Overview An emerging challenge A belated response Debating the alternatives – Air-Sea Battle – A distant blockade – Maritime denial Conclusions

An emerging challenge Motivation – Countering US power projection The shocks of 1991 and Capabilities and doctrine – Conventional An evolving “reconnaissance-strike complex” “Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines” – Nuclear

China’s evolving reconnaissance-strike complex ReconnaissanceStrike Offense Satellites OTH radar UAVs C4ISR Ballistic missiles Cruise missiles Torpedoes Defense ASAT Cyber EW OPSEC, CCD Mobility IAD Hardening [BMD] [ASW]

Implications for the US Growing vulnerability of forward forces, bases Rising potential costs of intervention Doubts about credibility of security guarantees Increasing costs of long-term competition Increasing risk of deterrence failure

A belated US response Obstacles: – Intelligence failures – Conceptual shortcomings – Distraction – Service preferences – Money

Evaluating the alternatives: An overview of the debate Two approaches – Direct: Air-Sea Battle – Indirect: Distant blockade and Maritime denial Four criteria – Deterrence and crisis stability* – War-fighting and escalation control** – Long-term competition – Reassurance Trade-offs and tensions Implications for force posture and budgets

Air-Sea Battle Recognizing the A2/AD challenge – 1991: Gulf War – 1997: National Defense Panel report – 2001: QDR – October 2008: “Pacific Vision” wargames Crafting a response – July 2009: SecDef Gates memo – February 2010: QDR – May 2010: CSBA monograph – November 2011: Joint Operational Access Concept – May 2013: unclass Air-Sea Battle Office paper

Air-Sea Battle Concept – What? “Disrupt” (C4ISR) “Destroy” (A2/AD weapons and platforms) “Defeat” (weapons ‘post-launch’) – How? “Networked, integrated, attack in depth…” Kinetic and non-kinetic attacks Active and passive defenses Pros and cons – Escalatory risks – Would require significant new capabilities, but… – Militarily essential? – Would impose costs in return – A potentially effective deterrent

Distant blockade Concept – Avoid strikes on mainland – Interdict energy SLOCs at distant chokepoints Pros and cons – Implementation challenges (operational, legal, economic) – Speed, extent of impact? – Could leave friends, allies exposed – Permits a sanctuary for offensive operations – If it works, risks of escalation rise, but… – Doesn’t require major new capabilities – Targets existing concerns; costly to counter – Could be an effective deterrent

Maritime denial Concept – Avoid strikes on mainland – Create “no-man’s land” within first island chain Pros and cons – Speed, extent of impact? – May require significant additional USW capabilities – Permits a sanctuary for offensive operations – If it works, risks of escalation rise, but… – Plays to US strengths, PLAN weakness – Compatible with allied defense programs

Conclusions Actual strategy will be a hybrid Certain pieces are less controversial: – Need to reduce vulnerability – Coordination with allies – Undersea warfare an area of US/allied advantage Key issues: – Offensive options: How much (what type) conventional precision strike? How much (what type) undersea warfare capability? – Defensive choices: Pull back or stay forward? Active vs passive defenses? Kinetic vs directed energy – Role of cyber – Role of nuclear weapons – Prospects for control