Requirements for a Secure Voting System  Only authorized voters can vote  No one can vote more than once  No one can determine for whom anyone else.

Slides:

Advertisements

Similar presentations

Secret Ballot Receipts: True Voter Verifiable Elections Author: David Chaum Published: IEEE Security & Privacy Presenter: Adam Anthony.

Advertisements

A Pairing-Based Blind Signature

ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin Ronald L. Rivest – MIT CSAIL Warren D. Smith - CRV Talk at EVT’07 (Boston) August 6, 2007 Ballot Box Ballot Mixer Receipt G.

Payment Systems 1. Electronic Payment Schemes Schemes for electronic payment are multi-party protocols Payment instrument modeled by electronic coin that.

Public-key based. Public-key Techniques based Protocols –may use either weak or strong passwords –high computation complexity (Slow) –high deployment.

Pretty Good Voting (PGV) Christian Bell, Jason Duell, Amir Kamil Computer Security CS 261 Fall 2004.

© VoteHere, Inc. All rights reserved. November 2004 VHTi Data Demonstration Andrew Berg Director, Engineering.

Cryptography1 CPSC 3730 Cryptography Chapter 10 Key Management.

Key Management public-key encryption helps address key distribution problems have two aspects of this: –distribution of public keys –use of public-key.

CSCI 530L Public Key Infrastructure. Who are we talking to? Problem: We receive an . How do we know who it’s from? address Can be spoofed.

Distributed Systems1 Lecture 12: RSA Distributed Systems2 Plan for today: Introduce RSA and a toy example using small numbers. This is.

8-1 What is network security? Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents m sender encrypts message m receiver.

Introduction to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Office of Information Security The University of Texas at Brownsville & Texas Southmost College.

Remarks on Voting using Cryptography Ronald L. Rivest MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.

Homework #5 Solutions Brian A. LaMacchia Portions © , Brian A. LaMacchia. This material is provided without.

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 10. Chapter 10 – Key Management; Other Public Key Cryptosystems No Singhalese, whether man or woman, would venture.

Encryption Methods By: Michael A. Scott

Static Validation of a Voting ProtocolSlide 1 Static Validation of a Voting Protocol Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen with Esben Heltoft Andersen and Hanne.

Cryptographic Security Cryptographic Mechanisms 1Mesbah Islam– Operating Systems.

J. Wang. Computer Network Security Theory and Practice. Springer 2008 Chapter 4 Data Authentication Part II.

Digital Signature Xiaoyan Guo/ Xiaohang Luo/

INTRODUCTION Why Signatures? A uthenticates who created a document Adds formality and finality In many cases, required by law or rule Digital Signatures.

1 Fluency with Information Technology Lawrence Snyder Chapter 17 Privacy & Digital Security Encryption.

8. Data Integrity Techniques

Part Two Network Security Applications Chapter 4 Key Distribution and User Authentication.

KYUSHUUNIVERSITYKYUSHUUNIVERSITY SAKURAILABORATORYSAKURAILABORATORY Sakurai Lab. Kyushu University Dr-course HER, Yong-Sork E-voting VS. E-auction.

Identity Based Encryption Debdeep Mukhopadhyay Associate Professor Dept of Computer Sc and Engg, IIT Kharagpur.

CSI-4138/CEG-4394 Design of Secure Computer Systems Virtual Election Booth Lab Project Jean-Yves Chouinard Fall 2002.

Protocols to do seemingly impossible 1 CHAPTER 11: Protocols to do seemingly impossible A protocol is an algorithm two (or more) parties have to follow.

Security Keys, Signatures, Encryption. Slides by Jyrki Nummenmaa ‘

SSL / TLS in ITDS Arun Vishwanathan 23 rd Dec 2003.

Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms David Chaum CACM Vol. 24 No. 2 February 1981 Presented by: Adam Lee 1/24/2006 David.

Masked Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections Sam Heinith, David Humphrey, and Maggie Watkins.

Symmetric versus Asymmetric Cryptography. Why is it worth presenting cryptography? Top concern in security Fundamental knowledge in computer security.

Protecting Internet Communications: Encryption  Encryption: Process of transforming plain text or data into cipher text that cannot be read by anyone.

Introduction to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Based on:

Unit 1: Protection and Security for Grid Computing Part 2

Public-Key Cryptography CS110 Fall Conventional Encryption.

Topic 22: Digital Schemes (2)

10. Key Management. Contents Key Management  Public-key distribution  Secret-key distribution via public-key cryptography.

6. Esoteric Protocols secure elections and multi-party computation Kim Hyoung-Shick.

Chapter 3: Basic Protocols Dulal C. Kar. Key Exchange with Symmetric Cryptography Session key –A separate key for one particular communication session.

Based on Schneier Chapter 5: Advanced Protocols Dulal C. Kar.

ITIS 1210 Introduction to Web-Based Information Systems Chapter 50 Cryptography, Privacy, and Digital Certificates.

