Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Response Oil Spill Response 25 Years After the Exxon Valdez and in the Wake of Deepwater Horizon University of New Hampshire Center for Spills in the Environment School of Marine Science and Ocean Engineering October 28, 2014

Alaska Background oil discovered on Alaska’s North slope 1969 – SS Manhattan, the largest ever ice breaking crude oil tanker, transited from the east coast through the Arctic Northwest Passage to Alaska’s North Slope proving the need to ship oil by a trans Alaska pipeline to an ice free port 1971 – Alaska establishes the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and oil pollution statutes to prepare the state for the “oil era” 1972 – Final Environmental Impact Statement 1974 – Construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline Project begins amid promises to prevent spills and effectively cleanup any that occur Alaska enacts oil pollution statutes for oil spill contingency planning and proof of financial responsibility and the “Tank Vessel Act” to incentivize tanker safety but is challenged and preempted by federal law Construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline and Valdez Marine Terminal is completed and oil starts flowing Alaska providing 25% of U.S. domestic crude oil production. 2

Alaska’s Ocean Area 3 Exxon Valdez Spill Area

Incident Exxon Valdez foot supertanker with cargo load of ~53 million gallons ~ 11 million gallons spilled; 42 million gallons remained on board Well chartered waters - Bligh reef a well known maritime hazard CONTINGENCY PLANS National /Regional Contingency Plan/COTP PWS Pollution Action Plan (OSC Plan) Alyeska Oil Spill Contingency Plan, required by the State of Alaska - approved in 1987 Exxon Oil Spill Plan not specific to Prince William Sound or reviewed or approved No Federal Plan required Prince William Sound Dispersant Guidelines approved on March 6,

Valdez Terminal Valdez Narrows DAY 3 Zone 1

Recovery Conditions Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef at 0004 on March 24, 1989 (Day 1) 10 mg rapidly released from 8 cargo tanks Good weather prevailed and the slick remained largely intact for three days extending ~16 miles SW On the evening of Day 3 (March 26) high winds broke up the slick extending it to ~37 miles on Day 4 Oil emulsified after the storm eliminating the effectiveness and use of ISB and dispersants. 6 Emulsification – “Mousse”

March 24 – Day 1 - Friday 0004 Spill occurs 1500 Three skimmers and barge arrive on scene 1510 RRT and FOSC approve Zone 1 dispersant application gallon helo dispersant application – inconclusive 1830 State issues ISB approval ~210 barrels recovered March 25 – Day 2 – Saturday 0736 Lightering to Exxon Baton Rouge starts 1200 Exxon takes over spill management from Alyeska 1315 FOSC approves second Zone 1 dispersant request ,750 gallon C-130 dispersant application – inconclusive 1700 FOSC approves additional dispersant applications ISB conducted 2300 Five skimmers operating on scene ~1,200 barrels recovered March 26 – Day 3 - Sunday ,500 gallon DC-6 dispersant application – inconclusive, defective spray ,100 gallon SAT C-130 dispersant application – successful 1845 FOSC approves additional dispersant applications 2400 Five skimmers operating on scene ~1,560 barrels recovered Slick extends 16 miles SW of Bligh Reef. Initial Response Actions 7

Lessons Learned 8 Prevention measures including but not limited to tanker design (single hull), tanker tracking, tug escorts, navigation systems, pilotage, manning, training and safety management systems were inadequate in preventing the grounding. Double hull construction would have dramatically minimized the amount spilled. The response capacity identified in the Alyeska oil spill contingency plan was inadequate. Implementation of the approved oil spill contingency plan and the initial response to contain, control and remove the oil during the most opportune 72 hour window failed. Deployment of out of region resources to Alaska could not be logistically accomplished in the timeframe needed for immediate containment, control and removal to protect Alaska’s shorelines and world class resources. Failure to initially contain and control the oil resulted in extensive shoreline impacts, distribution of oil over hundreds of miles, unprecedented damage to natural resources and fisheries, cultural, personal and economic impacts and strident debate over shoreline cleanup prioritization, shoreline cleanup methodologies and shoreline cleanup endpoints. The ensuing shoreline cleanup program continued during summers only to 1992.

