Trident Replacement: the practical implications Presentation to British Pugwash AGM 8 April 2008 John Ainslie Coordinator, Scottish CND

Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Targeting Warhead

“Successor” Submarine

New submarine Timeline 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Concept Design Initial Design Detail Design Outputs Initial Gate Build Main Gate

Nuclear-Powered Submarines 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 Successor MUFC Astute

Reactor for “Successor” Rolls Royce Royal Navy PWR2 P P New Design

New Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant (NGNPP) “avoid pumped flow systems” Steve Ludham RR “a modern & much simpler plant” Rear Admiral Matthews

USS Narwhal (1969 – 1999) When built - quietest submarine

Continuous Patrols One armed submarine on patrol at all times Alert – “measured in days” non-verifiable “our planned future programme should take us up to 750 [patrols]” Rear Admiral Matthews Patrols 1968-2007 300 2008-2060 ? 450 Total 750

Infrastructure - Devonport Refit Dockyard

Infrastructure - Derby Fuel Rod Fabrication

Infrastructure - Faslane Submarine Base and Shiplift

Infrastructure - Coulport Explosives Handling Jetty

Infrastructure - Dounreay Submarine Reactor Prototype & overhaul of coolant pumps

The Scottish Question 71 for 16 against 39 abstained 2 did not vote “the Parliament … calls on the UK Government not to go ahead at this time with the proposal in the White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” 14 June 2007 71 for 16 against 39 abstained 2 did not vote

If not Scotland where ? 1963 Polaris option - Falmouth

Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Targeting Warhead

Missile System

Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS) New US missile to replace Trident D5 In service by 2029 Initial concept studies started in 2007 Considered by Strategic Advisory Group November 2007

Missile options British “successor” submarine in-service 2024 – 2060 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 British “successor” submarine in-service 2024 – 2060 Trident D5 in service with US Navy until 2042 ULMS & SSBN(X) in service with US Navy from 2029

Underwater Launched Missile System “any successor to the D5 system should be compatible with, or be capable or being made compatible with, the launch system for the D5 missile” Bush to Blair Dec 2006 “concepts for future submarines may have missile tubes larger than 87 inches in diameter” ULMS Test Bed Request for Information 7 Nov 2007

Future RV system ? Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) Developed for nuclear Trident (E2 RV) Revived for Conventional Trident Option for ULMS ?

Operational independence ? “without United States cooperation … Polaris would become ineffective after only a few months” Sir Charles Ellworthy, CDS, March 1971

Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Targeting Warhead

Nuclear Warhead

The special nuclear relationship 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement Solly Zuckerman – no interest beyond Polaris Polaris upgrade – to revive relationship Peter Jones – “whether the UK had done it themselves”

The first UK thermonuclear bomb Red Snow warhead Not based on Grapple design Anglicised version of US Mk 28 warhead

The Polaris family Polaris Chevaline WE 177

Primary Secondary US or UK UK design US design Origin Cleo test W 58 Polaris Jennie Reggie WE 177B Katie Simon WE 177A Katie A Chevaline Harriet WE 177C source: www.nuclear-weapons.info

Origin of the UK Trident design UK design Anglicised US design “The warhead was designed in the UK” Bob Ainsworth Mar 08 “The warheads were anglicised by the AWE” National Archives 1978 – 1980 4 tests of UK lightweight warhead; 50 kiloton yield opened door to details of US designs; 6 further tests 1980-87 Primary uses British High Explosive Secondary probably derived from US design (as with Polaris family)

US components in UK Trident warhead … it was decided on cost-effectiveness grounds to procure certain non-nuclear warhead components from the United States. (Bob Ainsworth) Arming, Fusing & Firing System Neutron Generator Gas Transfer System ?

Future of the US nuclear stockplie Life Extension Reliable Replacement Warhead

US Life Extension Programmes (LEP) B61-7/11 LEP underway W80 LEP cancelled W76 Major LEP

US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) More reliable ? Safer More secure Increased weight and size

US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Livermore design chosen No funding FY 2008 Advanced Certification Funding request FY 2009

US Nuclear Weapon Reviews Report date Congress Commission 2008 Policy Review 2009 Posture Review 2010

Options for British warheads Life Extension or High Surety Warhead Life Extension underway since 2000 Britain will probably follow US lead

New UK High Surety Warhead Features – IHE, FRP, No Be Design Options Design Previous tests Modified UK Trident None Modified UK TD-127 ?? Anglicised US WR1 US W89

