The Jupiter Launch System A Direct Derivative of the Space Transportation System International Space Development Conference Washington DC, May 29 th 2008

“The Administrator shall, to the fullest extent possible consistent with a successful development program use the personnel, capabilities, assets, and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle program in developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle, Crew Launch Vehicle, and a heavy-lift launch vehicle.” -NASA Authorization Act of 2005 DIRECT Delivers what Congress Authorized “The best civil space policy to have been enunciated by a president in four decades or more, and the best authorization act to be approved by the Congress since the 1960s.” – Dr. Mike Griffin STS Jan. 22, 2008

A DIRECT Derivative of the Space Transportation System

DIRECT ‘is’ the Historic NASA STS Derived Approach Step 2: Type in “National Launch System” or “Shuttle Derived” into the search box Step 1: Go to Result: Over 190 detailed studies from 1978 to 2005 that use the DIRECT approach. True STS derived systems have three things in common 1)They Retain the STS Stack configuration 2)They Reuse the 4-Segment SRB 3)They Keep the STS External Tank at a 8.4m dia. Ares-I and Ares-V do none of these three things Shuttle-CBuzz Aldrin’s Aquila National Launch System (NLS) Mars Direct’s Ares Shuttle-B

New 5-Seg. SRB New J-2X Engine New Configuration New Infrastructure New Upper Stage Existing 4-Seg. SRB Existing RS-68 Engine Existing Configuration Existing Infrastructure No Upper Stage Operational Date Bottom-line: DIRECT Closes the Gap within the Current Budget Ares-I STS Jupiter-120 $9.5 Billion$14.4 Billion* March 2016** Total Development Cost September 2012 *GAO Figure DIRECT Maximizes the Space Transportation System ** March 2016 recently revealed

Jupiter core re-uses all existing Shuttle tooling Parallel construction of Jupiter cores and Shuttle External Tanks Jupiter test articles at Stennis and KSC before Shuttle retirement Jupiter Upper Stage begins production 2 years earlier than Ares-V DIRECT Removes the Workforce “GAP” at Michoud

The Jupiter vehicles are delivered to KSC before Shuttle retires The First Jupiter flight occurs 2 months before last Shuttle flight 11 Jupiter vs. 7 Ares-I flights thru 2015 – requires full workforce The Jupiter can fly 20mT of mission payload with each crew DIRECT Removes the Workforce & Flight “GAP” at KSC One year slide in last 3 months 3

Man-rating of the DIRECT Engine is Five Years Ahead of Ares GAO Assessment of the Ares-I J-2X Engine* - The J-2X is a new engine development on the critical path for ISS return - NASA is trying to do 29 rework cycles in only 7 years vs. 9 years for SSME - The J-2X has insufficient testing facilities DIRECT uses the proven RS-68 *GAO T April 3, 2008

Speech by Dr. Michael D. Griffin Space Transportation Association 22 January 2008 “The most obvious split involves launching two identical vehicles” We agree 100% with Dr. Griffin that one Launch System is Superior. “However… [this] is vastly over designed for ISS logistics.” This is Dr. Griffin’s Single Point of Contention with DIRECT “This method … was to be employed [for Apollo]” “Costs are lower because of only one launch vehicle development” “Recurring costs are amortized over a larger number of flights” “Knowledge of system reliability is enhanced by … flight experience”       The Jupiter-120 doesn’t use an upper stage though, making this variant a close match for the ISS Crew and Logistics capabilities of Shuttle NASA Admits the Benefits of One Launch System It is true that two Jupiter-232, which has an upper stage, places more mass in orbit than the Ares-I + Ares-V for the Lunar mission.

Ares-I STS Jupiter-120 No ISS Modules ISS is Left Unfinished = Less capable than the Space Shuttle more expensive than an EELV Delivers ISS Modules We Can Finish ISS = More capable than the Space Shuttle and less expensive than Ares-I The Jupiter-120 is More Capable,available Sooner and needs Less Money Operational Date $9.5 Billion$14.4 Billion March 2016 Total Development Cost September 2012 Lunar Class Orion?Lunar Class Orion Mission Payload Robust ISS Logistics No Mission Payload No ISS Logistic   Non-Reusable Orion Water Landing Reusable Orion Land Landing DIRECT is Ideally Suited for both the ISS & VSE Missions

