Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security1 CSC 774 Advanced Network Security Topic 4.2 BiBa.

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Presentation transcript:

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security1 CSC 774 Advanced Network Security Topic 4.2 BiBa

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security2 Overview BiBa stands for “Bins and Balls” –Use one-way functions without trapdoors (e.g., hash functions) BiBa signature scheme BiBa broadcast authentication protocol

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security3 BiBa Signature Scheme Precompute of SEALs –SEAL: SElf Authenticating vaLues Signature generation –Exploit SEALs and the difficulty of finding collisions under hash functions Signature verification –Verify SEAL –Verify collisions

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security4 SEAL Each SEAL is randomly generated Given a SEAL s, the signer computes f s = F s (0), where F s is a PRF –f s is the commitment to s –f s is authenticated to all possible verifiers (e.g., through a RSA signature or pre-distribution) In BiBa, the signer has t pre-computed SEALs –SEALs: s 1, s 2, …, s t –All SEALs are authenticated to all verifiers

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security5 BiBa Signature: Intuition Sign message m –Compute hash h = H(m), where H is a hash function –Consider a hash function family G h, whose range is 0, n-1 Example: G 1 (x) = G(x|1), where G is SHA1 –Compute G h for all SEALs s 1, …, s t That is, G h (s 1 ), G h (s 2 ), …, G h (s t ) –Look for a 2-way collision of SEALs G h (s i ) = G h (s j ) with s i  s j –The pair forms the signature Signature verification –Compute hash h = H(m) –Verify s i  s j and G h (s i ) = G h (s j )

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security6 Basic BiBa Scheme Balls (SEALs): Bins (Range of G h ):

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security7 Security of BiBa Signature Security comes from –The difficulty of finding k-way collisions for one- way functions –The asymmetric property that the signer has more SEALs than the adversary Signer can easily generate the BiBa signatures with high probability while adversary can’t. Exploits the birthday paradox –Probability that there is at least one collision of the hashes of t random messages is approximately 1 - e -t(t-1)/2N, where N is range of hash function.

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security8 Security of BiBa Signature (Cont’d) Signer (with 1200 SEALs) Attacker (with 10 SEALs) Bins

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security9 BiBa Signature Scheme Basic scheme –Signer is not guaranteed to find a signature BiBa Signature –Sign message m h=H(m|c), where c is a counter starting from 0 c is incremented if no signature is found Compute G h for all SEALs s 1, …, s t Look for a k-way collision of SEALs –Verify signature Verify the k SEALs are distinct Verify that they have the same image

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security10 BiBa Broadcast Authentication Protocol Sender needs to authenticate potentially infinite stream of messages Sender can only disclose a small number of SEALs before attacker would have enough to forge signature –Limit the number of messages that can be signed Solution –SEAL chains Combination of SEALs and TESLA

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security11 SEAL Chains SEAL chainsSalt chain

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security12 Limitation of BiBa Broadcast Authentication High receiver computation overhead –Most of the SEALs are not used –To authenticate a SEAL, each receiver needs to recompute many SEALs in a one-way SEAL chain

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security13 Extension A SEAL boundary SEALs above the boundary are disclosed If attacker slows down the traffic to the receivers, … Packet losses (0, 2, 3, 0, 1, 2)

Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Adv. Net. Security14 Extension B To tolerate packet losses –Add SEAL boundary information to packets –More communication overhead, but also more robust Receivers still need to know the sending rate –Why?