6.896: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 18 Constantinos Daskalakis.

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Presentation transcript:

6.896: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 18 Constantinos Daskalakis

Overview Social Choice Theory Gibbard-Satterwaite Theorem Mechanisms with Money (Intro) Vickrey’s Second Price AuctionMechanisms with Money (formal)

Social-Choice Preliminaries

Setting: A : Set of alternatives (“candidates”) Social Choice Theory I : Set of n voters L : Preferences on A ; usually this is the set of total orders on A Social Welfare Function: f : L n  L Social Choice Function: f : L n  A

Theorem [Arrow ’51] Every social welfare function on a set A of at least 3 alternatives that satisfies unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives is a dictatorship. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Proof: Last Lecture

- use a social choice function f Electing a President - ideally f should satisfy the following properties: 2. it should not be susceptible to strategic manipulation 1. it should not be a dictatorship Def: A social choice function f is a dictatorship if there exists some voter i such that f ( < 1, < 2, …,< n ) = top( < i ) ; Such voter i is called the dictator of f. Def: f can be strategically manipulated by voter i if there exist preferences < 1, < 2, …, < n and < i ’ such that f (< 1,…, < i, …, < n ) =a < i a’ = f (< 1,…, < i ’, …, < n ) i.e. i can elect a preferable candidate by lying If f cannot be manipulated it is called incentive compatible.

Monotonicity Def: f is monotone iff f (< 1,…, < i, …, < n ) = a ≠ a’ =f (< 1,…, < i ’, …, < n )  a’ < i a and a < i ’ a’ Proposition: (f is incentive compatiable) iff (f is monotone) i.e. if the outcome changes from a to a’ when i changes his vote from > i to > i ’, then it must be because the swing voter i also switched his preference from a to a’ Proof: Immediate by definition.

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Thm

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Theorem: If f is an incentive compatible social choice function onto a set of alternatives A, where |A|≥3, then f is a dictatorship. Remark: “onto” is important; if |A|=2 then the majority function is both incentive compatible and non-dictatorship. Proof Idea: Suppose f is both incentive compatible and non- dictatorship. Use f to obtain a social welfare function F that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship, which is impossible by Arrow’s theorem.

Proof of the GS theorem From the social choice function f to a social welfare function F Notation: If S  A, and <  L, we denote by < S the preference obtained from < by moving all elements of S to the top of <. e.g. S = {a, b}, and x < a < y < b < z then x < S y < S z < S a < S b. Definition of F( < 1, < 2,…, < n ) =: < a < b iff f ( < 1 {a, b}, < 2 {a, b},…, < n {a, b} ) = b Claim 1: F is a social welfare function. What can go wrong? Claim 2: F satisfies unanimity, IIA, and non-dictatorship.

Proof of the GS theorem (cont.) Lemma: For any S, < 1, < 2,…, < n, f ( < 1 S, < 2 S,…, < n S )  S. Proof: hybrid argument, on board. Claim 1: F is a social welfare function. Proof:By direct application of lemma, F is a total order and it is anti-symmetric. Transitivity? Suppose that a < b < c < a (*). W.l.o.g. suppose that f ( < 1 {a, b, c}, < 2 {a, b, c},…, < n {a, b, c} ) = a. Hybrid argument: by sequentially changing < {a, b, c} to < {a, b} argue that f ( < 1 {a, b}, < 2 {a, b},…, < n {a, b} ) = a, contradiction to (*).

Proof of the GS theorem (cont.) Proof: Claim 2: F satisfies unanimity, IIA, and non-dictatorship. unanimity, IIA on board non-dictatorship: 2 points

Mechanisms with Money

- The GS theorem applies to the setting where voters declare ordinal preferences over the alternatives, rather than cardinal preferences. - What if the voters assign a “score” to each alternative ? Going beyond the GS obstacle valuation function - Voter’s utility if alternative a is chosen and money m i is given to him quasi-linear preferences

Example 1: Auctioning off a single item - each bidder i has value w i for the item - alternatives A ={ 1 wins, 2 wins, …, n wins} - for all i: - suppose we want to implement the social choice function that gives the item to the bidder with the highest value for the item - unfortunately we don’t know the w i ’s - want to cleverly design the payment scheme to make sure that the social choice cannot be strategically manipulated

Example 1: Auctioning off a single item (cont) - first attempt: no payment - second attempt: pay your bid - third attempt: Vickrey’s second price auction the winner is the bidder i with the highest declared value w i = max j w j non-winners pay 0, and the winner pays max j≠i w j Theorem (Vickrey): For all w 1, w 2,…,w n and w i ’, let u i be bidder i ’s utility if she bids her true value w i and let u i ’ be her utility if she bids an untrue value w i ’. Then u i ≥ u i ’.

General Framework

Setting: A : Set of alternatives (“candidates”) Mechanisms with Money I : Set of n players valuation function of player i set of possible valuations Def: A direct revelation mechanism is a collection of functions where is a social choice function and is the payment function of player i.

Incentive Compatibility Def: A mechanism is called incentive compatible, or truthful, or strategy-proof iff for all i, for all and for all utility of i if he says the truth utility of i if he lies i.e. no incentive to lie! but isn’t it too good to be true ?