Problem Structure and Institutional Effectiveness HARDER problems less likely to be effective Easy: COORDINATION: Big effect on shallow problems EPISTEMIC: pooling informational resources that are cheap AND states have interests in pooling Medium: UPSTREAM/DOWNSTREAM: hard to resolve but structure generates careful rules that make likely to succeed PEPI: structure leads to careful rules that tend to be “incentive-compatible” Hard group: COLLABORATION: all have incentives to contribute AND cheat NORMATIVE problem: changing norms is very hard

Problem Structure and Institutional Effectiveness Violation tolerance LESS violation tolerance, more likely institution WILL be effective Inherent transparency LESS inherent transparency, more likely institution will NOT be effective Response incentives STRONGER response incentives, more likely institution WILL be effective

Institutional Design and Institutional Effectiveness Institutional type: Procedural/programmatic – regulatory – generative Membership: more states, LESS effective Primary rule system MORE specific, MORE effective Common MORE effective than Differentiated (??) Information system: clearer, MORE effective Response systems: Facilitative, MORE effective than Clear/specific MORE effective

Assessing Effects - Change over Time Did something change? If so, when?

GATT formed in 1948, WTO formed as revised GATT in Assessing Effects - Change over Time Did something change? If so, when?

Assessing Effects – Members/Nonmembers Did Members Behave Differently? Source: Hathaway, 2002.

Assessing Effects - Differential Obligations Did regulated countries behave differently?

Sources of Compliance In Face of Incentives to Violate Altering incentives/consequences Deterrence: increase costs of violation Remuneration: increase benefits of compliance Altering opportunities/capacities Generative: create opportunities to comply Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate Altering perceptions Cognitive: provide new information Normative: create new norms and identities