Coercion vs. Incentivizing: A Way Out of the Section 2 Impasse? Ken Glazer April 1, 2004 April 1, 2004
Summary Two ways of achieving “exclusivity” : Refusal to sell ("coercion") Financial incentives ("incentivizing") That distinction is critical Coercive conduct should be presumed illegal Incentivizing conduct should be tested under predatory pricing rules
I. The Context A. Vertical Microsoft Microsoft LePage’s LePage’s Dentsply Dentsply RJ Reynolds RJ Reynolds Concord Boat Concord Boat Hill-Rom Hill-Rom B. Not Horizontal Aspen Skiing Aspen Skiing Trinko Trinko Classic essential facilities Classic essential facilities
II. The Distinction A. “Coercion” 1. What is it? R efusal to sell a “necessary” product unless customer confers exclusivity E ither express O r implicit through manipulation of p pricing L Lorain Journal D Dentsply C lassic tying case 2. Why is it bad? A ctual use of monopoly power C ustomer given no choice
Original Price Price to Resisting Customer Price to Accepting Customer “Coercion” Scenerio $2.00/unit$3.00/unit$2.00/unit “Incentivizing” Scenerio $2.00/unit$2.00/unit$1.00/unit
II. The Distinction B. Incentivizing 1. What is it? Use of incentives to induce customer behavior Not a refusal to deal RJ Reynolds Concord Boat
II. The Distinction B. Incentivizing (cont.) 2. Why is it not bad? Not a use of monopoly power at all Customer has a choice O r had a choice at the time contract was formed B eing locked into a contract ≠ coercion Money in customer’s pocket Does not preclude competitors from countering the incentive
III. Practical Significance of Distinction A. Coercion is presumptively illegal Presumption of illegality because Lorain type conduct is plainly anticompetitive Application to Dentsply
III. Practical Significance of Distinction B. Incentivizing conduct should be tested under Brooke Group Must be below cost Otherwise we are just shielding competitors from having to dig into their own pockets Bad intent doesn’t matter But incentives on Product A can be “attributed” to Product B Le Page’s
IV. Objections A. Distinction isn’t important Objection: Why distinguish if outcome is same – customer tied up? Response: Outcome is not the same, only the superficial appearance In any event, antitrust law often distinguishes between two different means of achieving the same end Price fixing vs. lawful merger Collusion vs. oligopoly
IV. Objections B. Distinction isn’t real Objection: Too hard to tell difference between coercive penalty and “penalty” resulting from loss of incentive Response: Not true. Look at whether the “unencumbered” price went up In any event, even if hard in some cases, at least it’s the right distinction
IV. Objections C. Too hard on coercion Objection: We shouldn’t automatically condemn Lorain type conduct Response: Not automatic. Presumption can be overcome But it should be presumed illegal
IV. Objections D. Too soft on incentivizing Objection: Even non-predatory incentives can harm competition Response: Persuade the Supreme Court Counselors need a bright line
V. Conclusion A. Coercive conduct very different from incentivizing conduct B. This framework may supply the long- sought test