Coordination between Logical Agents Chiaki Sakama Wakayama University Katsumi Inoue National Institute of Informatics CLIMA-V September 2004.

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Coordination between Logical Agents Chiaki Sakama Wakayama University Katsumi Inoue National Institute of Informatics CLIMA-V September 2004

Coordination in Multi-Agent Systems In MAS different agents may have different beliefs, and agents negotiate and accommodate themselves to reach acceptable agreements. A process of forming such agreements between agents is called coordination. The outcome of coordination is required to be consistent and is desirable to retain original information of each agent as much as possible.

Purpose The goal of this research is to provide a logical framework of coordination between agents. Each agent has a knowledge base as a logic program and the set of beliefs under the answer set semantics. Coordination between two agents is captured as the problem of finding a new program which has the meaning balanced between them.

Problem Description Given: two programs P 1 and P 2 ; Find: (1) a program Q satisfying AS(Q) = AS(P 1 ) ∪ AS(P 2 ), Q is generous coordination of P 1 and P 2 ; (2) a program R satisfying AS(R) = AS(P 1 ) ∩ AS(P 2 ), R is rigorous coordination of P 1 and P 2 ; where AS(P) is the set of answer sets of P.

Example To decide the Academy Award of Best Pictures, each member of the Academy nominates films. Now there are 3 members – p1, p2, and p3, and each member can nominate at most 2 films: p1 nominates f1 and f2, p2 nominates f2 and f3, and p3 nominates f2. At this moment, 3 nominees f1, f2, and f3 are fixed. After final voting, the film f2 is supported by 3 members and becomes the winner of the Award.

Example The situation is represented by three programs: P1: f1 ; f2 ←, P2: f2 ; f3 ←, P3: f2 ←, where AS(P1)={ {f1}, {f2} }, AS(P2)={ {f2}, {f3} }, and AS(P3)={ {f2} }. A program Q having three answer sets {f1}.{f2} and {f3} is generous coordination. A program R having the single answer set {f2} is rigorous coordination.

Logical Framework A program is an extended disjunctive program (EDP) which consists of rules of the form: L 1 ; … ; L l ← L l+1,…, L m, not L m+1,…, not L n where L i is a literal and not represents NAF. A rule r is also written as head(r) ← body(r) with head(r) = { L 1,…, L l } and body(r) = { L l+1,…, L m, not L m+1,…, not L n }. The semantics of an EDP is given by answer sets (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991).

Terminology and Notation A program is consistent if it has a consistent answer set. (The contradictory answer set Lit is not considered.) A literal L is a consequence of credulous/skeptical reasoning in a program P (written as L ∈ crd(P) / L ∈ skp(P)) if L is included in some/every answer set. Two programs P 1 and P 2 are AS-combinable if every set in AS(P 1 ) ∪ AS(P 2 ) is minimal under set inclusion.

Properties of Coordination For two programs P 1 and P 2, let Q (resp. R) be a result of generous (resp. rigorous) coordination. We say that generous (resp. rigorous) coordination succeeds if AS(Q) ≠Φ (resp. AS(R) ≠ Φ ); otherwise, it fails. Generous coordination always succeeds whenever both P 1 and P 2 are consistent. By contrast, rigorous coordination fails when AS(P 1 ) ∩ AS(P 2 ) = Φ. When generous/rigorous coordination of two programs succeeds, the result of coordination is consistent.

Properties of Coordination Let P 1 and P 2 be two programs. If Q is a result of generous coordination, (a) crd(Q) = crd(P 1 ) ∪ crd(P 2 ) ; (b) skp(Q) = skp(P 1 ) ∩ skp(P 2 ); (c) crd(Q) ⊇ crd(Pi), skp(Q) ⊆ skp(Pi) (i=1,2) : Q increases credulous consequences but decreases skeptical ones. Reflecting the situation that accepting opinions of the other agent increases alternative choices while weakening the original argument of each agent.

Properties of Coordination R is a result of rigorous coordination, (a) crd(R) ⊆ crd(P 1 ) ∪ crd(P 2 ) ; (b) skp(R) ⊇ skp(P 1 ) ∩ skp(P 2 ) if AS(R)≠Φ; (c) crd(R) ⊆ crd(Pi), skp(R) ⊇ skp(Pi) (i=1,2) : R reduces credulous consequences but increases skeptical ones. Reflecting the situation that excluding opinions of other party costs abandoning some of one’s alternative beliefs, which results in strengthening some original argument of each agent.

Properties of Coordination Let Q (resp. R) be a result of generous (resp. rigorous) coordination between P 1 and P 2. When AS(Q)=AS(P 1 ) (resp. AS(R)=AS(P 1 )), we say that P 1 dominates P 2 under generous (resp. rigorous) coordination. When AS(P 1 ) ⊆ AS(P 2 ), P 2 dominates P 1 under generous coordination, and P 1 dominates P 2 under rigorous coordination.

Note When P 1 dominates P 2 under generous/rigorous coordination, a result of generous/rigorous coordination becomes Q=P 1 (resp. R=P 1 ). The problem of interest is the cases where AS(P 1 ) ⊆ AS(P 2 ) and AS(P 2 ) ⊆ AS(P 1 ) for generous/rigorous coordination, and AS(P 1 )∩AS(P 2 )≠Φ for rigorous coordination.

