Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21 st Century – Conference Review and the Future Pierce S. Corden, Visiting Scholar Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy American Association for the Advancement of Science 3 November 2013

Course Focal Points --Arms Control Specifically Primarily bilateral : building on the US-Russian framework of agreement Nuclear weapon “modernization” Monitoring and verification Arms control/weapon policies 2

Course Focal Points – the CTBT Monitoring for nuclear explosions – xenon Monitoring for nuclear explosions – seismology On-site inspections Stockpile stewardship and the NAS Report 3

Course Focal Points – Ballistic Missile Defense The NAS Study on ballistic missile defense Science, technology and politics of BMD 4

Course Focal Points – Nuclear Proliferation Evolution of the non-proliferation regime The DPRK, India and Pakistan Enrichment technologies and blend-down Monitoring the FMCT Nuclear forensics Iran 5

Course Focal Points – Mass Casualty Terrorism S&T for homeland security Risks and responses to mass terrorism Terrorism and nuclear detection Scanning vehicles for nuclear materials 6

7 Issues for the Future Global stability Understanding what “proliferation” means The moving baseline Starting from 1945 What is the current situation? Which way will the vector point? The role of nuclear energy The role of international governance

8 Stability in the International System

9 Understanding What “Proliferation” Means A state acquires demonstrated (or clandestine) nuclear weapons capability: nuclear testing, delivery means (horizontal) A state adds to its capabilities (vertical) A state gives up capabilities (reversal of proliferation) A non-state actor acquires weapons (terrorism) A state acquires latent capabilities (materials, knowledge, delivery means)

10 The Moving Baseline The number of states changes over time The number of acknowledged possessors of nuclear weapons changes The number of states with latent capabilities changes The role of non-state actors changes The international political “matrix” evolves The “big” problems: continuity and change

11 Starting from 1945 By nuclear weapon state (a defined category) By testing: 1945, 1949, 1952, 1961, 1964, 1974, 1998, 2006 Covert acquisition Delivery vehicles: aircraft; missiles; submarines; artillery; mines; people Highly enriched uranium; plutonium: nuclear reactors, enrichment plants, reprocessing The vectors over time

12 The Current Situation The world has come close to nuclear catastrophe more than once From the standpoint of net proliferation, the 1960s - 80s represent the maximum risk to date From the standpoint of proliferation “horizontally”, the situation has fluctuated, but is somewhat worse today From the standpoint of proliferation “vertically”, the situation is mixed From the standpoint of non-state actors, the picture is unclear

13 Thinking about the Future The US and RF are sharply down, from a very high level The UK and France are somewhat down, from a high level China is somewhat up from a high level India and Pakistan are sharply up from a low level North Korea is roughly neutral from a low level, but the direction of movement is uncertain The net vector is sharply down

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17 The Role of Nuclear Energy What is the issue? Brazil, Iran, India, Pakistan, Japan Latent capabilities and the level playing field Carbon and a “nuclear renaissance” Alternatives

18 The Role of International Governance Failed Baruch, Gromyko Plans Antarctic, Outer Space, and Seabed Treaties LTBT, TTBT/PNET, CTBT NPT, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok, CANWFZ (Semipalatinsk) SALT, INF, START, SORT, New START Cutoff, Security Assurances MTCR, ZBM?, CFE/CSBMs Going to zero nuclear weapons (all vectors reach zero)

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL SALT ISALT IISTART ISTART IISORTNew START StatusExpiredNever Entered Into Force ExpiredNever Entered Into Force In ForceRatified and In Force Deployed Warhead Limit NA Deployed Delivery System Limit US: 1719 ICBMs And SLBMs USSR: 2347 ICBMs And SLBMs NA 700; 800 Including Non-deployed Date SignedMay 26, 1972June 18, 1979 July 31, 1991January 3, 1993 May 24, 2002 April 8, 2010

Arms Control Timeline, Showing Intersections/Overlaps between Multi(Tri)lateral and Bilateral Tracks Baruch Atoms IAEA LTBT OST NPT BWTC ENMOD CCW [73 MBFR]CFE CWC CTBT Plan for Peace (tril) (tril) [GSE] NPTRCs N... N… N... N... N.. N.. N.. N.. Antarctic Tlatelolco Raratonga Pelindaba (LANWFZ) (SPNWFZ) (ANWFZ) Seabeds Bangkok Semipalatinsk [05]SEANWFZ [06](CANWFZ) [75 Helsinki] [86 Stockholm] CSBMS (Vienna Doc 90, 92, 94, 99, 11) McCloy- SALT I TTBT/PNET [SALT II] INF START I[II] SORT New START Zorin [CTBT trilat] Nuc.Sec.Summ. 20

The Take-Away Nuclear weapons are ultimately problematic. Nuclear weapons are fundamentally destabilizing. With good reason, the international community is nearly unanimous in a determination to eliminate them.

US “Baker” Nuclear Test, 23 Kilotons,1946

French “Canopus” Test, 900 Kilotons, 1971

USSR “Tsar Bomba” Test, 50,000 KT, 1961