Warhead components

Reentry Vehicle (RV) case Life Extension Mk 4 RV Replace some fittings New Warhead Larger Mk 5 RV New production

Plutonium pit Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus New Warhead New Pit Fire Resistant

Pit Tube Life Extension Replace pit tube

Tamper Life Extension Beryllium No replacement New Warhead Substitute for Beryllium

High Explosives Life Extension US – replace after 30 yrs UK - EDC 37 High Explosive - replace after 16 ? years New Warhead Insensitive High Explosives Safer, Larger & Heavier

Detonation System Life Extension Replace detonators New Warhead Optical initiated firing system

Secondary HEU Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus New Warhead New HEU secondary

Interstage Life Extension Remanufacture Fogbank New Warhead Substitute for Fogbank Substitute for Beryllium

Radiation Case Life Extension No replacement New Warhead New simpler design

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System AWE vacancy Warhead Electrical Engineer Support the approval programme for the introduction of the system into UK Trident AWE website Support the approval programme for the introduction of the Mk4A AF&F system into UK Trident Beechgrove Recruiting

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System MK4A AF&F key part of US W76-1 warhead upgrade / LEP advanced fuzing options increased targeting flexibility and effectiveness increase the warfighting effectiveness of the D5 system introduced in UK Trident system by 2017

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System Life Extension upgrade to Mk4A New Warhead New design

Neutron Generator Life Extension MC4380 introduced 2003 New Warhead New design

Gas Transfer System Life Extension Acorn (UK 2005) Acorn II (LEP) New Warhead New design

Reliable Replacement Warhead Warhead Timeline 08 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 W76-0 W76-1 and Reliable Replacement Warhead Initial lifespan New AF&F Refurbished Warhead or High Surety Warhead

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Orion Laser

Hydrus Hydrodynamic Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Hydrus Hydrodynamic Facility

High Explosives Fabrication Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston High Explosives Fabrication Facility

Uranium Production Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Uranium Production Facility

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Refurbish A90

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Refurbish A45

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston New Supercomputers

Modernisation of AWE Burghfield New Warhead Assembly & Dissassembly Facility Current Gravel Gerties

AWE budget 2005 - 2011 £ million Development Running costs 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11

Tritium supply Tritium decays with half-life of 12 years 2006 2054 Tritium decays with half-life of 12 years No current source of UK tritium New facility ? – linked to civil nuclear

Lower yield warhead the continued availability of a lower yield from our warhead Future of UK Nuclear Deterrent December 2006 UK Trident warhead – yield fixed at time of manufacture. Future US & UK submarine warheads – possible variable yield.

Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Targeting Warhead

Targeting system

Transfer of US targeting data UKLO STRATCOM Omaha SACEUR Mons Belgium NOTC MoD London SWS IPT Bath / Corsham OPLAN 8044 information STRATCOM Omaha sanitised

Corsham

Corsham

Cold War bunker for PM and Queen Corsham Site 3 Cold War bunker for PM and Queen

UK Defence Communications Hub Corsham DCSA HQ UK Defence Communications Hub

Corsham Corsham Computer Centre Trident targeting

Targeting system Magnetic Tape Cartridge Target Planning (Corsham) Fire Control (Submarine) Target Change Message

Targeting system upgrades SLBM Retargeting System (SRS) operational in 2003 quickly, accurately & reliably retarget missiles to targets timely & reliable processing of an increased number of targets support adaptive planning US and UK systems

Targeting system upgrades SLBM Planning & Operational Flexibility (SPOF) follow on to SRS funded 2010 - 2012 improve flexibility & responsiveness enhance accuracy and effectiveness application in UK ?

Fire Control hardware upgrades US UK In service Mod 4 Mod 5 2003 Mod 6 Mod 7 2010

Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) [ F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k); F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k]; Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3); If(Fsum<min_pk) MIN_PK=Fsum; If(Fsum>max_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk Software for US target planning & fire control

Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) [ F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k); F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k]; Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3); If(Fsum<min_pk) MIN_PK=Fsum; If(Fsum>max_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk US Eyes Only items removed from code, tables and manuals

Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) [ F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k); F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k]; Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3); If(Fsum<min_pk) MIN_PK=Fsum; If(Fsum>max_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk Sanitised software supplied to Corsham

Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) [ F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k); F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k]; Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3); If(Fsum<min_pk) MIN_PK=Fsum; If(Fsum>max_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk US could cripple software to restrict use

Assigned to NATO ? NATO attack less likely independent attack bilateral attack most likely

Closing Points Dependence on US support Early stage of long-term plan Need greater transparency Endangered species