Computing Generous Coordination Given two programs P 1 and P 2, P 1 + P 2 = { head(r 1 ) ; head(r 2 ) ← body*(r 1 ), body*(r 2 ) | r 1 ∈ P 1, r 2 ∈ P 2 } where body*(r 1 ) = body(r 1 ) \ {not L | L ∈ T \ S} and body*(r 2 ) = body(r 2 ) \ {not L | L ∈ S \ T } for any S ∈ AS(P 1 ) and T ∈ AS(P 2 ).

Theorem Let P 1 and P 2 be two AS-combinable programs. Then, AS(P 1 + P 2 ) = AS(P 1 ) ∪ AS(P 2 ).

Example P 1 : p ← not q, q ← not p, P 2 : ¬ p ← not p, where AS(P 1 ) = { {p}, {q} } and AS(P 2 ) = { { ¬ p} }. Then, P 1 + P 2 becomes p ; ¬ p ← not q, q ; ¬ p ← not p where AS(P 1 + P 2 ) = {{p}, {q}, { ¬ p}}

Computing Rigorous Coordination Given two programs P 1 and P 2, P 1 ×P 2 = ∪ R(P 1,S) ∪ R(P 2,S) S ∈ AS(P 1 )∩AS(P 2 ) where R(P,S) = { head(r) ∩S ← body(r), not (head(r) \ S) | r ∈ P and r S ∈ P S } and not (head(r) \ S) = { not L | L ∈ head(r) \ S }. When AS(P 1 )∩AS(P 2 )=Φ, P 1 ×P 2 is undefined.

Theorem Let P 1 and P 2 be two programs. Then, AS(P 1 × P 2 ) = AS(P 1 ) ∩ AS(P 2 ).

Example P 1 : p ← not q, not r, q ← not p, not r, r ← not p, not q, P 2 : p ; q ; ¬ r ← not r, where AS(P 1 ) = {{p},{q},{r} }, AS(P 2 ) = {{p},{q},{ ¬ r}}, and AS(P 1 ) ∩AS(P 2 )={{p},{q}}. Then, P 1 × P 2 becomes p ← not q, not r, q ← not p, not r, p ← not r, not q, not ¬ r, q ← not r, not p, not ¬ r, where AS(P 1 × P 2 ) = {{p}, {q}}

Algebraic Properties The operations + and × are commutative and associative. When generous/rigorous coordination are done among more than two agents, the order of computing coordination does not affect the result of final outcome. Two types of coordination are mixed among agents, but they are neither absorptive nor distributive.

Discussion When a set of answer sets is given, it is not difficult to construct a program which has exactly those answer sets. Given a set of answer sets { S 1,..., S m }, 1. Compute the DNF S 1 ∨・・・∨ S m, 2. Convert it into the CNF R 1 ∧・・・∧ R n, 3. The set of facts {R 1,..., R n } has the answer sets { S 1,..., S m }.

Discussion P 1 : sweet ← apple, apple ← P 2 : red ← apple, apple ← where AS(P 1 )={{ sweet, apple }} and AS(P 2 )={{ red, apple }}. To get generous coordination, taking the DNF of each answer set produces (sweet ∧ apple) ∨ (red ∧ apple). Converting it into the CNF, it becomes (sweet ∨ red) ∧ apple.

Discussion As a result, the set of facts Q: sweet ; red ← apple ← is a program which is generous coordination. On the other hand, P 1 + P 2 becomes sweet ; red ← apple, apple ← after eliminating redundant rules.

Discussion Q and P 1 + P 2 have the same meaning. Which program is more preferable as a result of coordination? We would like to include as much information as possible from the original programs. Comparing Q with P 1 + P 2, information of dependency between sweet (or red) and apple is lost in Q.

Discussion Generally, if there exist different candidates for coordination between two programs, a program which is syntactically closer to the original ones is preferred. How to measure such “syntactical closeness” between programs? We prefer a result of coordination which inherits dependency relations from the original programs as much as possible.

Discussion Let (L 1,L 2 ) be a pair of ground literals s.t. L 1 depends on L 2 in the dependency graph of P. Let δ(P) be the collection of such pairs in P. Let P 3 and P 4 be two different programs which are candidates of coordination between P 1 and P 2. We say that P 3 is preferable to P 4 if Δ(δ(P 3 ), δ(P 1 ) ∪ δ(P 2 ) ) ⊂ Δ(δ(P 4 ), δ(P 1 ) ∪ δ(P 2 ) ), where Δ(S,T) represents symmetric difference between two sets S and T.

Discussion P 1 : sweet ← apple, apple ←. P 2 : red ← apple, apple ←. Q: sweet ; red ←, apple ←. P 1 + P 2 :sweet ; red ← apple,apple ←. δ(P 1 )={ (sweet, apple) }, δ (P 2 )={ (red, apple) }, δ (Q)=Φ, and δ (P 1 + P 2 )={ (sweet, apple), (red, apple) }. Then, Δ(δ(P 1 + P 2 ), δ(P 1 ) ∪ δ(P 2 ) ) ⊂ Δ(δ(Q), δ(P 1 ) ∪ δ(P 2 ) ), so we conclude that P 1 + P 2 is preferable to Q.

Final Remarks From the viewpoint of answer set programming, the process of computing coordination is considered a program development under a specification that requests a program reflecting the meanings of two or more programs. Future work includes investigation of other types of coordination and collaboration, and their characterization in terms of computational logic.