Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications Werner Schindler 1, Wolfgang Killmann 2 2 T-Systems.

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Presentation transcript:

Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications Werner Schindler 1, Wolfgang Killmann 2 2 T-Systems ISS GmbH Bonn, Germany 1 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) Bonn, Germany

Random numbers in cryptographic applications - random session keys - RSA prime factors -... Examples: - zero-knowledge-proofs - random numbers for DSS - challenge-response-protocols - IV vectors

Random number generators - deterministic random number generators (DRNGs) (output completely determined by the seed) - true (physical) random number generators (TRNGs) - hybrid generators (refreshing their seed regularly; e.g. by exploiting user‘s interaction, mouse move- ment, key strokes or register values)

Requirements on random numbers R1: The random numbers should have good statistical properties The requirements on the used random numbers depend essentially on the intended application! R2: The knowledge of subsequences of random numbers shall not enable to compute pre- decessors or successors or to guess them with non-negligible probability.

TRNGs vs. DRNGs For sensitive applications requirement R2 is indispensable! DRNGs rely on computational complexity („practical security“) TRNGs: If the entropy per random number is suffi- ciently large this ensures theoretical security.

Objectives of a TRNG evaluation (I): at hand of Verification of the general suitability of the TRNG-design carefully investigated prototypes theoretical considerations and

TRNGs in operation: General problems and risks - total breakdown of the noise source - tolerances of components - aging effects

tot-test / startup test / online test testaim shall detect a total breakdown of the noise source very soon tot-test shall ensure the functionality of the TRNG at the start startup test shall detect non-tolerable weaknesses or deterioration of the quality of random numbers online test

Objectives of a TRNG evaluation (II): at hand of Verification of the suitability of the tot-, startup- and online test theoretical considerations

TRNG (schematic design) digitised analog signal (das-random numbers) internal r.n. algorithmic postprocessing (optional) noise source analogdigital external r.n. external interface buffer (optional)

Which random numbers should be tested? (I) Example: linear feedback shift register... das-r.n.internal r.n. worst case scenario: total breakdown of the noise sorce das-r.n.s : constant, i.e. entropy /bit = 0... but... internal r.n.s: good statistical properties!!!

Which random numbers should be tested? (II) Statistical blackbox tests applied on the internal random numbers will not detect a total breakdown of the noise source (unless the linear complexity profile is tested). The relevant property is the increase of entropy per random bit. Example (continued):

Entropy (I) Fundamental problems: - Entropy is a property of random variables but not of observed random numbers! - „general“ entropy estimators do not exist - Entropy cannot be measured as voltage etc. Consequences: - at least the distribution class of the underlying random variables has to be known General demand (-> R2): - Entropy / random bit should be sufficiently large

Entropy (II) The das-random numbers should be tested. Conclusion: das-random numbers: - may not be equidistributed - may be dependent on predecessors - but there should not be complicated algebraic long-term dependencies (-> math. model of the noise source)

ITSEC and CC ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria) and CC (Common Criteria) - provide evaluation criteria which shall permit the comparability between independent security evaluations. - A product or system which has been successfully evaluated is awarded with an internationally recognized IT security certificate.

CC: Evaluation of Random Number Generators ITSEC, CC and the corresponding evaluation manuals do not specify any uniform evaluation criteria for random number generators! AIS 31: Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Physical Random Number Generators In the German evaluation and certification scheme the evaluation guidance document has been effective since September 2001

AIS 31 (I) - provides clear evaluation criteria for TRNGs - discusses positive and negative examples - no statistical blackbox tests for class P2 - distinguishes between two functionality classes P1 (for less sensitive applications as challenge-response mechanisms) P2 (for sensitive applications as key generation)

AIS 31 (II) - does not favour or exclude any reasonable TRNG design; if necessary, the applicant has give and to justify alternative criteria - mathematical-technical reference: W. Schindler, W. Killmann: A Proposal for: Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for True (Physical) Random Number Generators

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (I) P2-specific requirement P2.d)(vii): Digitised noise signal sequences meet particular criteria or pass statistical tests intended to rule out features such as multi-step dependencies Tests and evaluation rules are specified in sub-section P2.i) Aim of this requirement: to guarantee a minimum entropy limit for the das-random numbers and, consequently, for the internal random numbers.

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (II) Case A): The das-random numbers do not meet these criteria. Using an appropriate (data-compressing) mathematical postprocessing the entropy of the internal r.n.s may yet be sufficiently large. The applicant has to give clear proof that the entropy of the internal random numbers is sufficiently large, taking into account the mathematical postprocessing on basis of the empirical properties of the digitized noise signal sequence.

AIS 31: Alternative Criteria (III) Case B): Due to construction of the TRNG there is no access to the das-random numbers possible. The applicant additionally has to give a comprehensible and plausible description of a mathematical model of the noise source and of the das random numbers (specifying a distribution class!).

AIS 31: Reference Implementation A reference implementation of the applied statistical tests will be put on the BSI website in September The AIS 31 has been well-tried in a number of product evaluations

for improvement of the AIS 31 are always welcome! Proposals and ideas