Evolving Approaches to Managing Recreational Fisheries Donald Leal The Property and Environment Research Center August 12, 2009 The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council Orange Beach, Alabama

U.S. marine recreational fishing is increasingly popular outdoor activity U.S. marine recreational fishing is increasingly popular outdoor activity In 2006, 13 million marine anglers caught 476 million fish off U.S. Coasts In 2006, 13 million marine anglers caught 476 million fish off U.S. Coasts From 1996 to 2000, marine recreational fishing (# of trips per year) increased 20 percent in U.S. coastal regions From 1996 to 2000, marine recreational fishing (# of trips per year) increased 20 percent in U.S. coastal regions Nearly third of that occurred in the Gulf. Nearly third of that occurred in the Gulf.

But along with rising popularity comes a number of issues Failure to limit catch (growing share of TAC in some fisheries) Failure to limit catch (growing share of TAC in some fisheries) Trend toward tighter restrictions reflects management problems Trend toward tighter restrictions reflects management problems User conflicts over allocation User conflicts over allocation Greater angler dissatisfaction with one- size-fits-all regulations over large areas Greater angler dissatisfaction with one- size-fits-all regulations over large areas

What are principles for managerial success ? Limit the overall recreational catch Limit the overall recreational catch Generate information on catch Generate information on catch Allow flexibility to meet different angler preferences Allow flexibility to meet different angler preferences Build on gains from commercial LAPP programs through integration (transfers, pounds to # of fish etc.) Build on gains from commercial LAPP programs through integration (transfers, pounds to # of fish etc.) Mitigate user conflict and increase benefits through optimal allocation mechanism Mitigate user conflict and increase benefits through optimal allocation mechanism

Marginal benefits to recreational sector Marginal benefits to commercial sector Commercial Recreational Q =TACqcqr=Q-qc How to maximize benefits through catch allocation MB = MC

Key points: Optimal allocation depends on marginal benefits Optimal allocation depends on marginal benefits Total benefits maximized when MBc=MBr Total benefits maximized when MBc=MBr In order to determine the optimal allocation an allocating authority must know relevant segments of marginal benefit curves and anticipate changes In order to determine the optimal allocation an allocating authority must know relevant segments of marginal benefit curves and anticipate changes The market is best mechanism for optimizing allocations and achieving cooperation The market is best mechanism for optimizing allocations and achieving cooperation

Fisheries management options: Angler fish tags Angler fish tags For-hire IFQs For-hire IFQs AMOs: community quotas for angling groups AMOs: community quotas for angling groups

Fish tags can be modeled after existing programs in wildlife

And Recreational Fisheries

Current management vs. fish tags no effective harvest limit effective harvest limit shorter seasons longer seasons open to all/allocation not a concern allocations more complicated monitoring and enforcement challenges challenges mitigated requires separate data collection tags provide data no revenue from bag and size limits revenue from tag sales not integrated provides basis for integration

For-hire sector: Given the commercial aspect, IFQs appear well suited. Given the commercial aspect, IFQs appear well suited. Same management and operator benefits as in commercial sector. Same management and operator benefits as in commercial sector. Once in place, IFQs could be readily traded across commercial and for-hire sectors. Once in place, IFQs could be readily traded across commercial and for-hire sectors.

Angling management organizations Like community development quotas Assign IFQ to a well defined group. Let the group manage its IFQ and ensure it is not being exceeded The organization can trade for quota with other angler organizations or commercial quota holders.

Possible initial actions: Design pilot program to test fish tag program for private anglers Design pilot program to test fish tag program for private anglers Develop criteria for allocating IFQs to for- hire recreational sector Develop criteria for allocating IFQs to for- hire recreational sector Design test cases for allowing quota trades between commercial and for–hire recreation sectors Design test cases for allowing quota trades between commercial and for–hire recreation sectors