A rose (cartel) by any other name? – The economics of pay-for-delay settlements Mat Hughes – November 2013 www.alixpartners.com.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Presented by Richard J. Berman, Partner Arent Fox LLP Washington, DC
Advertisements

12 MONOPOLY CHAPTER.
IMPACT ESTIMATION PROJECT h o r i z o n s c a n n i n g Anti-trust issues in on-line retailing Ed Smith Director Office of Fair Trading The views expressed.
Chapter 5: Mutual Assent
Damages Calculations in Infringement Cases Frank S. Farrell F.S. Farrell, LLC 7101 York Ave., So.; Suite 305 Edina, MN Phone: (952) Fax:
Copyright©2004 South-Western 15 Monopoly. Copyright © 2004 South-Western While a competitive firm is a price taker, a monopoly firm is a price maker.
The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents Brief Overview.
IMPACT ESTIMATION PROJECT h o r i z o n s c a n n i n g Observations on retail-MFNs and RPM Nelson Jung Director, Mergers Office of Fair Trading The views.
International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation Edwin L.C. Lai Journal of Development Economics 55 (February 1998):
IP rights and competition law: Friends or foes? Etienne Wéry Attorney at the bars of Paris and Brussels Lecturer at Robert Schuman University (Strasbourg)
COSTS AGREEMENTS AND DISCLOSURES BAR ASSOCIATION CPD SEMINAR 2 AUGUST 2007 By Roger Traves SC.
Mediation and the Trial Civil Procedure Reforms practice direction Law Society of the Northern Territory Steve Walsh QC Alistair Wyvill SC.
Ratio Analysis.
WHY DO SOME FIRMS SUCCEED? Why do some firms succeed and others fail? Possible explanations include- Luck. How does this help us understand decision-making?
Monopoly While a competitive firm is a price taker, a monopoly firm is a price maker. A firm is considered a monopoly if it is the sole seller of.
I. A Simple Model. Players: Sellers, I and E, and a consumer Period 1: Seller I and the buyer can make an exclusive contract. Period 2: Seller E decides.
12 MONOPOLY CHAPTER.
© 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 2e. Fernando & Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Chapter 14 Monopoly.
12 MONOPOLY CHAPTER.
CHAPTER 8: SECTION 1 A Perfectly Competitive Market
 Market research is the process of gathering information which will make you more aware of how the people you hope to sell to will react to your current.
A New Pathway for Follow-on Biologics Presented by: Steve Nash May 7, 2010.
The U.S. Patent System is Changing – A Summary of the New Patent Reform Law.
SUCCESS AND LAWYERS’ FEES IN TURKEY Av Cumhur Kemal Turam Member, Bar of Istanbul.
CHAPTER Section 16.1 Legal Issues Section 16.2 Insurance Protecting Your Business.
When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T Explain the effects of regulation of natural monopoly.
Authorized Generics: Good For Everyone (Even Generics) Jerome A. Swindell Senior Counsel.
Industrial Economics Fall INFORMATION Basic economic theories: Full (perfect) information In reality, information is limited. Consumers do not know.
Chapter 15 notes Monopolies.
Patent Damages and Free Options Jerry Hausman MIT February 15,
Explorations in Economics
Copyright©2004 South-Western Monopoly. Copyright © 2004 South-Western While a competitive firm is a price taker, a monopoly firm is a price maker.
H I R S C H & P A R T N E R S A v o c a t S o l i c i t o r R e c h t s a n w a l t Pharmaceutical settlement agreements and competition law A litigation.
When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T Explain the effects of regulation of natural monopoly.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Monopoly Chapter 12.
Evaluating Monopoly Comparison with Perfect Competition.
 How firms compete Easy as PIE: Presenting in English 09/03/2011.