Exxon Shoreline Oiling - 1,500 miles 9

Major Changes Alaska policy ……the state would nevermore be without in region response capable of containing, controlling and removing a spill comparable in size to the Exxon Valdez in three days. State Emergency Order, issued on April 7, 1989, defined a new minimum in region response capability for Prince William Sound tankers that resulted in the creation of the Ship Escort Response Vessel System (SERVS). State legislation (HB 567) is passed in June, 1990 defining the response planning standard to ensure adequate “in region” response equipment, personnel and resources to contain, control and remove 300,000 barrels of oil in 72 hours for Prince William Sound tankers; other legislation establishing contingency plan requirements, inspections, training, incident command systems, exercises and verification are also passed. Federal legislation, the Oil Pollution Act 1990, aka the tanker act, is passed in August, 1990 including Alaska’s response planning standard; double hull requirement; incident command system; regional citizens advisory committees and more. Alaska Oil Spill Commission is created by the Alaska State Legislature and generates 58 recommendations dealing with prevention: industry, state and federal regulation, response and oversight; response implementation and research and development. 10

State Emergency Order April 7, Acquire and have in operation best available equipment and technology and the capability to respond to and arrive on-scene within two hours of notification, a 10,000,000 gallon oil spill or distressed tanker between Hinchinbrook Entrance and Potato Point including: a.30,000 feet of heavy duty, deep skirted, rough water, seagoing boom capable of withstanding and performing in a 3 meter sea state; b.Immediate deployment and management of the boom so as to contain spilled oil and prevent shoreline impacts; c.Recovery equipment capable of removing oil from water at a rate not less than 10,000 barrels per hour; d.Pumping, transfer, lightering equipment and storage capacity to receive, transfer and store recovered oil at a rate of not less than 10,000 barrels per hour without interruption; e.Pumping, transfer and lightering equipment and storage capacity adequate to remove and store oil from a distressed tanker at a rate of not less than 10,000 barrels per without interruption; f.Sufficient vessels, manpower, equipment and appurtenances adequate to accomplish all of the above.

Prevention - NOW 12 Tanker Escort System SHIP ESCORT VESSEL RESPONSE SYSTEM (Established July, 1989) Best available technology, 11 tugs, 2 escorts for all laden tankers, modern double hull tanker fleet, speed limits, alcohol screening, weather restrictions, pilotage to and from Bligh Reef, towing packages, ice radar, vessel traffic center, enhanced radar coverage, radio check-ins, closed circuit video surveillance, additional manning, and a Regional Citizens Advisory Committee.

13 Overseas Ohio Exxon Valdez Prevention

Preparedness - NOW Offshore Recovery Systems Near shore Recovery Systems 14 THEN Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. in 1989 had 13 oil skimmers, five miles of containment boom, 2,475 gallons of dispersants, no fire boom or igniters and one 12,000 barrel storage barge for spilled oil NOW Offshore and near shore recovery systems including 108 skimmers, 9 oil barges, 59,000 barrel per hour recovery capacity, 900,000 barrels of on water storage, pre-positioned equipment, 5 hatchery protection sites, 71 miles of selected boom, 3,600 feet of fire boom, 75,000 gallons of dispersant with multiple application systems, 400 fishing vessels and 1,500 participants under contract, 5 response centers, extensive training, drills, inspections, exercises and rigorous 5 year review, update and renewal of the oil spill contingency plan with public review and oversight by regional citizens advisory councils. Shoreline Protection Systems Prepositioned Response Equipment in Five Community Response Centers

Future Response Considerations 15 Response capacity must include adequate trained personnel, equipment and response resources to immediately contain and control the source of the spill and the spill itself. Response capacity must be in the area of operation. Oil spill contingency plans must include local resources, local knowledge, local personnel and local vessels of opportunity to provide able vessels and knowledgeable captains and crew with local knowledge of state waters and resources Oil spill contingency plans should meet rigorous response planning standards, include best available technology, be verified through rigorous inspections, drills and exercises and accommodate changing oil conditions. Response management should recognize and accommodate state legal authorities, state ownership of state uplands, subtidal and intertidal lands, state waters and state managed biological and natural resources. Local governments, local resources, local knowledge and local resources must be included in spill planning and response..

Questions? 16