ISS Crew ISS Crew & Logistics ISS Elements & Hubble Servicing Crew Lunar Flyby Cargo Probes MSR etc. Lunar & Mars Missions The Jupiter-120 is Easily Extensible to New Mission Types

Finish the ISS Mars Sample Return JWST ServiceHubble Service DIRECT Expands & Joins Manned and Unmanned Efforts

- Three Years Before the first flight of Ares-I to the ISS Imagine an ‘Apollo 8’ Lunar Flyby Mission before 2013 DIRECT Enables an Apollo-8 Mission Much Sooner

The Jupiter-120 Protects Our Heavy Lift Infrastructure

Add a 2 nd Stage and LSAM and we can Return to the Moon

“The most obvious split involves launching two identical vehicles” “This method … was to be employed [for Apollo]” “Knowledge of system reliability is enhanced by flight experience” Speech by Dr. Michael D. Griffin Space Transportation Association 22 January 2008 DIRECT Produces a More Capable Lunar Program

“Costs are lower because of only one launch vehicle development” “Recurring costs are amortized over a larger number of flights” Speech by Dr. Michael D. Griffin Space Transportation Association 22 January 2008 DIRECT Saves Money Now and Later

A leaked memo from Constellation indicates that NASA began to prepare an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for Jupiter-120. These are the results of an 8-week Internal NASA Study performed in October/November DIRECT is the Best Based on a Recent Internal NASA Study

It is Too Late to Switch Horses Now

We Agree, It is Too Late to Switch Horses Now STS is the horse we are on Next launch is this Saturday

We Agree, It is Too Late to Switch Horses Now STS is the horse we are on Next launch is this Saturday The Jupiter is a Direct Derivative of STS Same Foot Print

We Agree, It is Too Late to Switch Horses Now STS is the horse we are on Next launch is this Saturday The Jupiter is a Direct Derivative of STS Ares Retains < 5% of the STS Hardware or Infrastructure New 10m Tank New 5-Segment SRB Different Foot Print Same 8.4m Tank Existing Reusable 4-Segment SRB Different Upper Stages Common Upper Stage Al-Li Disposable 5.5- Segment SRB Six RS-68 Engines Even Longer Tank Breaking News Same Foot Print

Summary Dr. Griffin agrees that one launch system costs less than two launch systems Congress directed us to leverage the STS infrastructure and workforce ESAS Appendix 6a-f confirms our cost and performance numbers Even now the Jupiter-120 is four years ahead of the Ares-I Dr. Griffin agrees that one launch system is the obvious and safest approach NASA studies done late last year confirm that DIRECT is the best approach Ares utilizes < 5% of the STS infrastructure and < 25% workforce Jupiter utilizes > 95% of the STS infrastructure and >75% workforce Over 100 NASA studies over 35 years agree with the DIRECT approach DIRECT is Safer, Simpler and Sooner Jupiter provides new capabilities while lowering operational costs below Ares-I DIRECT ‘is’ the NASA engineering recommendation

Manned Missions to Mars ? No we are at least 6 Presidential and 12 Congressional cycles away The Critical Decisions before America Now Manned Missions to Near Earth Object ? No we are at least 4 Presidential and 8 Congressional cycles away Manned Missions to the Lunar Surface ? No we are at least 2 Presidential and 4 Congressional cycles away Ares-I/V No EELV/COTS Yes DIRECT Yes Do we continue United States access to the ISS ? Do we save the United States’ second Heavy Lift system ? No Yes Do we remain the leading space faring nation ? No Yes

We must not make A New Mistake Protect key STS infrastructure from destruction by Ares-I Perform an independent evaluation of the Jupiter-120 vs. Ares-I Review the recent internal NASA study endorsing Jupiter-120/232 The Key to the Next 50 Years Starts with Clear Thinking Today Dr. Michael D. Griffin NASA Administrator August 31, 2005 AIAA Space 2005 Conference & Exhibition “From , between the retirement of the Apollo-Saturn system and the first flight of the Shuttle, the United States did not have the capability to send humans into space, our country was not driving the space exploration agenda, and our aerospace workforce was decimated. We lost valuable people from the program, people who never came back. We lost valuable skills that were relearned with difficulty, or not at all. We lost momentum. Let us learn from these experiences. Let us not repeat them. Let us at least make a new mistake.”

Fifty years after the Space Age began America must once again answer the same question that began it. Do we want to be the “world’s leading space faring nation”? -President John F. Kennedy