The FTC, Pharmaceuticals, Antitrust & IP: A Grab Bag October 23, 2008 This presentation was prepared from public sources. The views expressed herein do.
Chapter 3 Arbitrage and Financial Decision Making
Antitrust. “Is there not a causal connection between the development of these huge, indomitable trusts and the horrible crimes now under investigation?
How to assess vertical mergers cast your vote! Miguel de la Mano* Member of the Chief Economist Team DG COMP, European Commission *The views expressed.
Merger Antitrust Law Fundamentals Dale Collins Shearman & Sterling LLP April 18, 2013.
A monopolistically competitive market is characterized by three attributes: many firms, differentiated products, and free entry. The equilibrium in a monopolistically.
Monopoly CHAPTER 12. After studying this chapter you will be able to Explain how monopoly arises and distinguish between single-price monopoly and price-discriminating.
© 2009 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Essentials of Economics Hubbard/O’Brien, 2e. Fernando & Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Chapter 9 Monopoly and Antitrust.
1. Introduction to Price Fixing: Legal and Economic Foundations Antitrust Law Fall 2014 Yale Law School Dale Collins MORE SLIDES FOR CLASS.
Judge Sarah S. Vance, Eastern District of Louisiana Establishing Damages Under U.S. Antitrust Law.
Antitrust in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Introduction to Brand-Generic Competition Scott Hemphill New York State Office of the Attorney General George.
Chapter 13: Predatory Conduct: recent developments 1 Predatory Conduct: Recent Developments.
Medicines and the Poor: What Role for Competition Law & Policy? Mariana Tavares de Araujo Competition Department, Head SDE, Ministry of Justice, Brazil.
MONOPOLY 12 CHAPTER. Objectives After studying this chapter, you will able to  Explain how monopoly arises and distinguish between single-price monopoly.
1 Economic Analysis in Competition Law – A Lawyer’s Perspective A. Douglas Melamed March 23, 2009.
GTA Rate Review Chairman’s Recommendation. The Chairman has opined… 2.
MONEY. Why do we need money? ► Key Economic Concepts: ► Barter ► Exchange ► Markets ► Price.
Market Structures Chapter 7. MARKET STRUCTURES AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS.
Copyright©2004 South-Western 15 Monopoly. Copyright © 2004 South-Western Monopoly While a competitive firm is a price taker, a monopoly firm is a price.
Evaluating Monopoly Comparison with Perfect Competition.
Economics ch. 7 Perfect Competition  A large number of buyers and sellers exchange identical products under the following five conditions. ___________.
Microeconomics ECON 2302 May 2009 Marilyn Spencer, Ph.D. Professor of Economics Chapter 14.
Chapter Monopoly 15. In economic terms, why are monopolies bad? Explain. 2.
Chapter 5 The Free Enterprise System. Traits of Private Enterprise Section 5.1.
I. A Simple Model. Players: Sellers, I and E, and a consumer Period 1: Seller I and the buyer can make an exclusive contract. Period 2: Seller E decides.
Recent FTC Pharmaceutical Cases: Background and Examples Sue H. Kim This presentation was prepared from public sources. The views expressed herein do not.
Patent Settlements, Risk, and Competition Mark R. Patterson Fordham University School of Law Patent Settlements: The Issues Beyond the “Reverse Payment”
1/30 PRESENTED BY BRAHMABHATT BANSARI K. M. PHARM PART DEPARTMENT OF PHARMACEUTICS AND PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLGY L. M. COLLEGE OF PHARMACY.
Ian Bracy Brian Hendel David Jones
Time Warner Rules Manhattan
The 8th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress
Monopoly.
Presentation transcript:

