Games With No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Player 2 Player 1 10-1.

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Presentation transcript:

Games With No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Player 2 Player

Strategies for Games With No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium In games where no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, players find it in there interest to engage in mixed (randomized) strategies. n This means players will “randomly” select strategies from all available strategies. 10-2

An Advertising Game Two firms (Kellogg’s & General Mills) managers want to maximize profits. Strategies consist of advertising campaigns. Simultaneous moves. n One-shot interaction. n Repeated interaction. 10-3

A One-Shot Advertising Game General Mills Kellogg’s 10-4

Equilibrium to the One-Shot Advertising Game General Mills Kellogg’s Nash Equilibrium 10-5

Can collusion work if the game is repeated 2 times? General Mills Kellogg’s 10-6

No (by backwards induction). In period 2, the game is a one-shot game, so equilibrium entails High Advertising in the last period. This means period 1 is “really” the last period, since everyone knows what will happen in period 2. Equilibrium entails High Advertising by each firm in both periods. The same holds true if we repeat the game any known, finite number of times. 10-7

Can collusion work if firms play the game each year, forever? Consider the following “trigger strategy” by each firm: n “Don’t advertise, provided the rival has not advertised in the past. If the rival ever advertises, “punish” it by engaging in a high level of advertising forever after.” In effect, each firm agrees to “cooperate” so long as the rival hasn’t “cheated” in the past. “Cheating” triggers punishment in all future periods. 10-8

Suppose General Mills adopts this trigger strategy. Kellogg’s profits?  Cooperate = /(1+i) + 12/(1+i) /(1+i) 3 + … = /i General Mills Kellogg’s Value of a perpetuity of $12 paid at the end of every year  Cheat = 20 +2/(1+i) + 2/(1+i) 2 + 2/(1+i) 3 + … = /i 10-9

Kellogg’s Gain to Cheating:  Cheat -  Cooperate = /i - ( /i) = /i n Suppose i =.05  Cheat -  Cooperate = /.05 = = -192 It doesn’t pay to deviate. n Collusion is a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game! General Mills Kellogg’s 10-10

Benefits & Costs of Cheating  Cheat -  Cooperate = /i n 8 = Immediate Benefit ( today) n 10/i = PV of Future Cost ( forever after) If Immediate Benefit - PV of Future Cost > 0 n Pays to “cheat”. If Immediate Benefit - PV of Future Cost  0 n Doesn’t pay to “cheat”. General Mills Kellogg’s 10-11

Key Insight Collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium when there is no certain “end” to a game. Doing so requires: n Ability to monitor actions of rivals. n Ability (and reputation for) punishing defectors. n Low interest rate. n High probability of future interaction

Real World Examples of Collusion Garbage Collection Industry OPEC NASDAQ Airlines 10-13

Normal Form Bertrand Game Firm 1 Firm

One-Shot Bertrand (Nash) Equilibrium Firm 1 Firm

Potential Repeated Game Equilibrium Outcome Firm 1 Firm

Simultaneous-Move Bargaining Management and a union are negotiating a wage increase. Strategies are wage offers & wage demands. Successful negotiations lead to $600 million in surplus, which must be split among the parties. Failure to reach an agreement results in a loss to the firm of $100 million and a union loss of $3 million. Simultaneous moves, and time permits only one-shot at making a deal

The Bargaining Game in Normal Form Union Management 10-18

Three Nash Equilibria! Union Management 10-19

Fairness: The “Natural” Focal Point Union Management 10-20

Lessons in Simultaneous Bargaining Simultaneous-move bargaining results in a coordination problem. Experiments suggests that, in the absence of any “history,” real players typically coordinate on the “fair outcome.” When there is a “bargaining history,” other outcomes may prevail

Single Offer Bargaining Now suppose the game is sequential in nature, and management gets to make the union a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. Analysis Tool: Write the game in extensive form n Summarize the players. n Their potential actions. n Their information at each decision point. n Sequence of moves. n Each player’s payoff

Firm Step 1: Management’s Move 10-23

Firm Union Accept Reject Accept Reject Step 2: Add the Union’s Move 10-24

Firm Union Accept Reject Accept Reject Step 3: Add the Payoffs 100, , , , , ,

Firm Union Accept Reject Accept Reject The Game in Extensive Form 100, , , , , ,