Ian Apperly University of Birmingham What is belief reasoning? (And why do researchers from the “theory of mind” and social cognition traditions find it so hard to talk to each other?) Ian Apperly University of Birmingham

Collaborators Funding Dana Samson Elisa Back Jason Braithwaite Dan Carroll Glyn Humphreys Kevin Riggs Andrew Simpson Funding British Academy Leverhulme Trust ESRC MRC

Overview Background Recent behavioural data on theory of mind in adults Observations, problems and questions about the link between theory of mind and social cognition

What is “Theory of Mind”? Folk psychology, mentalising, social cognition False belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) Ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

Background on ToM We know a lot about development We know something about the cognitive and neural basis in adults Yet we know almost nothing about the basic operating characteristics of theory of mind processes What kinds of mental representations? Specialised versus generic functional and neural processes? Automatic versus controlled processing? What role in on-going cognitive activity (social cognition, communication)?

Why is it important to study ToM in adults? Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex Lateral view TPJ TP Medial view mPFC

ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…… ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…….) is not a unitary ability

ToM inferences Sometimes we must infer mental states

Non-inferential “holding in mind” Sometimes we are told what someone thinks (and should not confuse this with what we know) All George needs is the guiding hand of a trusted friend

You was caned? Respect man, respect ToM Use e.g., Interpreting what people say in terms of what they know Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

Are ToM inferences automatic? Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci. Rationale: In a situation where there is no particular reason to make ToM inferences, will the inferences nonetheless be made?

Are ToM inferences Automatic? Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci. Condition 1: Monitor Reality Is belief monitored too? Condition 2: Track Reality and Belief Condition 3: Track Belief

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes ToM inferences are not automatic: They require cognitive control But this may not always be true

Automatic perspective taking Automatic perspective taking? (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, submitted) 1,2, or 3 discs Self / Other Consistent You / He 2 Disc position varies Self / Other Inconsistent You / He 2

Automatic perspective taking? Egocentric interference RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

Automatic perspective taking? Altercentric interference RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition. Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this information

Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition. Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this False belief + reality Unrelated belief + reality

Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition. Processing Efficiency (RT/Proportion Correct) * ~

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)

ToM Use Rationale Very easy ToM inference Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission). Rationale Very easy ToM inference Can this inference be used to guide interpretation of speech? E.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr (2003)

Instructor: Experimental

Instructor: Control

No-instructor: Experimental

ToM Use Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission). Average number of errors

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa) Using ToM information can be a difficult task-set to maintain

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex Lateral view TPJ TP Medial view mPFC

ToM processing model: (after Leslie, 1992, 2005) Observed Behaviour ToMM SP Modular: Fast, automatic, domain-specific…. “Executive selection”: Slow? Controlled? Domain-General?

(after Shallice & Burgess, 1996)

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising” Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex Lateral view TPJ TP Medial view mPFC

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising” Important role for cognitive control processes Understanding ToM will require more than understanding the functional and neural basis of ToM-specific processes Some of the “social network” may be concerned with control processes Some processes critical for ToM are almost certainly subtracted out in existing analyses Caution when interpreting meta-analyses of imaging data Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole A good design for identifying tom-specific neural regions may be a bad design for understanding whether executive processes are necessary for ToM Medial prefrontal cortex Lateral view TPJ TP Medial view mPFC

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions “Beliefs” in the ToM tradition are usually transitory states closely linked to epistemic access But enduring beliefs surely play a similar causal role in explaining and predicting behaviour “Transitory versus enduring” is an important dimension I’m not sure if it can discriminate different kinds of mental states in a clear way

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions The ToM tradition studies beliefs as the causal consequences of epistemic access. Any rational, sentient agent will have such beliefs. Contrast with social cognition tradition which tends to see beliefs as characteristics of the target - the “kind of person” they are Target characteristics are irrelevant for typical ToM problems Self-other similarity is irrelevant to these typical ToM problems Is it nonetheless an influence?

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions Self-reflection and projection (or egocentric anchoring and adjustment) are possible but not necessary processes in ToM reasoning We can make ToM judgements even when we don’t have to infer hidden mental states, when we don’t know reality and when we don’t care about the content of the mental state

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Clever new methods + Careful task analysis = plenty of interesting work Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole A good design for identifying tom-specific neural regions may be a bad design for understanding whether executive processes are necessary for ToM Medial prefrontal cortex Lateral view TPJ TP Medial view mPFC

Functional and neural processes specific to ToM? Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls Very short stories False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM stimuli?

Functional and neural processes specific to ToM? Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls Very short stories False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM-related stimuli? Responds selectively for thinking about beliefs, desires, intentions Not for people’s appearance or background social information, (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) or non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006) Responds selectively for thinking about false beliefs and non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006) Left hemisphere L-TPJ R-TPJ Right hemisphere

So what have we found? Perspective-taking in left-TPJ? (Perner et al. 2006) ToM is specific to right-TPJ and is independent of processes for inhibition and cognitive control? (e.g., Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004) We can accept that these findings are informative, but still think that other processes are equally interesting and equally necessary for ToM