Collective Problem Solving in Networks Winter Mason and Duncan J. Watts.

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Presentation transcript:

Collective Problem Solving in Networks Winter Mason and Duncan J. Watts

Financial Incentives in Crowdsourcing (or, How I Learned to Love Mechanical Turk)

Financial Incentives and Performance  Intuitive Hypothesis:  Greater pay will lead to more and better work  Support from:  Rational economic theory  Classic Mgmt Sci studies (Lazear, 1998)  CEO incentives  Conflicting evidence:  Intrinsic motivation undermined by extrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1972)  Contingency on pay, when value is high, can lead to ‘choking’ (Ariely, Gneezy, Lowenstein, & Mazar)  Risk aversion (Herzberg, 1987)

Study 1: Traffic Images Manipulated  Task Value  Amount earned per image set  $0.01, $0.05, $0.10  No additional pay for image sets  Difficulty  Number of images per set  2, 3, 4 Measured  Quantity  Number of image sets submitted  Quality  Proportion of image sets correctly sorted  Rank correlation of image sets with correct order

How Much to Pay?  Pay rate can affect quantity of work  Pay rate does not have a big impact on quality  (MW ’09)

Collective Problem Solving

Exploration vs. Exploitation  Exploration/Exploitation represents a fundamental tradeoff in complex optimization problems in CS and Stat Mech:  MCMC = hill-climbing (exploit) + random jumps (explore)  Also true of human/organizational learning, where exploration and exploitation are both required, and compete for resources  Rational Search (e.g. Radner)  N projects with unknown payoffs distributions  Must choose between learning current distribution vs. exploring new ones  Boundedly Rational Search  Like above, but with cognitive biases  Satisficing (Simon)  Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky)  Organizational Learning (March 1991)  Refinement vs. Invention  Basic Science vs. Development  Evolutionary Models (in particular, of organizations)  Variation vs. Selection (Hannan and Freeman)

Collective Problem Solving  Exploration / exploitation tradeoff is more complex when multiple agents are sharing information about problem space  Can accelerate learning, by sharing good solutions  But can lead to premature convergence on suboptimal solution

Our Project  Substantive Questions  How do individuals collaboratively solve (certain kinds of) “complex” problems?  How does the structure of the communication network between them contribute to their collective performance?  How does individual position in the network relate to  Individual strategy and performance?  Collective performance?  Our approach so far has been experimental  Human participants recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT)

Payoff Functions  Background generated with 4-octave Perlin noise  Added to a unimodal Gaussian function with mean chosen uniformly at random and SD = 3  Normalized so maximum points = 100

Constructing Communication Networks  Goal: 16-node fixed-degree graphs with extreme statistics  Start with fixed-degree random graphs  All players have same amount of information  Only position in graph can affect success  Rewire to increase or decrease some graph feature  Maximum, Average, Variance  Betweenness, Closeness, Clustering, Network Constraint  Ensuring connected graph  Stop when no rewiring improves feature  Repeat 100 times, keep maximal graph

Features  Clustering:  Number of connected neighbors / Possibly connected neighbors  Betweenness  Number of shortest paths through node  Closeness  Average shortest path to all nodes  Network Constraint  Redundancy with neighbors

Communication Networks Greatest Average BetweennessSmallest Maximum ClosenessGreatest Average ClusteringGreatest Maximum Betweenness Smallest Average BetweennessSmallest Average ClusteringGreatest Variance in ConstraintGreatest Maximum Closeness

Experiments  For each session, 16 subjects are recruited from MTurk  Standing panel alerted previous day  Accept work & read instructions  Sit in “waiting room” until enough players have joined  Each session comprises 8 games  One for each network topology  Each game runs for 15 rounds  100 x100 grid  Relative dimensions of peak and landscape adjusted such that peak is found sometimes, but not always  171 out of total of 232 games (25 sessions) used  61 games removed because player dropped out

Preview of Results  Network structure affects individual search strategy  Individual search strategy affects group success  Network structure affects group success  Individual and group performance are in tension

Network structure affects individual search strategy  Networks differ in amount of exploration  Related to clustering

Network structure affects individual search strategy  Higher clustering  Higher probability of neighbors guessing in identical location  More neighbors guessing in identical location  Higher probability of copying

Individual search strategy affects group success  More players copying each other (i.e., fewer exploring) in current round  Lower probability of finding peak on next round

Individual search strategy affects group success  No significant differences in % of games in which peak was found  But pattern similar to differences in exploration

Communication Networks Greatest Average BetweennessSmallest Maximum ClosenessGreatest Average ClusteringGreatest Maximum Betweenness Smallest Average BetweennessSmallest Average ClusteringGreatest Variance in ConstraintGreatest Maximum Closeness

Network structure affects group success

Diffusion of Best Solution

Individual and group performance are in tension  More likely to find peak with more players exploring (= fewer players copying)  When peak is found, large difference in points (nearly 2x income)

Individual and group performance are in tension BUT  Per player, higher points on average with “copying” strategy  = free-riding problem / social dilemma

Individual and group performance are in tension  Most successful node in structured networks ~ performance of median node in unstructured networks

Individual Performance Is Combination of Individual Position and Collective Performance Greatest Average BetweennessGreatest Maximum BetweennessGreatest Maximum Closeness

Summary of Results  Network structure affects individual search strategy  Clustering increases copying (exploitation)  Individual search strategy affects group success  More copying means lower probability of finding maximum  Network structure affects group success  Networks with lower average path length spread information more quickly  Individual and group performance are in tension  Individuals can improve own relative performance by free-riding on others’ exploration  Best position in structured networks as good as average position in unstructured networks

Thank you! Questions?