RouteViews + BGPmon Enabling BGP Monitoring and Analysis Catherine Olschanowsky Lawrence Weikum John Kemp.

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Presentation transcript:

RouteViews + BGPmon Enabling BGP Monitoring and Analysis Catherine Olschanowsky Lawrence Weikum John Kemp

A Community Infrastructure Started by the operations community – Unfunded grassroots effort Used by – University researchers – The operations community – Government contractors and security teams Maintained and Expanded by – University of Oregon – Colorado State University RouteViews + BGPmon: Introduction DeploymentUpdatesDIYDemos

Public BGP Monitoring RouteViews + BGPmon: Peer A Peer B RV Collector BGPmon BGP BGPmon Archives (MRT) Archives (MRT) MRT BGP XML MRT Archives (XML, TXT) Archives (XML, TXT) XML Live Stream Introduction DeploymentUpdatesDIYDemos

Made possible by our peers RouteViews + BGPmon: Introduction DeploymentUpdatesDIYDemos

RouteViews Deployment BGP Collectors  Multi-hop and at Major Exchanges  17 Collectors, 170 v4 peers, 75 v6 peers  Telnet Cisco Command-Line with Open Access  Full-Table View from Each Peer to AS6447 BGP Data  Collection, Distribution, Archiving, and Operations  Archive Data in MRT Format, 1997 to present  Live Data Streams in XML Format Introduction Deployment UpdatesDIYDemos

RouteViews + BGPmon Collectors Introduction Deployment UpdatesDIYDemos route-views {+ 2,3,4,6} telxatl paix eqix saopaulo jinx kixp perth soxrs linx wide sydney nepalix bgpdata livebgp(ix) UCLA

RouteViews+BGPmon Deployment Introduction Deployment UpdatesDIYDemos

RouteViews Resources RouteViews PeeringDB, Complete List of Collectors / Exchanges A Typical RIB, Route-views2 Every 2 Hours RouteViews Data {http,ftp}://archive.routeviews.org/ rsync –list-only archive.routeviews.org::routeviews rsync –av archive.routeviews.org::routeviews/bgpdata. BGPlay ASpath DNS Files Contact: Introduction Deployment Topic 3Topic 4

Internet Wide Monitoring IntroductionDeployment Demos Hilbert Graph: Hierarchical view of prefix space (IPv4) Focuses on a single peer Shows what portion of the address space changes When the path for a prefix changes it turns white This is the Australian outage in Feb UpdatesDIY

Internet Wide Monitoring IntroductionDeployment Demos UpdatesDIY

Internet Wide Monitoring Multi-Peer View IntroductionDeployment Use Cases DIY Traffic Analytics Feeding Alerts – Send Rate – Origin Changes – Path Changes – New Entries – Withdrawals Alerts triggered by – > 2000 send rate (yellow alert) – > 1000 origin changes (yellow alert) – Lawrence will send these later Demos UpdatesDIY

Internet Wide Monitoring IntroductionDeployment Use Cases DIY Demos UpdatesDIY

Organizational Level Create a Critical Prefix List (CPL) Monitor your address space Monitor space of other’s whom you depend on for reachability and services. Store and compare updates with PostgreSQL database IntroductionDeployment Demos UpdatesDIY

Organizational Level Monitoring (CERT Australia) IntroductionDeployment Demos UpdatesDIY

7.3.1 Release of BGPmon Improved Stability XSD Message changes Side-by-side deployments – Live feed from bgpdata3.netsec.colostate.edu Updates on Updates on Receives direct peering data as well as chains from BGPmons at RouteViews. IntroductionDeployment Updates DIY Demos

DIY Perl Tools Open source Perl Modules Available on CPAN – BGPmon-core Fetch, Translate, Configure, Log – BGPmon-Archiver Standalone application + modules – BGPmon-AnalyticsDB Experimental relational database – BGPmon-CPM Critical prefix discover and management IntroductionDeployment DIY DemosUpdates

Example Client: Counts Path Changes for a Specific Peer use BGPmon::Fetch qw/connect_bgpdata read_xml_message is_connected/; use BGPmon::Translator::XFB2PerlHash::Simpler qw/parse_xml_msg extract_nlri extract_aspath/; connect_bgpdata($source, $port); while(is_connected()){ my $msg = read_xml_message(); parse_xml_msg($msg); = extract_aspath(); = extract_nlri(); num_orig_change += 1 if rib->{$_} } } IntroductionDeployment DIY DemosUpdates

Conclusions RouteViews+BGPmon is a public infrastructure and a valuable community resource Our deployment spans 6 continents and comprises over 200 peers Internet-wide and organization specific BGP monitoring are well supported Try out our DIY Perl tools! IntroductionDeploymentDemosUpdatesDIY

Acknowledgements RouteViews Team – John Kemp – David Meyer BGPmon Team – Catherine Olschanowsky – Lawrence Weikum – Kaustubh Gadhari – Lixia Zhang – Christos Papadopoulos Previous Team Members – Daniel Massey IPv4 Demo (ISI) – Yuri Pradkin – John Heidemann IntroductionDeploymentDemosUpdatesDIY This material is based upon work supported by Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, Cyber Security Division, via SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific under Contract No. N C Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of SSC-Pacific. This work has been supported by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate contract number N C-2028 and the National Science Foundation’s CISE Research Infrastructure (CRI) Program contract number CNS