1 Balancing Security and Privacy in Times of Cyberterror EDUCAUSE Midwest Regional Conference March 13, 2007 Steve Worona EDUCAUSE

2 The Internet Obeys Only One Law

3 The Law of Unintended Consequences

4 or…

5 Be careful what you ask for…

6 …you might just get it

7 Example 1: A Story from the Dawn of (Internet) Time It all started in 1995 with a simple question: What’s the best resource for filtering out adult material for K-12 students? Net Nanny Cybersitter Surfwatch Cyber Patrol Etc.…

8 Example 2: A Poll on Campaign Finance

9 Proposition 1: Who are our political candidates taking money from? This should be public information. (Agree/Disagree?)

10 Example 2: A Poll on Campaign Finance Proposition 1: Who are our political candidates taking money from? This should be public information. (Agree/Disagree?) Proposition 2: What political candidates are you giving money to? This should be public information. (Agree/Disagree?)

11

12 Example 3: Do you want Privacy or Privacy?

13 Example 3: Do you want Privacy or Privacy? Sorry, you can’t have both.

14 “You can’t have Privacy without Security”

15 “You can’t have Privacy without Security” Privacy: Ensuring that your personal information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands

16 “You can’t have Privacy without Security” Privacy: Ensuring that your personal information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands “VA Data Files on Millions of Veterans Stolen” “Bank of America Loses A Million Customer Records” “UCLA Warns 800,000 of Computer Break-In”

17 “You can’t have Privacy without Security” Privacy: Ensuring that your personal information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands “VA Data Files on Millions of Veterans Stolen” “Bank of America Loses A Million Customer Records” “UCLA Warns 800,000 of Computer Break-In” HIPAA, FERPA, etc. State and federal data-spill notification mandates

18 “You can’t have Privacy without Security” Privacy: Ensuring that your personal information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands “VA Data Files on Millions of Veterans Stolen” “Bank of America Loses A Million Customer Records” “UCLA Warns 800,000 of Computer Break-In” HIPAA, FERPA, etc. State and federal data-spill notification mandates Security: Limiting everyone’s activity to only the things they have a right to see and do Who is trying to access data (“Authentication”) Whether they have the right (“Authorization”)

19 So Whenever Anyone Does Anything Online, We Want to Know…

20 So Whenever Anyone Does Anything Online, We Want to Know… Who they are

21 So Whenever Anyone Does Anything Online, We Want to Know… Who they are What they’re doing

22 So Whenever Anyone Does Anything Online, We Want to Know… Who they are What they’re doing Why they’re doing it

23 Authentication Mechanisms Accounts and passwords ATM cards and PINs Smart cards Challenge/response systems Digital certificates Key-fob tokens Biometrics Etc…

24 When to Authenticate Each time a data element is accessed Each time a screen is presented Each time a transaction is initiated Once every minute/15 minutes/hour/day “Single Sign-On”

25 “To Whom” to Authenticate The program you’re talking to The server you’re talking to The network

26 The Trend Single sign-on With possible refresh for sensitive transactions Network sign-on Stronger authentication “Guest” authentication Wireless authentication Identity intermediaries Shibboleth

27 Another Definition of Privacy Privacy: The ability to go about your daily life without leaving a trail; the ability to read, speak, attend meetings, etc. anonymously

28 The Importance of Anonymity “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.” – Hugo Black, Talley v. California, 1960

29 Privacy 1 vs Privacy 2 Privacy 1 : Ensuring that your personal information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands. (“Confidentiality”) Privacy 2 : The ability to go about your daily life without leaving a trail; the ability to read (speak, attend meetings, etc.) anonymously. (“Anonymity”)

30 The Dilemma

31 The Dilemma We want to go through cyber-life without leaving a trail

32 The Dilemma We want to go through cyber-life without leaving a trail But we want everyone who comes in contact with our data (and with us) to be identified and monitored

33 The Dilemma We want to go through cyber-life without leaving a trail But we want everyone who comes in contact with our data (and with us) to be identified and monitored Spam Phishing Threats Poison-pen postings Baseless accusations Etc…

34 The Dilemma We want to go through cyber-life without leaving a trail But we want everyone who comes in contact with our data (and with us) to be identified and monitored Not Much Different Than We want everyone to know who the candidates are getting money from But we don’t want anyone to know who we are giving money to

35 Privacy Can Be Tricky: Consider Chat Rooms In general you have no legal “expectation of privacy” in a chat room because you don’t know who else is listening You’re essentially speaking in public You have no reason to believe a police officer (on- or off-duty) isn’t present US vs Charbonneau

36 Privacy Can Be Tricky: Consider Chat Rooms In general you have no legal “expectation of privacy” in a chat room because you don’t know who else is listening You’re essentially speaking in public You have no reason to believe a police officer (on- or off-duty) isn’t present US vs Charbonneau What are the limitations on government surveillance of chat rooms?

