SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CORRUPTION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTERVENING ROLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE Riccardo Ferraresso Bryce Peterson Daiwon Lee John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY Graduate Center

I. Intro II. Present Study III. Methods i. Data ii. Analytic Strategy IV. Hypotheses V. Results of Analyses VI. Conclusions VII. Implications Presentation Outline

Intro Social Capital  Corruption (-)

Intro Social Capital  Governance Performance (+)

Intro Social Capital  Corruption (-) Social Capital  Governance Performance (+) Governance Performance  Corruption (-)

Goal: of the study is to examine the paths between social capital, governance performance, and corruption. Contributions 1.Clarify the role social capital plays in reducing corruption 2.Examine the direct and intervening role of governance in explaining the level of corruption 3.Cross-national study with large sample of countries 4.Potential research implications Present Study 6

7 H 1 - H 2 + Controls Gini Index GDP Mean Education # Years Democracy H3-H3- Social Capital Governance Corruption Hypotheses H4+H4+ H4-H4-

◦ World Values Survey ( ) ◦ World Bank – Governance Indicators ( ) ◦ 192 countries ◦ Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index ◦ UNDP – Human Development Index ( ) ◦ 126 countries ◦ World Development Indicators ( ) ◦ 178 countries ◦ Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation – University of Washington (2002) ◦ 174 countries ◦ Treisman, 2007 (2000) ◦ 173 countries Data 8

Variables MeanMin/MaxAlpha Corruption Perception of Corruption (n=86) /8.8- Social Capital Civism (n=86) 21.37/ Interpersonal Trust (n=86) /.74- Governance- Quality of Governance (n=86) / Controls Education (n=84)0.90/ GDP (n=83) / Years Democratic (n=84) /70- Gini Index (n=81) /

Path Analysis – Four-step process Step 1: Social Capital  Corruption Step 2: Social Capital  Governance Step 3: Governance  Corruption Step 4: Full Model Analytic Strategy 10

Findings Findings – Hypothesis One 11 Social Capital  Corruption Social CapitalControls CivicismInterpersonal Trust EducationYears Democratic GDPGini (.055)-.138* (.961)-.033 (.05)-.194*(.009)-.653** (0)-.037(.016) Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.001, *p<.05, two-tailed

Findings Findings – Hypothesis Two 12 Social Capital  Governance Social CapitalControls CivicismInterpersonal Trust EducationYears Democratic GDPGini (.119).024 (2.066).156* (.108).119(.019).655** (0)-.047(.035) Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.001, *p<.05, two-tailed

Findings Findings – Hypothesis Three 13 Governance  Corruption Controls GovernanceEducationYears Democratic GDPGini -.548**(.045).068(.042)-.190*(.007)-.296** (0)-.010(.013) Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.001, *p<.05, two-tailed

Findings Findings – Hypothesis Four 14 Full Model Social CapitalControls GovernanceCivismInterpersonal Trust EducationYears Democratic GDPGini -.553**(.044)-.038 (.045)-.125* (.779).054(.042)-.128 † (.007)-.29* (0)-.063(.013) Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.001, *p<.05, † p<.10, two-tailed

Only generalized trust is a good predictor of lower levels of corruption Social capital does not impact the quality of governance – Cross national application Both social capital and good governance contribute to lower levels of corruption – But governance is particularly important Discussion 15

Test different ways to construct social capital Include more developing countries Test mediation at country level Use multi-level modeling to test the full model Implications & Future Research 16

Riccardo Ferraresso - Daiwon Lee - Bryce Peterson - Contact Information 17