INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS IN MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORS Anas A. Al-Roubaiey Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Adaptive ACKnowledgment (AACK)
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June 20092KFUPM: MS Defense
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Mobile Ad hoc NETwork 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense3 Definition MANET is a collection of wireless mobile nodes which may form a temporary network, without the use of any fixed infrastructure or centralized administration Characteristics Multi-hop communication Dynamic topology Constrained resources Nodes work as routers F1 F2 F3 D S
Applications Military and Rescue operations Extend BS range 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense4 BACKGROUND BACKGROUND MANET Applications
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense5 BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Routing in MANET MANET Routing Protocols DSR basic functions Route discovery Route maintenance
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense6 BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Route discovery in DSR S D Route Request (RREQ) Broadcasting
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense 7 BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Route discovery in DSR S D Route Reply (RREP) Unicasting
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense8 BACKGROUND BACKGROUND Route Maintenance in DSR S D RERR(5,8) Mobility of a node can break routes passing through it
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June 20099KFUPM: MS Defense
Misbehaving Actions in MANET Misbehaving Actions in MANET Securing DSR DSR vulnerable to attacks Passive ( eavesdropping) Active ( dropping packets) Proposed solutions Prevention techniques (Cryptography) Detection techniques ( Watchdog) Detection Techniques Second wall of defense Detect and banish the misbehaving nodes 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense10 Problem: In a malicious environment, misbehaving nodes may not cooperate. How can they misbehave? What is the effect of them on network performance ?
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense11 Misbehaving Actions in MANET Misbehaving Actions in MANET Nodes misbehaviour C M S Cooperative node: cooperate in both route discovery and packet forwarding functions Selfish node : Prevent data packet forwarding try to save their own resources (energy and bandwidth) Malicious node: Prevent data packet forwarding Try to disrupt the network
Packet Dropping InMANET Intended Selfish Save Power Save BW MaliciousBlack holeGray hole Non-Intended Node Errors CPU overloaded SW fault Network Errors CongestionCollisions 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense12 Misbehaving Actions in MANET Misbehaving Actions in MANET Nodes misbehaviour
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense13 Misbehaving Actions in MANET Misbehaving Actions in MANET Misbehaving model ASD RREQ packets from S to D RREP packets from D to S CBR packets from S to D M S What is the effect on the Network performance as we increase the % of misbehaving nodes?
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense
LITERATURE REVIEW LITERATURE REVIEW Watchdog IDS 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense15 How it works When a node forwards a packet, the node’s watchdog verifies that the next node in the path also forwards the packet Watchdog does this by listening promiscuously to the next node’s transmissions Problems Ambiguous collisions, False misbehavior, Partial dropping, Collusion Receiver collisions, Limited transmission power Hint: Promiscuous mode means a node accepts the packets regardless of its destination SABCD
LITERATURE REVIEW LITERATURE REVIEW Previous IDS 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense16 Mechanism Published Date RP Detection Function Misbehaving Detected Use WD Problems Solved Watchdog 2000DSRAll nodesAll Packet Drop (APD)YesNone CORE 2002All Selective Packet Drop (SPD)Yes Partial Dropping CONFIDANT 2002DSRAllAPD + Routing AttacksYesNone Patcha 2003AODVSomeAPDYesCollusion CineMA 2004DSRSomeSPDYes Partial Dropping Parker 2004AllSomeAPDYesNone TWOACK 2005DSRAllAPDNoRC+TC Routeguard 2005DSRAllSPDYes Partial Dropping ExWatchdog 2007DSRAllAPDYes False Misbehaving Cop 2008DSRSomeAPDYesNone
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense
PROBLEM STATEMENT PROBLEM STATEMENT Receiver Collision 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense18 Node A believes that B has forwarded packet 1 on to C However, C never received the packet due to a collision with packet 2 being sent from D
6 June 2009 KFUPM: MS Defense 19 limit its transmission power A node could limit its transmission power such that the signal is strong enough to be overheard by the previous node but too weak to be received by the true recipient. B C A PROBLEM STATEMENT PROBLEM STATEMENT Limited Power Transmission
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense
Study the impact of Misbehaving nodes on Network Performance Propose a solution for the two problems, RC and LPT Enhancing TWOACK reduce routing overhead Minimizing acknowledgment transmissions per one data packet Increase detection efficiency Node detection instead of link detection 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense21 PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS Research Objectives
PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS AACK Mechanism Definition Definition AACK stands for Adaptive ACKnowledgment Adapts the number of acknowledgments based on network state Components End to end acknowledgment E-TWOACK Switching system Response system Node types Node types : SDF Source, Destination, Forwarder 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense22 F1SDF2 SourceDestinationForwarders
PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS End to end Acknowledgment 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense23
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense24 PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS TWOACK – How it works
Disadvantage Detects ML instead of MN Misbehaving node still active in other links Specially in high mobility scenarios where links are changing rapidly 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense25 PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS TWOACK – Link Detection MMMM F2-F3 is ML
The order of three consecutive nodes has 4 probabilities : F – D S – F – D F – D F – F – D F is the misbehaving node because in the nature of the packet dropping attacks the attackers just existing on the intermediate nodes F1 – F2 S – F1 – F2 if S receives alarm then F2 is MN If S does not receive alarm then F1 is MN F2 – F3 F1 – F2 – F3 F3 is the MN because F2 is reported by the S and F1 as well-behave node. 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense26 PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS E-TWOACK – Node Detection
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense27 PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS E-TWOACK – Detection Procedure
PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS Switching Scheme 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense28 AACK modes AACK modes End to end acknowledgment ( Aack mode) E-TWOACK ( Tack mode) Data packets Data packets AA packets ( Aack mode) TA packets (Tack mode) One bit from DSR header is used Data Packets AATA
PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS Switching Scheme 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense29 Tack Aack
PROPOSED IDS PROPOSED IDS Response System 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense30
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense
Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation why NS-2 ? Suitable for researchers Free and open source simulator 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense32 Simulator usage survey of simulation-based papers in MANET, 2005.
