Introduction to Game Theory Economics 171. Course requirements Class website Go to economics department home page. Under Links, find Class pages, then.

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Presentation transcript:

Introduction to Game Theory Economics 171

Course requirements Class website Go to economics department home page. Under Links, find Class pages, then click on Econ 171 Textbook: Games, Strategies, and Decision Making by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Clicker available at campus bookstore i>clicker Register your clicker at

Office Hours Location: 2052 North Hall Times: Wednesday, 2:00-3:30 and by appointment

Is this the course for you? Regular assigned reading and homework. Frequent unannounced in-class quizzes— some with clickers, some pencil and paper. Strict grading. Challenging, but I hope interesting.

Cheating Sorry to have to mention this, but it has been a problem recently. If I catch you cheating, for example, by copying homework or exams, you will fail the course and I will turn the case over to university authorities. University ruling: “Being copied counts as cheating, just as much cheating as copying.”

Assignments: See class website Week 1 January 7 and 9. Readings: Harrington: Chapters 1 and 2. Complete readings by Thursday, Jan 9. As you read, do the "Check Your Understanding Exercises." Answers to these are found in the back of the book. You do not need to turn these in, but you should do them. Homework: Due January 19: problems 2 and 3 pp 49-50

Extensive game: Perfect Information Players take turns making moves. Each player knows the rules of the game and the payoffs of each outcome to all players. Whenever it is somebody’s turn, he or she knows everything that has happened so far.

An Example:

Example: Incumbent and Challenger Incumbent firm holds a monopoly Challenger considers entering and sharing the market. If challenger enters, incumbent decides whether to fight him or share the market.

A possible outcome

Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information Example: The Entry Game Challenger Stay out 0 Challenger’s payoff 1 Incumbent’s payoff Challenge Incumbent Give in Fight 1010 Challenger’s payoff Incumbent’s payoff

Vocabulary for Extensive form games Decision Tree Decision Node-Specifies whose turn Branches-Options Terminal Node—End of play Payoffs—For each person at each terminal node. Strategy—What will you do at each decision node where it is your turn

What are strategies in entry game? For Challenger – Challenge – Stay Out For Incumbent – Give in if challenged – Fight if challenged

A Kidnapping Game Kidnapping is risky and dangerous, but could be profitable. Will victim’s friends pay a ransom? If they do pay a ransom, why should you free the victim? If they don’t expect you to free the victim, would you expect friends of victim to pay ransom?

Kidnapping Game

Vocabulary for Extensive form games Decision Tree Decision Node-Specifies whose turn Branches-Options Terminal Node—End of play Payoffs—For each person at each terminal node. Strategy—What will you do at each decision node where it is your turn

What are the strategies? Vivica has 1 decision node and two strategies – Pay Ransom – Don’t Pay Ransom Guy has three decision nodes. A strategy specifies what he will do at each node. Example strategy: – Kidnap, Kill if ransom, Kill if no ransom – Kidnap, Don’t kill if ransom, Kill if no ransom – Kidnap, Kill if ransom, Don’t kill if no ransom – Kidnap, Don’t kill, Don’t Kill – Don’t kidnap, Kill, Kill – Don’t kidnap, Don’t kill, kill – Etc.

Extensive form: Imperfect Information When you move, you don’t always know what move the other guy has made. Often motivated by simultaneous move games.

Example: Copy cat game (matching pennies) Little brother wants to do everything that big brother does. Big brother is embarrassed by this. Wants to do opposite of what little brother does.

Big Brother Little Brother HT HTH T Complete Information: Big brother moves first

What would happen? What would you predict if big brother moves first? What would you predict if little brother moves first?

Big Brother Little Brother HT HTH T Incomplete Information: Simultaneous move Information set:

Clicker Trial Run A)Do you have a working clicker? B)No, I am just pressing the button on my ballpoint

See you on Thursday… Don’t forget your homework. (or your clicker.)