Software Security Seminar - 1 Chapter 5. Advanced Protocols 조미성 Applied Cryptography.

Chapter 6:Esoteric Protocols Dulal C Kar. Secure Elections Ideal voting protocol has at least following six properties 1.Only authorized voters can vote.

Evoting using collaborative clustering Justin Gray Osama Khaleel Joey LaConte Frank Watson.

Chapter 3 (B) – Key Management; Other Public Key Cryptosystems.

Security Digital Cash Onno W. Purbo

Copyright 1999 S.D. Personick. All Rights Reserved. Telecommunications Networking II Lecture 41b Cryptography and Its Applications.

1 Needham-Schroeder A --> S: A,B, N A S --> A: {N A,B,K AB,{K AB,A} KBS } KAS A --> B:{K AB,A} KBS B --> A:{N B } KAB A --> B:{N B -1} KAB.

1 Chapter 10: Key Management in Public key cryptosystems Fourth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (Modified by Prof. M. Singhal,

Electronic Commerce School of Library and Information Science PGP and cryptography I. What is encryption? Cryptographic systems II. What is PGP? How does.

BY: CHRIS GROVES Privacy in the Voting Booth. Reason for Privacy Voters worry that their vote may be held against them in the future  People shouldn’t.

Electronic Voting R. Newman. Topics Defining anonymity Need for anonymity Defining privacy Threats to anonymity and privacy Mechanisms to provide anonymity.

Software Security Seminar - 1 Chapter 4. Intermediate Protocols 발표자 : 이장원 Applied Cryptography.

Key Management Network Systems Security Mort Anvari.

Secure Remote Electronic Voting CSE-681 Fall 2006 David Foster and Laura Stapleton Laura StapletonLaura Stapleton.

Lecture 11 Overview. Digital Signature Properties CS 450/650 Lecture 11: Digital Signatures 2 Unforgeable: Only the signer can produce his/her signature.

BZUPAGES.COM E-cash Payment System A company, DigiCash, has pioneered the use of electronic cash or e-cash. Anonymity of the buyer is the key feature of.

Fall 2006CS 395: Computer Security1 Key Management.

1 Chapter 3-3 Key Distribution. 2 Key Management public-key encryption helps address key distribution problems have two aspects of this: –distribution.

ECE Prof. John A. Copeland fax Office: GCATT Bldg.

SOA Seminar1 Seminar on Service Oriented Architecture RSA.

Security By Meenal Mandalia. What is ? stands for Electronic Mail. much the same as a letter, only that it is exchanged in a different.

CS580 Internet Security Protocols

ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin

Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms

eVoting System Proposal

Ronald L. Rivest MIT ShafiFest January 13, 2019

Presentation transcript:

Requirements for a Secure Voting System  Only authorized voters can vote  No one can vote more than once  No one can determine for whom anyone else voted  No one can duplicate anyone else's vote  No one can change anyone else's vote without being discovered  Every voter can make sure that his vote has been properly counted

Simplistic Voting Protocol  The voter creates a ballot (perhaps via DRE machine).  The voter sends his vote to a central tabulating facility, or CTF.  The CTF decrypts the votes, adds them up, and makes the results public.

Voting Using Public-Key Cryptography  Each voter creates a ballot and signs it with his private key.  Each voter then encrypts the vote with the CTF's public key.  Each voter sends his vote to the CTF.  The CTF decrypts the votes with its private key and verifies the signatures with the voters' public keys.

Voting Using Blind Signatures  Each voter generates n sets of messages, each containing a valid vote for each possible outcome. Each includes a unique, randomly generated ID number.  Each message is blinded using a unique blinding factor. These are then sent to the CTF.

Voting Using Blind Signatures  The CTF first verifies that the voter has not previously submitted any votes. It then chooses n-1 of the sets and gets their blinding factors from the voter.  The CTF unblinds those sets, verifies that they are properly formed. It then signs the remaining blinded set, sends it back to the voter, and marks that the voter has cast his ballot.

 The voter removes the blinding factor, producing a set of votes signed by the CTF.  The voter chooses one of the votes, encrypts it with the CTF's public key, and sends it in. Voting Using Blind Signatures

 The CTF decrypts the votes, validates the signatures, makes sure the ID number is unique, and tabulates the votes. It then publishes the results of the election with every ID number and the corresponding vote.

Voting With a Centralized Legitimization Authority  The voter generates a ballot, blinds it and sends it to the CLA with his username and password (encrypted using the CLA's public key).  The CLA decrypts the data, validates the username and password, and remembers that this voter has submitted a ballot. The CLA then signs the ballot, and returns it to the voter.

Voting With a Centralized Legitimization Authority  The voter removes the blinding factor, thus producing a signed ballot.  The ballot is sent in anonymously along with a cryptographically secure checksum, to the CTF.  The CTF verifies the ballot and adds it to the tally.  Each ballot and its checksum are posted so that the voter may verify his vote.

Secret Ballot Receipts