Packet Delivery Ratio Routing Overhead Average end to end Delay 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense33 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation Performance metrics
ParameterValue Number of nodes50 nodes Simulation area670 meter X 670 meter Simulation time900 second Mobility modelRandom waypoint with pause time 0 Maximum speed1 (low mobility) m/s20 ( high mobility) m/s Antenna modelOmni-directional 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense34 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation Simulation parameters
ParameterValue Transmission range250 meter MAC protocol CSMA/CA WD and TA timeout0.1 and 0.2 sec WD and TA threshold40 packets AACK timeout AACK threshold30 Packets Misbehaving nodes varying from 0 % – 40 % (40% smart attackers) Data traffic CBR and Video traffic 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense35 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation Simulation parameters
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense36 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: Low speed DSR has the lowest PDR no detection mechanism used WD has better PDR than DSR partial detection for MN AA outperforms TA especially in 30 and 40 % of Misbehaving nodes All the schemes performance decreases as MN increases
AA has lower overhead than TA Reduction of TA Ack packets WD has almost the same overhead as DSR No packets are used for detection Just alarm packets are used 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense37 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: Low speed
TA has the highest delay More computation More acknowledgment packets AA has lower value than TA The intermediate nodes will not do the detection function all the time 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense38 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: Low speed
DSR and WD PDR decreases much more than in low speed, 50 % with 40% of MN High rate of broken links With no MN, AA and TA performance is lower than DSR and WD Their overhead packets due to detection function TA outperforms AA in case of 40% MN Switching overhead 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense39 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: High speed
RoH of TA increased from 16% in LS to 40% in HS AA and TA have larger overhead than WD and DSR Due to Ack packets and Alarms 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense40 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: High speed
in average AA and TA has the same AED AED is more than in LS Salvaged packets increase with HS 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense41 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation CBR: High speed
Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic For our best of knowledge, this is the first attempt to evaluate IDSs in MANETs using video traffic Not supported by NS-2. we use Contributions of NS-2 users, which have been used in publications Small experiment is conducted to choose the best video traffic type (MPEG-4 or H.264) over DSR 5 stationary nodes, 670 X 670 flat space 30 frame / second 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense42
At sender At receiver 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense43 Raw Video encoder converter Input Trace file Input Trace file NS-2 Raw Video decoder converter output Trace file NS-2 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense44 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio PSNR measures the error between a reconstructed image and the original one 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense45 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic PSNR [dB]MOS valueClass ≥ 375Excellent Good Fair Poor <201Bad
6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense46 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic: High Speed notice the decreasing of PDR to 34 % High data rate up to 50 p/s More collision and congestions AA outperform TA and DSR in presence of MN
RoH here is much less than in case of CBR data traffic rate is much more than it was in CBR TA also has a slight increase RoH more than AA 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense47 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic: High Speed
As the # hops increases, e-to-e delay increases Also, TA has the highest e-to-e delay as in CBR results In one hop all the schemes are almost the same No misbehaving nodes No acknowledgments 6 June 2009KFUPM: MS Defense48 Performance Evaluation Performance Evaluation video traffic: High Speed
CONTENTS Background Literature Review Problem Statement Misbehaving Actions in MANET Proposed IDS Performance Evaluation Conclusions and Future Work 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK Conclusion 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense In this research we continue the improvement of the existing IDSs over MANETs A new IDS is proposed and studied for addressing packet dropping misbehaving by Solve the RC and LPT of watchdog Enhancing TWOACK Technique Implementation of IDS over variable environments is a challenge. Timeout and threshold parameters should be dynamically adapted to the network speed and traffic rate
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK Future Works 6 June KFUPM: MS Defense Solve the other WD problems such as partial dropping and colluding attacks using AACK Extend the AACK to work with other MANET routing protocols Study AACK IDS performance under other popular routing protocols (both reactive and proactive). Do more performance evaluation for AACK in terms of power consumption and memory usage