Japan's Efforts on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Regional Framework HIROSHI TAMAI Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management (STNM) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) SEMINARIO ABACC 20 ANOS November 2011 Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL

CONTENTS 2 Japan’s Position Japan’s Position State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) Regional Framework Regional Framework Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident This presentation shows neither official statement of Government of Japan nor that of JAEA.

Japan’s Position

disarmament non-proliferation Japan ： - only nation suffered by Atomic Bomb - actively promotes the policy on peaceful nuclear activity Japan’s Policy on Peaceful Nuclear Activity Memorial Dome (Hypocentre in Hiroshima) registered as the World Heritage in Dec Japan was the first bombed nation and shall be the last one. Atomic Energy Basic Law ◆ Atomic Energy Basic Law (Dec. 1955) The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management, the results there from shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation. Three Non-nuclear Principles ◆ Three Non-nuclear Principles Nuclear weapons: not making, not possessing, not bringing in

1945.8Atomic bombs on Hiroshima & Nagasaki 1957 accepted to IAEA first application of IAEA safeguards to JRR-3 fuel 1976ratified NPT CSA in force 1977 AP in force 1999 PP Convention in force 1988 Nuclear Terrorism Convention concluded 2007 NSG Atomic Energy Basic Act 1967Three Non-nuclear Principles signed CTBT 1996 IS Broader Conclusion The Constitution Japan’s Chronology of Peaceful Nuclear Activity 1940 s 1950 s 1960s1970 s 1980 s 1990 s 2000 s State level approach

State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC)

Legislative Measures for SSAC in Japan Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors ◆ Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Jun. 1957) Chap.1General Rules Chap.2~6-1Regulations concerning individual business Chap.6-2Control concerning the uses of international controlled material (U, Pu, Th) Permission, Report, Record, Accounting and Control, Safeguards Inspection, Designated organisation Chap.6-3Concerning welding inspection Chap.7Designation and Permission, Collecting reports, Entering inspections Chap.8Penal rules Ordinance for the Use of International Controlled Material ◆ Ordinance for the Use of International Controlled Material 7 - Accountancy & Control - Safeguards Inspection

NMCC8 Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) - Nuclear fuel-related R&D activities without NM - Buildings in sites - Activities specified in Annex I - Uranium mines, etc. NUCLEAR FACILITIES - Report on Inventory & Material Transfer - Notification/Confirmation of Transfer etc. International Atomic Energy Agency International Inspection Data Processing GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Japan Safeguards Office:JSGO, MEXT) BIRATERAL AGREEMENT COUNTRIES BIRATERAL AGREEMENT COUNTRIES - Accountancy Report - Inspection Report National Inspection Comple- mentary Access Annual Declaration NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONROL CENTER (NMCC) Accountancy Report - Inspection Result - Conclusion Report on buildings, activities, etc. under AP CSA (INFCIRC/153) 8 SSAC Structure in Japan

Note: PDI does not include the person days of DIV and CA SSAC Inspections in Japan for Categories Number of Facilities and LOFs Number of Material Accountancy Persons Day Inspection (PDI) ReportsDataJSGONMCC Fabrications648631, Reactors813,323295, Reprocessing383271,8841, R&Ds, LOFs2091,93185, Total2996,572484,1212, ,177

Development of Integrated Safeguards in Japan First Broader Conclusion on Japan by IAEA (Jun. 2004) Introductory Statement of the Director General of IAEA at Board of Governors: “I am pleased to note that the secretariat was recently able to reach all conclusions needed for the implementation of integrated safeguards in Japan-the State with the largest nuclear program subject to Agency safeguards.” Facility Level Integrated Safeguards (2004-) 2004 LWR without MOX, RRCAs, Spent Fuel Storage 2005 LWR with/without MOX, LEU 2008 RRP 2011 Small Facilities and LOFs, Nigyo-Toge R&D Site Level Integrated Safeguards (2008-) 2008 JNC-1 site (TRP, PFPF and etc.) 2009 JNC-4 site (Monju Fast Breeder Reactor) 2010 JNC-2 site (Joyo Fast Reactor, Critical Assembly and etc.) 2011 JNFL-2 site (Rokkasho Enrichment Plant and etc.) Concept of IS The Optimum Combination of all Safeguards Measures available to the IAEA under CSA and AP to achieve the Maximum Effectiveness and Efficiency Reduction in Verification Effort for Declared Material, based on Assurance of the Absence of Undeclared Nuclear Material and Activities through Additional Protocol Measure Utilization of Random Interim Inspections Development of Integrated Safeguards approaches for all facilities and LOFs in Japan was completed as the end of