A rose (cartel) by any other name? – The economics of pay-for-delay settlements Mat Hughes – November

2  Economic (I): A (simple) theory of harm  Economics (II): Three key questions: 1.Would there still be scope for settlement? 2.Settlement without pay - would entry occur earlier or later? 3.What about incentives to innovate?  Conclusions Contents

3 “ Economics (I): a theory of harm  Majority opinion of Supreme Court: “An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment’s objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself” [Emphasis added ]

4  Theory of harm: consider incumbent and generic expected profits if there is patent litigation and incentives to reach a pay-for-delay settlement  Suppose that: ‒ 70% chance of incumbent winning ‒ Incumbent NPV profits of €100m if no generic entry, but if entry occurs its profits would halve to €50m ‒ Generic firm NPV profits of €20m if it can establish that it does not infringe patent(s) and ‒ Litigation costs for each party €2.5m, and the loser pays 100% of the other side’s costs. I.e. loser incurs total litigation costs of €5m Just an illustration and real life more complex (e.g. risk preferences, generic firm cash constraints, asymmetric information, different assessments of probabilities etc) Theory of harm (II)

5  EV g = 0.3 x x -5 = 2.5. Accordingly: ‒ Entry is attempted and, if successful, industry profits would fall from €100m (incumbent’s profits) to €70m (combined profits post-entry) ‒ Reduction in profits would reflect lower prices, and thus benefits to purchasers  Suppose could agree an enforceable pay-for-delay settlement: ‒ Incumbent expected profits EVi = €83.5m (0.7 ×€100m+0.3 ×(€50m-€5m)). So incumbent willing to pay up to €16.5m to preserve monopoly (€100m - €83.5m) ‒ Generic will find it profitable to accept any pay-for-delay offer over €2.5m ‒ €14m settlement window - Illustrates how pay-for-delay agreements can lead to profitable monopoly profit sharing ‒ Unlike a cartel agreement, not vulnerable to the generic firm “cheating” by subsequently entering the market  What if too many entrants to buy off? “Putting blood in the water where sharks are always near”? (SC Dissent) Might not be due to Hatch-Waxman Act 180 day exclusivity for first entrant, may still be profitable (see example) and would not observe if not! Theory of harm (III)

6  Q1: Scope for settlement? How do you get lawyers to smile for a photo? Settlement?  Simple theory incomplete. Actually need to ask what would happen absent pay-for- delay (counterfactual). Three possibilities: 1.Litigate to the bitter end (BAD/DEPENDS): -Should authorities care about litigation costs? Would you impose a new €5m tax on most profitable drugs.. R&D incentives (Q3)? -Suppose incumbent believes only 10% chance of winning and cannot otherwise settle? -Answer: Litigation (EVi = €50.5m (0.10 ×€100m+0.90 ×(€50m-€5m)) as greater than profits if generic entry of €50m 2.Generic abandons entry. People bluff! NB settlement might also involve entry pre- patent expiry (BAD) 3.Settle – entry earlier or later? (DEPENDS)

7  Q2. Third possibility – still settle, but would entry occur earlier or later?  Still settle? Growth in settlements and only 11% of patent settlements problematic (EC July 2012 report). Hard to extrapolate – litigate more/less and the existence of some settlements does not reveal if would otherwise settle (when do you fold in poker?)  Earlier or later? The clue’s in the name surely?  Majority SC opinion observed parties could still settle by agreeing that the generic could enter earlier. This is possible, and would serve consumers’ interests. Indeed, the FTC’s 2010 study indicated that: “Staff analysis of patent settlements restricting generic entry finds that agreements with compensation on average prohibit generic entry for nearly 17 months longer than agreements without payments, where the average is calculated using a weighted average based on sales of the drugs.” Would entry occur earlier or later?

8  Illustrative example easy to reach settlement - €14m settlement window. Window may collapse if can only settle via early entry: ‒ the incumbent firm loses a substantial sum if entry occurs one year earlier, whereas ‒ the generic firm’s profits from non-exclusive entry one year earlier may be small  Settlement may be difficult. Generic firm cash constraints, asymmetric information and different assessment of probabilities may all mean that cash payments promote settlement/entry  Banning pay-for-delay settlements may substantially narrow scope for settlements. The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court adds that: “Taking the prospect of settlements off the table—or limiting settlements to an earlier entry date for the generic, which may still be many years in the future—puts a damper on the generic’s expected value going into litigation, and decreases its incentive to sue in the first place. ….it’s a matter of common sense, confirmed by experience, that parties are more likely to settle when they have a broader set of valuable things to trade.” Would entry occur earlier or later? (II)

9  Are pay-for-delay agreements really akin to cartels?  Professor Sebastian Edwards: Economics is about telling stories, which capture peoples’ imagination. This requires three elements: question; theory; data analysis  Theories of harm are important: ‒ Make sense (completeness and incentives)? ‒ Encompass (competing theories/efficiencies)? ‒ What would expect to observe? Facts to look for  Facts (should) get in the way of many a good story, including admitting “don’t know”. Cartel stories catch imagination – “ "a pile of $$$" to be shared” (Lundbeck)  Any themes in economist jokes? Meet the one law we all agree on  Q3. What about incentives to innovate if within scope of patent?  Cartels: Very clear line of sight as to their consequences (particularly given damages actions).. No analogies here Conclusions

10 AlixPartners is ready to field a team of relevant experts whenever and wherever they are needed. Our professionals speak more than 50 languages and have experience in every corner of the world. Call us. We’ll be there when it really matters. © AlixPartners, LLP,