Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness David Parkes (Harvard) Ariel Procaccia (CMU) Nisarg Shah (CMU)

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Chapter Thirty-One Welfare Social Choice u Different economic states will be preferred by different individuals. u How can individual preferences be.
Advertisements

Announcement Paper presentation schedule online Second stage open
Ariel D. Procaccia (Microsoft)  A cake must be divided between several children  The cake is heterogeneous  Each child has different value for same.
Multi-item auctions with identical items limited supply: M items (M smaller than number of bidders, n). Three possible bidder types: –Unit-demand bidders.
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 6 Auction Theory Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer.
Better Ways to Cut a Cake Steven Brams – NYU Mike Jones – Montclair State University Christian Klamler – Graz University Paris, October 2006.
CUTTING A BIRTHDAY CAKE Yonatan Aumann, Bar Ilan University.
Seminar In Game Theory Algorithms, TAU, Agenda  Introduction  Computational Complexity  Incentive Compatible Mechanism  LP Relaxation & Walrasian.
No Agent Left Behind: Dynamic Fair Division of Multiple Resources Ian Kash 1 Ariel Procaccia 2 Nisarg Shah 2 (Speaker) 1 MSR Cambridge 2 Carnegie Mellon.
Short-Term Fairness and Long- Term QoS Lei Ying ECE dept, Iowa State University, Joint work with Bo Tan, UIUC and R. Srikant, UIUC.
Online Cake Cutting Toby Walsh NICTA and UNSW Sydney, Australia.
NOT JUST A CHILD’S PLAY CAKE CUTTING. How does one fairly divide goods among several people?
TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND CAKE CUTTING Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia (Harvard SEAS) 1.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions Written by: Presented by: Ron Holzman Rica Gonen Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz.
Reciprocal Resource Fairness: Towards Cooperative Multiple-Resource Fair Sharing in IaaS Clouds School of Computer Engineering Nanyang Technological University,
TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND CAKE CUTTING Ariel Procaccia (Harvard SEAS) 1.
MIX AND MATCH Itai Ashlagi, Felix Fischer, Ian Kash, Ariel Procaccia (Harvard SEAS)
Network Bandwidth Allocation (and Stability) In Three Acts.
Multicast Networks Profit Maximization and Strategyproofness David Kitchin, Amitabh Sinha Shuchi Chawla, Uday Rajan, Ramamoorthi Ravi ALADDIN Carnegie.
Distributed Rational Decision Making Sections By Tibor Moldovan.
Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-Line Auctions Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan SISL/IST, Cal-Tech Hebrew University.
Online Auctions in IaaS Clouds: Welfare and Profit Maximization with Server Costs Xiaoxi Zhang 1, Zhiyi Huang 1, Chuan Wu 1, Zongpeng Li 2, Francis C.M.
The Weighted Proportional Allocation Mechanism Milan Vojnović Microsoft Research Joint work with Thành Nguyen Harvard University, Nov 3, 2009.
1 Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods Part I: Minimizing Envy Elchanan Mossel Amin Saberi Richard Lipton Vangelis Markakis Georgia Tech CWI U. C. Berkeley.
Arbitrage in Combinatorial Exchanges Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm Carnegie Mellon University Computer Science Department.
Collusion and the use of false names Vincent Conitzer
DRFQ: Multi-Resource Fair Queueing for Packet Processing Ali Ghodsi 1,3, Vyas Sekar 2, Matei Zaharia 1, Ion Stoica 1 1 UC Berkeley, 2 Intel ISTC/Stony.
Advanced Artificial Intelligence Lecture 3B: Game theory.
Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful Andrew Mao, Sergiy Nesterko.
Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Limits Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, and Noam Nisan.
An Online Auction Framework for Dynamic Resource Provisioning in Cloud Computing Weijie Shi*, Linquan Zhang +, Chuan Wu*, Zongpeng Li +, Francis C.M. Lau*
E VALUATION OF F AIRNESS IN ICN X. De Foy, JC. Zuniga, B. Balazinski InterDigital
Scheduling policies for real- time embedded systems.
MAP: Multi-Auctioneer Progressive Auction in Dynamic Spectrum Access Lin Gao, Youyun Xu, Xinbing Wang Shanghai Jiaotong University.
Dominant Resource Fairness: Fair Allocation of Multiple Resource Types Ali Ghodsi, Matei Zaharia, Benjamin Hindman, Andy Konwinski, Scott Shenker, Ion.
Introduction to Matching Theory E. Maskin Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory June 2014.
August 16, 2010 MPREF’10 Dynamic House Allocation Sujit Gujar 1, James Zou 2 and David C. Parkes 2 5 th Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference.
1 Job Scheduling for Grid Computing on Metacomputers Keqin Li Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Procession Symposium.
Automated Mechanism Design Tuomas Sandholm Presented by Dimitri Mostinski November 17, 2004.
By: Eric Zhang.  Indivisible items from multiple categories are allocated to agents without monetary transfer  Example – How paper presentations are.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Question: Is there a public decision making process, voting method, or “Social Welfare Function” (SWF) that will tell us.
John Kubiatowicz and Anthony D. Joseph
Mok & friends. Resource partition for real- time systems (RTAS 2001)
Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni Presented by: Marcus Shea.
Determining Optimal Processor Speeds for Periodic Real-Time Tasks with Different Power Characteristics H. Aydın, R. Melhem, D. Mossé, P.M. Alvarez University.
Chapter 33 Welfare 2 Social Choice Different economic states will be preferred by different individuals. How can individual preferences be “aggregated”
Presented by Qifan Pu With many slides from Ali’s NSDI talk Ali Ghodsi, Matei Zaharia, Benjamin Hindman, Andy Konwinski, Scott Shenker, Ion Stoica.
Dominant Resource Fairness: Fair Allocation of Multiple Resource Types Ali Ghodsi, Matei Zaharia, Benjamin Hindman, Andy Konwinski, Scott Shenker, Ion.
MESOS.
Lottery Scheduling and Dominant Resource Fairness (Lecture 24, cs262a)
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2016 Nov 10, 2016
CS 425 / ECE 428 Distributed Systems Fall 2017 Nov 16, 2017
An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Fair division Lirong Xia Oct 7, 2013.
Intro to the Fair Allocation
Chaitanya Swamy University of Waterloo
Chaitanya Swamy University of Waterloo
James Zou1 , Sujit Gujar2, David Parkes1
Andy Wang Operating Systems COP 4610 / CGS 5765
General Equilibrium (Social Efficiency)
COS 518: Advanced Computer Systems Lecture 14 Michael Freedman
L13 General Equilibrium.
Shanjiang Tang1, Bingsheng He2, Shuhao Zhang2,4, Zhaojie Niu3
General Equilibrium (Social Efficiency)
Matching and Resource Allocation
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Allocation Without Money
General Equilibrium (Social Efficiency)
General Equilibrium (Social Efficiency)
Chapter 34 Welfare.
Chapter 34 Welfare Key Concept: Arrow’s impossibility theorem, social welfare functions Limited support of how market preserves fairness.
Presentation transcript:

Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness David Parkes (Harvard) Ariel Procaccia (CMU) Nisarg Shah (CMU)

Motivation Allocation of multiple resources (e.g., CPU, RAM, bandwidth) Users have heterogeneous demands Today: fixed bundles (slots) Allocate slots using single resource abstraction 2

The DRF mechanism Assume proportional demands (a.k.a. Leontief preferences) Example: o User wishes to execute multiple instances of a job that requires 2 CPU and 1 RAM o Indifferent between 5 CPU and 2 RAM, and 4 CPU and 2 GB o Happier with Dominant resource fairness [Ghodsi et al. 2011]: equalize largest shares 3

DRF animated 4 User 1 alloc. User 2 alloc. Total alloc.

Properties of DRF Pareto optimality Envy freeness: users do not want to swap allocations Sharing incentives (a.k.a. fair share, proportionality, IR): users receive at least as much value as an equal split Strategyproofness: reporting true demands is a dominant strategy Exciting application of fair division theory! 5

Indivisible tasks Demands specified as fraction of resource r that user i needs to run one instance of its task User’s utility strictly increases with number of complete instances of task 6

PO+SI+SP are incompatible 7 User 1 demand User 2 demand Allocation User 1 demand User 2 demand Allocation

Envy freeness PO and EF are trivially incompatible Need to relax the notion of envy freeness [Budish 2011, Lipton et al. 2004, Moulin and Stong 2002] Envy freeness up to one bundle (EF1) = i does not prefer j’s after removing one copy of i’s task Theorem: PO+EF1+SP impossible 8

Sequential Minmax SI+EF1+SP trivial SI+PO+SP, EF1+PO+SP impossible Can we achieve PO+SI+EF1? The S EQUENTIAL M INMAX mechanism: allocate at each step to minimize maximum allocated share after allocation Theorem: Mechanism is PO+SI+EF1 9

Sequential Minmax illustrated 10 User 1 demand User 2 demand User 1 alloc. User 2 alloc. Total alloc.

Discussion Additional results in paper o An extension of DRF to settings with possibly zero demands and endowments, which satisfies group strategyproofness o Lower bounds on social welfare maximization Current work: dynamic fairness 11