Contribution to IAEA Safeguards Issues  Safeguards Framework - Adoption of INFCIRC/153 - Adoption of INFCIRC/540 - IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) Enforcement of safeguards measures  Technical Projects - Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP): Establishment of safeguards measures in centrifugal enrichment plant - Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX): Improvement of safeguards technologies in Tokai reprocessing plant - Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR): Development of effective safeguards technologies in large reprocessing plant - Information Treatment Assistance Programme (ITAP): Effective evaluation of safeguards information - Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS): Development of technologies for advanced inspections 11

Regional Framework

Cooperation in Regional Framework 13 RCA (1972- ) ‘Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific’ - Research, Development, Training in Nuclear Science and Technology - 17 member states FNCA (1990- ) ‘ Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia’ -Socioeconomic development in peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear technology -12 member states APSN (2009- ) ‘Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network’ - Improvement of quality, effectiveness, efficiency of safeguards implementation - 14 member states Research & Development in Asia & Pacific Japan’s Standpoint Support cooperation - material/equipment for nuclear plant - domestic framework to ensure 3S aiming at peaceful use Bilateral Cooperation Agreement Background of Nuclear Renaissance in 21 Century Energy Security & Environmental Security => Revival of Nuclear Energy New comer countries to have Nuclear Power Plant => Support for infrastructure

・ Peaceful use of Nuclear Materials => Ensuring Safeguards, Security/PP ・ Export/Import of nuclear materials, Technical cooperation, Transfer ・ Regulation on enrichment and reprocessing Bilateral Cooperation Agreements between Japan signed Nations concluded/signed the Agreement/Memorandum between Japan signed signed MoC MoC signed Other MoC (Memorandum of Cooperation ): Italy, Kuwait, Mongolia, Poland, UAE Negotiation in progress Other Negotiation in progress: India, South Africa, Turkey, UAE 14

To provide participants with institutional and operational concepts and technology in the areas of nuclear material accountancy and control systems. To enable participants to initiate, operate and maintain such systems in their countries to meet national safeguards objectives. To meet international standard required by the IAEA. ・ IAEA Safeguards ・ SSAC ・ Accountancy & Control ・ Design Information ・ Exercise for NDA and C/S ・ Facility Visit Program Entrust IAEA SG Support Program (JASPAS) MEXT Structure IAEA, MEXT, NMCC, JAEA SSAC Training Course Purpose of Training Training Countries Lectures Request to cooperation Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippine, China, Bangladesh, South Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar, Singapore, Japan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Australia, Others To provide participants with institutional and operational concepts and technology in the areas of nuclear material accountancy and control systems. To enable participants to initiate, operate and maintain such systems in their countries to meet national safeguards objectives. To meet international standard required by the IAEA. SSAC Training Course for Asian and Pacific region is held every year. 15

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security Asian countries Domestic Organizations MEXT Building a framework Nuclear security ・Security of nuclear material, facilities and transport ・Exercise at a mock facility Nuclear non-proliferation and Safeguards EU US(DOE) IAEA Hub for International Joint Research Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security Cooperation ASNO METI NISA Cooperation ・Human resources development for Asian countries ・Training course for IAEA inspectors Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office Cooperation ROK, China, etc FNCA, APSN Cooperation Japan will this year establish a regional center for the strengthening of nuclear security, the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia” Japan will this year establish a regional center for the strengthening of nuclear security, tentatively named “the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia” under JAEA. Japan’s National Statement at the Nuclear Security Summit (2010, Washington) Kazakhstan, Mongolia (Expert Seminar in 2011) Background 16

Present Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tlatelolco (1969) Rarotonga (1986) Bangkok (1997) Pelindaba (2009) Semey (2009) (a)Total absence of nuclear weapons (b)An international system of verification and control General Assembly resolution 34/72B (1975) Obligations nuclear weapons: to prohibit and prevent test, use, manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, development, possession Control system IAEA safeguards (Regional system not explicitly indicated) Weapon States Protocol Definition by UN Description in Treaty 17

Prospect of North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 18 Mongolian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1992) Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Statement (1991) Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1997) de facto dead letter DPRK:withdrawal from NPT (2003) nuclear tests (2006, 2009) adopted by the UN General Assembly (1998) (Resolution 53/77D, 55/33S) entry into force Issues on the North-East Asia NWFZ purpose: mutual observation ? cooperation enforcement ? total/partial denuclearization ? ASIATOM ? regional backend ? member states: Japan, ROK, DPRK, (Mongolia ?), (China ?) step to function: denuclearization, verification concern: politically unstable relationship (DPRK, China, any other alliance)