37 Privacy Can Be Tricky: Consider Chat Rooms In general you have no legal “expectation of privacy” in a chat room because you don’t know who else is listening You’re essentially speaking in public You have no reason to believe a police officer (on- or off-duty) isn’t present US vs Charbonneau What are the limitations on government surveillance of chat rooms? Child molestors

38 Privacy Can Be Tricky: Consider Chat Rooms In general you have no legal “expectation of privacy” in a chat room because you don’t know who else is listening You’re essentially speaking in public You have no reason to believe a police officer (on- or off-duty) isn’t present US vs Charbonneau What are the limitations on government surveillance of chat rooms? Child molestors Dissident political groups

39 The Dilemma We want to go through cyber-life without leaving a trail But we want everyone who comes in contact with our data (and with us) to be identified and monitored Not Much Different Than We want everyone to know who the candidates are getting money from But we don’t want anyone to know who we are giving money to

40 “Identified and Monitored” “Government Plans Massive Data Sweep” “Feds Get Wide Wiretap Authority” “NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls” “Finance-Monitoring Program Amounts to Spying” “Police Chief Wants Surveillance Cameras in Houston Apartments” “Future Fuzzy for Government Use of Public Surveillance Cameras”

41 Why Now?

42 Why Now? Because we can

43 Why Now? Because we can Technology now makes it possible to collect, maintain, and process everything you do Moore’s Law is not being repealed Brain = 1TB = $500 retail Gordon Bell: MyLifeBits (10TB) Library of Congress = 100TB WORM drives The Internet Archive Ray Kurzweil: “The Singularity Is Near”

44 Why Now? Because we can And so our only limitations are those we choose to impose on ourselves

45 Why Now? Because we can Because we (think we) must

46 Why Now? Because we can Because we (think we) must Why?

47 Why Now? Because we can Because we (think we) must Because it makes law enforcement easier

48 Law Enforcement and Data Specific, focused, temporary Tap, probe, monitor, investigate what’s needed to deal with a particular crime or threat

49 The Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

50 Law Enforcement and Data Specific, focused, temporary Tap, probe, monitor, investigate what’s needed to deal with a particular crime or threat Just in case Capture all possible information so that, whenever something goes wrong, we can just play back the tape

51 Some simple examples Toll-gate license-plate photos No longer needed if the bell doesn’t ring But very helpful if you want to get a list of possible suspects for yesterday’s crime Metro cards Paying for your trip Who was where when? ATM cameras If no robbery occurred, no need to retain But might have caught a glimpse of a kidnapper

52 Déjà Vu? “Homeland Security Monitored Students” “…surveillance by the Pentagon … database [of] … military protests and demonstrations at institutions of higher education …” “Although there does not appear to be any direct terrorist nexus to the event, a large gathering, especially on a college campus, may gain momentum and create public safety concerns. I do not see an issue of civil liberties being violated, rather proactive precautionary measures being taken by DHS and DoD.” – William H. Parrish, Assoc. Prof. of Homeland Security, VCU

53 Airport Security Tomorrow Airport security chiefs and efficiency geeks will be able to keep close tabs on airport passengers by tagging them with a high powered radio chip developed at the University of Central London. The technology is to be trialled in Debrecen Airport in Hungary after being in development for two-and-a-half years by University College London as part of an EU-funded consortium called Optag. Dr Paul Brennan, of UCL’s antennas and radar group, said his team had developed a radio frequency identification tag far in advance of any that had been used to now to label supermarket produce. People will be told to wear radio tags round their necks when they get to the airport. The tag would notify a computer system of their identity and whereabouts. The system would then track their activities in the airport using a network of high definition cameras. – The Register (UK), Oct. 12, 2006

54 Network Authentication Today For every bit originating on our campus networks, we have the capability to know who put it there, when, and from where.

55 Network Authentication Today For every bit originating on our campus networks, we have the capability to know who put it there, when, and from where. Will we do it?

56 Network Authentication Today For every bit originating on our campus networks, we have the capability to know who put it there, when, and from where. Will we do it? Why?

57 Network Authentication Today For every bit originating on our campus networks, we have the capability to know who put it there, when, and from where. Will we do it? Why? Who should be involved in the decision?

58 The Dilemma in Other Words… “They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” – Benjamin Franklin (1755)

59 The Dilemma in Other Words… “They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” – Benjamin Franklin (1755) “While the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.” – Arthur Goldberg (1963)

60 “The Constitution Is Not a Suicide Pact”

61 “The Constitution Is Not a Suicide Pact”

62 Or… “Give me Liberty or give me Death!” – Patrick Henry (Delegate, Virginia, 1775)

63 Or… “Give me Liberty or give me Death!” – Patrick Henry (Delegate, Virginia, 1775) “You have no civil liberties if you’re dead!” – Patrick Roberts (Senator, Kansas, 2006)

64 “The Eternal Value of Privacy” (Bruce Schneier) The most common retort against privacy advocates is this line: “If you aren’t doing anything wrong, what do you have to hide?” Some clever answers: “If I’m not doing anything wrong, then you have no cause to watch me.” “Because the government gets to define what’s wrong, and they keep changing the definition.” “Because you might do something wrong with my information.” My problem with quips like these – as right as they are – is that they accept the premise that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It’s not. Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human condition with dignity and respect. Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance when he famously said, “If one would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged.” Watch someone long enough, and you’ll find something to arrest – or just blackmail – with. Privacy protects us from abuses by those in power, even if we’re doing nothing wrong at the time of surveillance. We do nothing wrong when we make love or go to the bathroom. We are not deliberately hiding anything when we seek out private places for reflection or conversation. We keep private journals, sing in the privacy of the shower, and write letters to secret lovers and then burn them. Privacy is a basic human need.

65 The Privacy/Security Rorschach

66 The Privacy/Security Rorschach “Law enforcement is not supposed to be easy. Where it is easy, it’s called a police state.” – Jeff Schiller, in Wired (1999)

67 End