COMMAND AND CONTROL: The Requirements of Successful Stability Operations DAVID McDONALD-JOYCE PARAMOUNT GROUP

2 SETTING THE SCENE Serb protesters clash with French peacekeepers in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica

3 SETTING THE SCENE If it is to be successful a Stabilising Force must be sufficiently well-armed to give the local population confidence in its ability to protect them and to make a potential aggressor think twice before attacking. This means deploying well-trained, professional troops in modern armoured vehicles with sufficient mobility, protection and firepower to allow them flexibility in their tactics, proportionate to the level and the nature of the threat. If it is to be successful a Stabilising Force must be sufficiently well-armed to give the local population confidence in its ability to protect them and to make a potential aggressor think twice before attacking. This means deploying well-trained, professional troops in modern armoured vehicles with sufficient mobility, protection and firepower to allow them flexibility in their tactics, proportionate to the level and the nature of the threat.

4 SETTING THE SCENE 1.Is there a real threat to international peace? 2.Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? 3.Can we see an end to our involvement? 4.How much will it cost? 1.Is there a real threat to international peace? 2.Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? 3.Can we see an end to our involvement? 4.How much will it cost?

5 THE BASICS

6 1. The most successful peacekeeping operations have been deployments in support of previously agreed peace settlements.

7 THE BASICS 1. The most successful peacekeeping operations have been deployments in support of previously agreed peace settlements. 2. Stabilising forces will usually be relatively small, probably quite widely dispersed and generally only have enough combat power for their own self- defence. 1. The most successful peacekeeping operations have been deployments in support of previously agreed peace settlements. 2. Stabilising forces will usually be relatively small, probably quite widely dispersed and generally only have enough combat power for their own self- defence.

8 THE BASICS 1. The most successful peacekeeping operations have been deployments in support of previously agreed peace settlements. 2. Stabilising forces will usually be relatively small, probably quite widely dispersed and generally only have enough combat power for their own self- defence. 3. Increases in the level of violence are common, because the degree of consent of the local population to the presence of foreign peacekeepers is different on the ground to what was discussed in New York. 1. The most successful peacekeeping operations have been deployments in support of previously agreed peace settlements. 2. Stabilising forces will usually be relatively small, probably quite widely dispersed and generally only have enough combat power for their own self- defence. 3. Increases in the level of violence are common, because the degree of consent of the local population to the presence of foreign peacekeepers is different on the ground to what was discussed in New York.

9 THE BASICS Equipment - especially vehicles - for use in PKOs needs to be selected while bearing in mind the difficult and dangerous tasks the peacekeepers are called on to perform.

10 MANDATES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

11 MANDATES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT Any increase in the level of the threat requires flexibility in the mandate under which the PK force is operating.

12 MANDATES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT Any increase in the level of the threat requires flexibility in the mandate under which the PK force is operating. It is essential that changes in the mandate as a result of increases in instability or the potential for violence are communicated to the local government immediately by the organisation sponsoring the deployment.

13 MANDATES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT Any increase in the level of the threat requires flexibility in the mandate under which the PK force is operating. It is essential that changes in the mandate as a result of increases in instability or the potential for violence are communicated to the local government by the organisation sponsoring the deployment With support at high level and with an effective Command and Control structure in place well-trained and well- equipped troops can be very effective at lowering tension and restoring stability.

14 HEARTS AND MINDS

15 HEARTS AND MINDS Well-led troops can be the ambassadors, peacekeepers and teachers of the people they are there to protect and this is likely to be repaid many times over in years to come.

16 HEARTS AND MINDS Well-led troops can be the ambassadors, peacekeepers and teachers of the people they are there to protect and this is likely to be repaid many times over in years to come. Winning hearts and minds is not easy, nor is it cheap - but then neither are any of the alternatives.

17 COMMAND AND CONTROL

18 COMMAND AND CONTROL It is only to be expected that there will be many obstacles in the path of a dedicated UN Command and Control structure - after all, it is the tool of many nations, most if not all of which have their own agendas.

19 COMMAND AND CONTROL It is only to be expected that there will be many obstacles in the path of a dedicated UN Command and Control structure - after all, it is the tool of many nations, most if not all of which have their own agendas. Another major obstacle is the process of developing mission mandates for PK forces and the Rules of Engagement under which they are required to operate.

20 COMMAND AND CONTROL It is only to be expected that there will be many obstacles in the path of a dedicated UN Command and Control structure - after all, it is the tool of many nations, most if not all of which have their own agendas. Another major obstacle is the process of developing mission mandates for PK forces and the Rules of Engagement under which they are required to operate. It is, therefore, essential that the military commander on the ground has a degree of flexibility in his orders, so that he can ensure the defence of his own troops and continue to protect the non-combatant civil population against any increase in the Threat.

21 THE COST – AND ITS EFFECT

22 THE COST – AND ITS EFFECT The UN is increasingly starved of cash and as its financial foundations grow weaker they debilitate its political will and its practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities.

23 THE COST – AND ITS EFFECT The UN is increasingly starved of cash and as its financial foundations grow weaker they debilitate its political will and its practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities. Experience shows that the ready availability of funds to enable preventive stabilising operations to be rapidly implemented would be good budget-peacekeeping, since it is more cost-effective to use military forces as a deterrent rather than to send them into combat.

24 THE COST – AND ITS EFFECT Other agencies and international organisations have reformed themselves and shown that they have both the leadership and the political will to take on tasks which were once the exclusive preserve of the UN.

25 THE COST – AND ITS EFFECT Other agencies and international organisations have reformed themselves and shown that they have both the leadership and the political will to take on tasks which were once the exclusive preserve of the UN. ‘Democratic Interventions’ are smaller in scale and include capacity-building programmes as part of their aim. They need to be flexible, to operate at a local level and - above all - to be responsive to the needs of the community they are there to help and protect.

26 AFRICA – SIGNS OF HOPE

27 AFRICA – SIGNS OF HOPE With the UN increasingly unable or unwilling to deploy peacekeeping forces in Africa the task has devolved, like it or not, on to Africans.

28 CHANGE IS IN THE AIR But change is already in the air. The Paramount Group of South Africa is providing support with funds, training, equipment and logistics to assist the deployment of African stabilising forces to keep the peace in Africa.

29 CONCLUSION

30 CONCLUSION 1.A clear plan for achieving peace in the disputed area in the first place.

31 CONCLUSION 1.A clear plan for achieving peace in the disputed area in the first place. 2.Well trained professional troops, properly equipped and in sufficient strength to achieve the aim.

32 CONCLUSION 1.A clear plan for achieving peace in the disputed area in the first place. 2.Well trained professional troops, properly equipped and in sufficient strength to achieve the aim. 3.A secured source of funding and manpower for the duration of the deployment.

33 CONCLUSION 1.A clear plan for achieving peace in the disputed area in the first place. 2.Well trained professional troops, properly equipped and in sufficient strength to achieve the aim. 3.A secured source of funding and manpower for the duration of the deployment. 4.The unequivocal commitment of all parties to see the mission through.

34 CONCLUSION 1.A clear plan for achieving peace in the disputed area in the first place. 2.Well trained professional troops, properly equipped and in sufficient strength to achieve the aim. 3.A secured source of funding and manpower for the duration of the deployment. 4.The unequivocal commitment of all parties to see the mission through. 5.An effective Command and Control system at all levels working to a well-defined, flexible, mandate.

Thank You Questions?