Way to North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Mutual confidence building - political issue like 6-Parties negotiation Denuclearization, Verification - support by nuclear weapon states, etc. Good practice in Countries of former USSR Denuclearization (1995) Central Asia NWFZ Treaty (2009) Japan’s support for their denuclearization, verification - Equipment for SSAC & PP - Cleaning-up & Medical care at test site 19 Construction of control system (conjecture) SSAC (already fully implemented in each country) RSAC (a good model: ABACC/EURATOM) technical support, transport - Collaboration with APSN (China, ROK, Japan, Russia, USA…) - Position in NWFZ (not explicit in present NWFZ) Denuclearization

Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident

/japanchallenges/pdf/japan-challenges_full.pdf Sequence of the Accident 1)Loss of off-site power due to the earthquake 2)Diesel generator inoperable due to the tsunami 3)All motor operated pumps including ECCS became inoperable 4)Decrease in reactor water level 5)Uncovering the Core 6)Hydrogen generation due to the Zirconium- Water reaction 7)Possible fuel rod damage 21

Roadmap towards resolving the accident Roadmap towards resolving the accident 22 Step 2Step 1 11 Mar.17 Apr. 3 months6~9 months Target Radiation dose in steady decline Controlling release of radioactive materials (significant reduction of dose level) [Reactors] [Spent Fuel Pools] [Contaminated Water] [Contaminated Atmosphere/Soil] Stable cooling - Resume heat exchange function - [Unit 1,3] Flood up to top of active fuel - [Unit 2] Seal the damaged location Prevent spreading Stable cooling - Enhance reliability of water injection - Restore coolant circulation system - [Unit 4] Install supporting structure Secure storage place - Prevent leakage to the outside of the site Decrease contaminated water (decontaminate and desalt) Install reactor building cover More stable cooling - Maintain sufficient level of water by remote-control - Resume heat exchange function Achieve cold shutdown -temperature below 100 degree -below 1 mSv/yr at site boundary

Draft Items to be studied for Nuclear Material Control 23 Review on nuclear material control technology & methodology applied in TMI-2 and Chernobyl-4 Study on concept of nuclear material control & Safeguards Approach Nuclear Material in spent fuel pond (1) Nuclear Material in spent fuel pond - Analysis of possible access paths/access points - C/S measures - Verification at shipment Nuclear Material in core (Debris) (2) Nuclear Material in core (Debris) - Estimation and evaluation for initial inventory - Mapping (incl. degraded fuels, waste materials, dispersed fuel to environment) - Procedure of Nuclear Material accountancy and declaration (sample measurement, Shipping container measurement) - Verification procedure at shipment of debris (Mobile monitoring etc.) - C/S measures for core debris (if necessary) - Safeguards approach appropriate to a treatment method of debris Study on measurement method for debris

Body washer JAEA’s Contribution to the Accident 24 A. Environment Radiation Monitoring B. Environmental Radioactivity Analyses C. Resident Public Consulting D. Scientific Advice and Technical Supports E. Equipment Support (A-D Total 34,884 Man-Days since 11 March.) Monitoring car Contamination Survey Decontamination of Schoolyards and Swimming Pools Trial of remedial actions for forest Autonomous Unmanned Helicopter Public consulting Radio controlled vehicle with  -eye Scientific advice Technical support Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership Operations established on 6 May To contribute to the resolution of the various challenges for the ultimate recovery from the accident

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SUMMARY Japan has intensively promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy based on well equipped SSAC, leading to the compliance record along the international norms.Japan has intensively promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy based on well equipped SSAC, leading to the compliance record along the international norms. Japan has developed the regional support programme in aspects of non-proliferation and peaceful use, which contributes to transparency and confidence building.Japan has developed the regional support programme in aspects of non-proliferation and peaceful use, which contributes to transparency and confidence building. Aiming at NWFZ in North-East Asia, many political and technical issues are to be cleared for confidence building and RSAC.Aiming at NWFZ in North-East Asia, many political and technical issues are to be cleared for confidence building and RSAC. Lessons from the Fukushima-Daiichi NPP accident should be shared world-wide to promote the peaceful use in safe and secure manner.Lessons from the Fukushima-Daiichi NPP accident should be shared world-wide to promote the peaceful use in safe and secure manner. 26

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