Rarest First and Choke Algorithms are Enough Arnaud LEGOUT INRIA, Sophia Antipolis France G. Urvoy-Keller and P. Michiardi Institut Eurecom France.

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Presentation transcript:

Rarest First and Choke Algorithms are Enough Arnaud LEGOUT INRIA, Sophia Antipolis France G. Urvoy-Keller and P. Michiardi Institut Eurecom France

2/29 BitTorrent Overview Web server Tracker coolContent.torrent random peer set P1P2P3 coolContent.xvid

3/29 Peer and Piece Selection  At the core of any P2P protocol  Peer Selection  Maximize capacity of service  Foster reciprocation and prevent free riders  Choice of the peers to upload to  Efficiency criteria

4/29 Peer and Piece Selection  Piece selection  Which pieces to download from peers  Should guarantee a high piece diversity Always find an interesting piece in any other peer  Do not bias peer selection

5/29  Choke algorithm  Local and remote peers  Choke and unchoke  Leechers: upload to the peers (unchoke) from which we are downloading the fastest Reevaluate periodically (10s)  Optimistic unchoke Reevaluate periodically (30s)  3 unchoke + 1 optimistic unchoke  Seeds: refer to the paper Choke and Rarest First Algorithms

6/29 :1 :2 :1 :2  Rarest first algorithm  Choose the pieces that are locally rarest  For short: rarest first Choke and Rarest First Algorithms :2

7/29 Some Real Numbers  Torrent characteristics  Torrent size: from a few peers to peers popular torrents: between and peers  Content size: from a few kB to 4GB TV series: 300MB, Movie: 600MB, DVD image: 4GB  Piece size: {256,512,1024} kB Typical case: 1000 pieces for a content  Peer set size: 80 peers

8/29 Why Studying BitTorrent Peer and Piece Selection?  Implemented in all BitTorrent clients  Very popular protocol  Large fraction of the internet traffic  Focus on efficient data dissemination  Very simple algorithms  Fast to compute  Minimal state  Easy to implement

9/29 Why Studying BitTorrent Peer and Piece Selection?  But, doubts on the efficiency  Rarest first  Poor pieces diversity (in specific scenarios) resulting in low efficiency  Proposed solutions  Source coding: Bullet’ (Kostic et al.)  Network coding: Avalanche (Gkantsidis et al.)  Refer to the paper for a discussion on those solutions

10/29 Why Studying BitTorrent Peer and Piece Selection?  Choke algorithm  Unfair  Favors free riders  Proposed solutions  Based on strict byte reciprocation  Do we see the claimed deficiencies in real torrents?

11/29 Outline  Background and motivation  Methodology  Results  Rarest first algorithm  Choke algorithm  Conclusion

12/29 Experiments  Instrumented a BitTorrent client (mainline)  Log each message sent or received, and internal state  Use default parameters (20kB/s upload)  Connected this client to real torrents  Single client to be unobtrusive No assumption on the other real peers  Connected to 80 peers selected at random  8 hours experiments per torrent

13/29 Choice of the Torrents  Real torrents (26 in the paper)  Both free and copyrighted contents TV series, movies, live concerts, softwares  Large variety in the number of seeds and leechers 0 seed, 66 leechers 1 seed, 1411 leechers (low seed to leecher ratio) 160 seeds, 5 leechers seeds, 7052 leechers

14/29 Outline  Background and motivation  Methodology  Results  Rarest first algorithm  Choke algorithm  Conclusion

15/29 Peer Interest  Peer X is interested in peer Y if peer Y has at least 1 piece that peer X does not have

16/29 Peer Availability  Peer availability of Y (according to peer X)  Peer availability=1  X is always interested in peer Y  Peer availability=0  X is never interested in peer Y  Peer availability=0.5  X interested in peer Y half of the time peer Y has spent in the peer set of peer X

17/29 Ideal Piece Selection  For each peer X the peer availability of all peers Y (according to X) must be 1  How far is rarest first to an ideal piece selection strategy?

18/29 High peer availability Low peer availability Peer Availability Increasing number of seeds Increasing peer availability 3 to seeds0 to 1 seed 20 th 50 th 80 th

19/29 Deeper Look at Torrent 8  The initial seed has not yet sent one copy of each piece (transient state) 1 seed, 861 leechers, 863 pieces 36kB/s

20/29 Transient State  Torrents with poor peer availability are in transient state  The initial seed has not yet sent one copy of each piece  Some pieces are rare (only present on the initial seed)  Rare pieces served at the upload speed of the seed, other pieces served with a capacity of service increasing exponentially

21/29 Transient State  This is a provisioning problem, not a piece selection problem  Cannot significantly improve on rarest first  Rarest first is an efficient piece selection strategy on real torrents  Network coding theoretically optimal in all cases, but more complex  Rarest first as efficient as network coding on real torrents (availability close to 1), but much simpler Large peer set (80)

22/29 Outline  Background and motivation  Methodology  Results  Rarest first algorithm  Choke algorithm  Conclusion

23/29  Choke algorithm fairness challenged in several studies  Does not guarantee strict byte reciprocation  Based on a short term throughput estimation  Tit-for-tat Fairness  Peer A can download data from peer B if: Tit-for-Tat Fairness (bytes downloaded from B - bytes uploaded to B) < threshold

24/29 Tit-for-Tat Fairness  Tit-for-tat fairness problems  Does not take into account extra capacity Seeds cannot download Leechers may have asymmetric capacity  May lead to deadlock, as it is complex to find appropriate thresholds  Need for another notion of fairness

25/29 Peer-to-Peer Fairness  Two criteria (inspired from BitTorrent)  A leecher must not receive a higher service than any other leecher that contributes more than himself Do not steal capacity if it is used by someone else No strict reciprocation  A seed must give the same service time to each leecher Distribute evenly spare capacity

26/29 Peer-to-Peer Fairness  Excess capacity is used  No need to maintain thresholds or enforce strict reciprocation  Foster reciprocation and penalize free riders  Free riders cannot receive a higher capacity of service than contributing peers

27/ Fairness of the Choke Algorithm LS  Good reciprocation for torrents in steady state  Choke algorithm biased by poor peer availability for torrents in transient state

28/29 Conclusion  Rarest first guarantees a high peer availability  No need for more complex solution in the monitored torrents  Transient state is a seed provisioning issue  Choke algorithm is fair and fosters reciprocation  Rarest first and choke algorithms are enough on real torrents  Simple and efficient on real torrents

29/29 Thank you Questions? Instrumented client available at: