priced higher than the clearing price or the administrative rate NOTE: The ‘auction’ includes the descending clock portion, the clearing engine, and any post-processing (e.g., administrative pricing mechanics). The final results of the auction after all steps have been completed are reflected in the MIS reports issued to participants approximately five days after the conclusion of the descending clock portion of the auction, and in the informational filing made to the FERC as soon as practicable. Examples: Case 1: The clearing price is $4, the administrative rate is $10, and the de-list bid is $7 The $7 de-list bid will not get a Capacity Supply Obligation De-list bids below $4 would get a Capacity Supply Obligation Case 2: The clearing price is $14, the administrative rate is $5, and the de-list bid is $7 The $7 de-list bid will not get a Capacity Supply Obligation De-list bids below $5 would get a Capacity Supply Obligation 12

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