The political economy of development in Africa Presented by David Booth and Ole Therkildsen on behalf of Tracking Development; Political Economy of Agricultural.

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Presentation transcript:

The political economy of development in Africa Presented by David Booth and Ole Therkildsen on behalf of Tracking Development; Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa; Elites, Production, Poverty: A comparative analysis; Developmental Leadership Programme; and Africa Power and Politics Presented at DIIS, March

Five research programmes that agree! TD: Why have SSA developed much slower than SEA in the past half century? PEAPA: How does emerging democratic politics affect policies for agricultural development? EPP: What motivates ruling elites to support productive sectors with well- implemented government initiatives? DLP: What is the role of developmental leadership and coalitions in development? APPP: What kinds of institutions and ways of exercising power work for development in Africa?

The importance of economic transformation for Africa To sustain pro-poor growth To cope with population growth and urbanization To improve global competitiveness To create conditions for better governance

‘Good fit’ for better outcomes Ruling political elite Sector actors (firms, farms and households) State bureaucrats

Why developmental political settlements are not usually achieved Political elites are fragmented Economic ‘rents’ are needed to cement ruling coalitions They can’t be got from taxation because formal economies are tiny Good politics makes bad economics: – Firms and farms are plundered, not supported – Fragmentation and collective-action problems pervasive for sector actors too

Why democracy doesn’t help Typically, clientelism is competive Multi-party elections sharpen the competition, and generate new uses for rents The effects on policy make it a mixed blessing: – big gestures – no consistent follow-up – resources too thinly spread

Big-picture exceptions East and Southeast Asia – Neither starting-points nor transformation processes as different from Africa as supposed Africa: love them or hate them, there have been regimes with a different sort of political settlement: Central mechanisms for developmental utilisation of rents Competitive corruption more or less controlled

Small-picture exceptions They matter, because change at the macro level may not be possible They exist, in productive sectors and social sectors The panels will be giving examples; here’s the summary...

Productive sectors They get better support when: – The politicians think success in the sector will help them stay in power – Mutual interests develop between politicians and private producers – Pockets of bureaucratic capability get created... whereas support is absent when – Competitive clientelism prevents elite consensus in favour of the sector – As a result, collective action by producers faces insuperable obstacles

Social sectors Public provision is better when: – Policies are reasonably coherent – Performance disciplines of provider professions and local governments are enforced (accountability upwards) – Local problem-solving and collective action are enabled... whereas under competitive clientelism: – Politics + aid produces incoherent policies – Provider discipline relies on generally ineffectual accountability downwards, to users and voters – Parties compete to capture self-help bodies

In both types of sector... Donor money and accountability rules undermine untidy but effective, capacity- enhancing, self-help Donor policy mantras can contribute to incoherence and rigidities which prevent problem-solving But there is another way...

Another way Start by recognising the role of political incentives and pervasive collective action problems – Their importance relative to financing gaps Firmly adopt a good-fit, not best-practice, approach Work with the grain: support processes that show real promise based on an informed assessment of political and sector incentives – Get out of the office, or else support those who can Take the message about how development happens to voters and pressure groups in the North

Next steps None of this will be easy We have good evidence but it could get better – Further unpacking the content of the collective action problems to be solved in productive and social sectors – More comparative analysis of successful cases, to distil the principles at work – Better insights into leadership roles in reconstructing and sustaining political settlements – More fine-grained Africa/Asia comparative work Meanwhile, we need much more dissemination and debate – With academic and political communities around the world – In the North, into the wider world of political discussion about aid

Thank you!