Biological Weapons Presented by Dr. Kenneth Alibek to the USAF Air War College November 1, 1999 HADRON, INC.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Chemical STRATEGICTACTICAL Biological

Factors in BW Effectiveness Choice of agent Deployment method Formulation Manufacturing process Meteorological and terrain conditions

Types of BW Threat Bacterial weapons Viral weapons Rickettsial weapons Fungal weapons Toxin weapons Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin weapons)

Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons Agents

BW Deployment Methods Vector Contamination of food and water sources Aerosol (the most effective deployment method)

Soviet Biological Weapons Developed and Approved for Use STRATEGICOPERATIONAL Smallpox Plague Tularemia Glanders VEE Anthrax Q Fever (<1990) Marburg (>1990)

Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s Ebola Bolivian hemorrhagic fever Argentinian hemorrhagic fever Melioidosis Lassa fever Japanese encephalitis Russian spring- summer encephalitis NATURAL STRAINS

Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s Antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague AR tularemia AR anthrax Antibiotic- and sulfonamide-resistant glanders Immune system- overcoming (IO) plague IO tularemia IO anthrax Smallpox with VEE genes inserted GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS

Types of Biological Weapons DRY Tularemia Anthrax Brucellosis Marburg LIQUID Smallpox Plague Anthrax VEE

BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Defense Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax  100+ tons stockpiled  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Kirov facility--plague  20 tons stockpiled  Production capacity ~ 200 tons annually Zagorsk facility--smallpox  20 tons stockpiled  Production capacity ~ 100 tons annually Strizhi (new facility)

BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia, glanders  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually

BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat (cont.) · Kurgan facility--anthrax  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually · Penza facility--anthrax  Production capacity > 1000 tons annually · Koltsovo facility--Marburg, smallpox  Exact production capacity unknown; dozens of tons annually

BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Agriculture · Pokrov facility--smallpox, VEE  Production capacity > 200 tons annually

Munitions, Submunitions, Delivery Means · Aviation bombs with “biological” bomblets for strategic and medium bombers · Spray tanks installed on medium bombers · Multiwarhead ballistic missiles with bomblet warheads · Cruise missiles with special disseminating devices (under development)

Epidemiological Pattern of Smallpox Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Tularemia Weapon Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Plague Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Anthrax Weapon Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Modes of Infection PRIMARY AEROSOL SECONDARY AEROSOL Caused by aerosols that form immediately after dissemination Affect “target objects” before sedimentation Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented, but have aerosolized again due to wind or activity (building ventilation, vehicular activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)

Modes of Infection (cont.) SECONDARY DROPLET SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who were infected by primary or secondary aerosols Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory droplet infection Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect parasites) directly or via objects, food or water, OR Transmitted by contaminated objects (without involving aerosolization)

Effectiveness of the USSR’s BW Specific expenditure value (Q 50 ) = amount of BW required to affect 50% of the population evenly distributed over one square kilometer (open area) Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE, glanders: Q 50 ~ 3-5 kg/km 2 Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry Ebola): Q 50 ~ 1 kg/km 2

Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons Physical: Early DetectionEarly Detection  Limited Capability Protective GearProtective Gear  Inadequate  Unrealistic

Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons Medical: VaccinesVaccines  Available for < 10% of known agents  Genetic engineering can render ineffective  Weeks / months to become effective  Supplies inadequate  Not cost effective Pre-treatmentPre-treatment  Depends on luck TreatmentTreatment  Marginal success

Medical Research Targets Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of infections by modulating the immune systemTreating and preventing a broad spectrum of infections by modulating the immune system Treating and preventing specific infections caused by biological weaponsTreating and preventing specific infections caused by biological weapons

Dr. Kenneth Alibek HADRON, INC Little River Turnpike Suite 404W Annandale, VA (703)